feat: harden atoms-nexst against review findings (37 items)

Second review pass covering security, performance, admin tooling and the
public/room flows. All HIGH and MEDIUM findings from the audit are resolved;
nothing in this commit changes the visible feature set.

Authentication & session security
- CSP is now set on the request headers in the proxy, which is what Next.js
  uses to derive the render nonce, so the nonce is effective.
- 2FA: an already-enabled user cannot re-enroll, the setup endpoint is
  rate-limited per account, and confirmed codes are persisted so the second
  secret no longer silently never applies.
- Password reset revokes the ticket, authTicket and all personal access
  tokens, and bumps the token version so existing sessions die. The same
  revocation is now wired into the staff-side password reset.
- /reset and /verify return a stable error code instead of raw text; the
  mail lookups are ordered by id so duplicates cannot vary between runs.
- Resending the verification mail gets a per-address cooldown on top of the
  per-user limit.
- Issue API tokens with the narrower radio/ticket ability set instead of "*".

Authorization & input handling
- Mid-rank staff can no longer keep dynamically granted non-view admin.*
  permissions: existing grants are revoked by migration and the grant lookup
  is restricted to "%.view". Rank guards use the dynamic super-admin check.
- Alerting a user is permission-checked and audited like the other tools.
- Material mutations (giveCredits/giveDuckets/giveDiamonds, the admin user
  actions route, bulk user actions) are capped and rank-guarded, and bulk
  ids are bounded.
- updateRoom / updateRoomItem write through a field allowlist, and items
  may only be edited through their own room.
- Classnames reaching the filesystem are validated before use so a crafted
  value cannot escape the asset directories.
- The word filter now also covers offline mails, guild forum threads and
  replies, and user mottos.
- Media uploads are validated by magic bytes, /api/media requires the page
  edit permission, APP_URL must be configured once mail is enabled, and the
  diagnostics error route checks the fetch site header.

Admin tooling
- Secret settings render masked and cannot be overwritten with a blank or
  an arbitrary raw key; radio credentials are new password inputs.
- Commandocentrum balance changes are audited.
- Admin list pagination reads the caller's per-page instead of the max, and
  the log exporter caps offset and search length.

Performance
- Catalog translations are cached per module, with a cheap revision hash;
  the public online count uses a stale window instead of hammering the DB.
- The cache warmup now primes the payload the home route actually reads.
- TopHeader batches its queries into one round trip, and LCP avatars load
  eagerly.
- motion/react and sonner are no longer part of the root layout; the nav
  dropdown and mobile nav panels are lazy client chunks. Anonymous visitors
  again get the navigation chrome, and public pages get an edge cacheable
  response.

Accessibility
- Nested <main> elements in phase pages became <section>; the page entrance
  and route progress animations are pure CSS that respect reduced motion.

src/actions/twofactor.ts

@@ -78,6 +78,22 @@ async function verifyTwoFactorCode(
 export async function beginTwoFactor(): Promise<void> {
 	const id = await sessionUserId();
 	if (!env.APP_KEY) redirect("/settings/2fa?error=noappkey");
+
+	if (!(await rateLimit(`2fa-begin:${id}`, 5, 30_000)).ok)
+		redirect("/settings/2fa?error=ratelimit");
+
+	// Re-running this action while 2FA is confirmed would be a silent *downgrade*
+	// (the new secret is stored unconfirmed, and unconfirmed means "login gate
+	// off"), so the existing setup has to be disabled through the proper flow
+	// first: a valid code, not just an authenticated session.
+	const [current] = await db
+		.select({ twoFactorConfirmedAt: User.twoFactorConfirmedAt })
+		.from(User)
+		.where(eq(User.id, id))
+		.limit(1);
+	if (current?.twoFactorConfirmedAt)
+		redirect("/settings/2fa?error=alreadyenabled");
+
 	const secret = generateTotpSecret();
 	const encrypted = new LaravelEncrypter(env.APP_KEY).encrypt(secret);
 	const codes = generateRecoveryCodes();
@@ -104,12 +120,19 @@ export async function confirmTwoFactor(formData: FormData): Promise<void> {
 		.normalize("NFC")
 		.trim();
 
-	const { ok } = await verifyTwoFactorCode(id, code);
+	const { ok, updatedRecoveryCodes } = await verifyTwoFactorCode(id, code);
 	if (!ok) redirect("/settings/2fa?error=badcode");
 
+	// A recovery code spends itself on use, so persist the remainder together
+	// with the confirmation instead of dropping the caller's own update.
 	await db
 		.update(User)
-		.set({ twoFactorConfirmedAt: new Date() })
+		.set({
+			twoFactorConfirmedAt: new Date(),
+			...(updatedRecoveryCodes !== undefined
+				? { twoFactorRecoveryCodes: updatedRecoveryCodes }
+				: {}),
+		})
 		.where(eq(User.id, id));
 	redirect("/settings/2fa?enabled=1");
 }