fix(compose): keep the CMS opt-in so it cannot claim the CI port
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On a CI-managed host scripts/ci-deploy.sh owns port 3002 through the blue/green slots, so a compose replica of the cms service could only ever crash-loop on EADDRINUSE — it never serves traffic, because nginx points at a slot container. Gate the service behind the `cms` profile so a bare `docker compose up -d` starts only byparr. Naming the service explicitly (`docker compose up -d cms`, which is what the installer and updater already do) still enables the profile automatically, so the compose-only install path keeps working. Keep the one port that is actually served (3002) and make the 2 GB ceiling hard by capping swap at 2g as well. Drop the green compose service (3003): the green slot only ever exists as a docker run container created by CI, so compose no longer defines it and the two paths cannot drift apart. The loopback override contract stays covered: proxy-config.test.mjs now renders the configuration with --profile cms, and a new build-contract test pins the profile and the memory limits so neither can be dropped by accident.
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@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ The direct template intentionally records the CDN/edge socket address when place
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### Local verification and deployment boundary
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`pnpm exec vitest run --coverage.enabled=false scripts/proxy-config.test.mjs` runs the installed Docker Compose CLI against a disposable clone configuration, without contacting Docker Engine, building images or reading the real `.env`. It verifies selection through `.env`, loopback/port override precedence, the IPv4 healthcheck and preservation of mounts, release selection and host networking. It explicitly skips when Compose is unavailable. This is not a container-start or network-isolation test.
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`pnpm exec vitest run --coverage.enabled=false scripts/proxy-config.test.mjs` runs the installed Docker Compose CLI against a disposable clone configuration, without contacting Docker Engine, building images or reading the real `.env`. It verifies selection through `.env`, loopback/port override precedence, the IPv4 healthcheck and preservation of mounts, release selection and host networking. The `cms` service is behind the `cms` profile (so a bare `docker compose up -d` cannot claim port 3002 on a CI-managed host), so the test renders the configuration with `--profile cms`. It explicitly skips when Compose is unavailable. This is not a container-start or network-isolation test.
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`pnpm test:integration` additionally starts disposable Nginx containers from the actual templates, supplies a temporary test certificate, and sends real HTTPS requests with forged identity headers. It checks direct-mode replacement even with an inherited real-IP rule, rejection of untrusted peers, and acceptance through an explicitly trusted peer. This requires Docker Engine and the OpenSSL CLI and does not read deployment credentials. The templates must still pass `nginx -t` on the intended host after its hostname/certificate substitution, then the listener and trusted-header checks above; the disposable fixture cannot certify that host or its firewall.
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