feat: harden atoms-nexst against review findings (37 items)

Second review pass covering security, performance, admin tooling and the
public/room flows. All HIGH and MEDIUM findings from the audit are resolved;
nothing in this commit changes the visible feature set.

Authentication & session security
- CSP is now set on the request headers in the proxy, which is what Next.js
  uses to derive the render nonce, so the nonce is effective.
- 2FA: an already-enabled user cannot re-enroll, the setup endpoint is
  rate-limited per account, and confirmed codes are persisted so the second
  secret no longer silently never applies.
- Password reset revokes the ticket, authTicket and all personal access
  tokens, and bumps the token version so existing sessions die. The same
  revocation is now wired into the staff-side password reset.
- /reset and /verify return a stable error code instead of raw text; the
  mail lookups are ordered by id so duplicates cannot vary between runs.
- Resending the verification mail gets a per-address cooldown on top of the
  per-user limit.
- Issue API tokens with the narrower radio/ticket ability set instead of "*".

Authorization & input handling
- Mid-rank staff can no longer keep dynamically granted non-view admin.*
  permissions: existing grants are revoked by migration and the grant lookup
  is restricted to "%.view". Rank guards use the dynamic super-admin check.
- Alerting a user is permission-checked and audited like the other tools.
- Material mutations (giveCredits/giveDuckets/giveDiamonds, the admin user
  actions route, bulk user actions) are capped and rank-guarded, and bulk
  ids are bounded.
- updateRoom / updateRoomItem write through a field allowlist, and items
  may only be edited through their own room.
- Classnames reaching the filesystem are validated before use so a crafted
  value cannot escape the asset directories.
- The word filter now also covers offline mails, guild forum threads and
  replies, and user mottos.
- Media uploads are validated by magic bytes, /api/media requires the page
  edit permission, APP_URL must be configured once mail is enabled, and the
  diagnostics error route checks the fetch site header.

Admin tooling
- Secret settings render masked and cannot be overwritten with a blank or
  an arbitrary raw key; radio credentials are new password inputs.
- Commandocentrum balance changes are audited.
- Admin list pagination reads the caller's per-page instead of the max, and
  the log exporter caps offset and search length.

Performance
- Catalog translations are cached per module, with a cheap revision hash;
  the public online count uses a stale window instead of hammering the DB.
- The cache warmup now primes the payload the home route actually reads.
- TopHeader batches its queries into one round trip, and LCP avatars load
  eagerly.
- motion/react and sonner are no longer part of the root layout; the nav
  dropdown and mobile nav panels are lazy client chunks. Anonymous visitors
  again get the navigation chrome, and public pages get an edge cacheable
  response.

Accessibility
- Nested <main> elements in phase pages became <section>; the page entrance
  and route progress animations are pure CSS that respect reduced motion.

src/actions/social.test.ts

@@ -14,8 +14,13 @@ const state = vi.hoisted(() => ({
 	selectQueue: [] as Queue,
 	rows: [] as Array<Record<string, unknown>>,
 	failInsert: false,
+	isAllowed: vi.fn(async () => ({ ok: true })),
 }));
 
+// The real moderation module loads the word filter through the (mocked) db
+// select queue, which would shift the rows the forum assertions rely on.
+vi.mock("@/lib/services/moderation", () => ({ isAllowed: state.isAllowed }));
+
 vi.mock("next/cache", () => ({ revalidatePath: state.revalidatePath }));
 vi.mock("next/navigation", () => ({
 	redirect: (path: string) => {
@@ -210,6 +215,7 @@ describe("postThread", () => {
 		state.failInsert = false;
 		state.selectQueue = [];
 		state.rows = [];
+		state.isAllowed.mockResolvedValue({ ok: true });
 		state.transaction.mockImplementation(
 			async (fn: (tx: unknown) => Promise<unknown>, txDb: unknown) => fn(txDb),
 		);
@@ -283,6 +289,18 @@ describe("postThread", () => {
 		expect(state.insert).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
 	});
 
+	it("rejects content blocked by the word filter before hitting the db", async () => {
+		state.isAllowed.mockResolvedValue({ ok: false, reason: "bad" });
+		state.selectQueue = [[{ id: 10 }]];
+		await expect(postThread(threadForm())).rejects.toThrow(
+			"/guilds/10/forum/new?error=invalid",
+		);
+		expect(state.isAllowed).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+			"Welcome thread Hello from the community",
+		);
+		expect(state.insert).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+	});
+
 	it("reports not_found when the guild does not exist", async () => {
 		state.selectQueue = [[]];
 		await expect(postThread(threadForm())).rejects.toThrow(
@@ -324,6 +342,7 @@ describe("replyToThread", () => {
 		state.failInsert = false;
 		state.selectQueue = [];
 		state.rows = [];
+		state.isAllowed.mockResolvedValue({ ok: true });
 		state.transaction.mockImplementation(
 			async (fn: (tx: unknown) => Promise<unknown>, txDb: unknown) => fn(txDb),
 		);
@@ -361,6 +380,16 @@ describe("replyToThread", () => {
 		expect(state.update.mock.calls[0][1]).toMatchObject({ postsCount: 1 });
 	});
 
+	it("rejects a reply blocked by the word filter before hitting the db", async () => {
+		state.isAllowed.mockResolvedValue({ ok: false, reason: "bad" });
+		state.selectQueue = [[{ id: 20, locked: 0, postsCount: 3 }]];
+		await expect(replyToThread(replyForm())).rejects.toThrow(
+			"/guilds/10/forum/20?error=invalid",
+		);
+		expect(state.isAllowed).toHaveBeenCalledWith("A thoughtful reply");
+		expect(state.insert).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+	});
+
 	it("rejects missing or non-positive ids by redirecting to /guilds", async () => {
 		await expect(replyToThread(replyForm({ guildId: "abc" }))).rejects.toThrow(
 			"/guilds",