feat: harden atoms-nexst against review findings (37 items)

Second review pass covering security, performance, admin tooling and the
public/room flows. All HIGH and MEDIUM findings from the audit are resolved;
nothing in this commit changes the visible feature set.

Authentication & session security
- CSP is now set on the request headers in the proxy, which is what Next.js
  uses to derive the render nonce, so the nonce is effective.
- 2FA: an already-enabled user cannot re-enroll, the setup endpoint is
  rate-limited per account, and confirmed codes are persisted so the second
  secret no longer silently never applies.
- Password reset revokes the ticket, authTicket and all personal access
  tokens, and bumps the token version so existing sessions die. The same
  revocation is now wired into the staff-side password reset.
- /reset and /verify return a stable error code instead of raw text; the
  mail lookups are ordered by id so duplicates cannot vary between runs.
- Resending the verification mail gets a per-address cooldown on top of the
  per-user limit.
- Issue API tokens with the narrower radio/ticket ability set instead of "*".

Authorization & input handling
- Mid-rank staff can no longer keep dynamically granted non-view admin.*
  permissions: existing grants are revoked by migration and the grant lookup
  is restricted to "%.view". Rank guards use the dynamic super-admin check.
- Alerting a user is permission-checked and audited like the other tools.
- Material mutations (giveCredits/giveDuckets/giveDiamonds, the admin user
  actions route, bulk user actions) are capped and rank-guarded, and bulk
  ids are bounded.
- updateRoom / updateRoomItem write through a field allowlist, and items
  may only be edited through their own room.
- Classnames reaching the filesystem are validated before use so a crafted
  value cannot escape the asset directories.
- The word filter now also covers offline mails, guild forum threads and
  replies, and user mottos.
- Media uploads are validated by magic bytes, /api/media requires the page
  edit permission, APP_URL must be configured once mail is enabled, and the
  diagnostics error route checks the fetch site header.

Admin tooling
- Secret settings render masked and cannot be overwritten with a blank or
  an arbitrary raw key; radio credentials are new password inputs.
- Commandocentrum balance changes are audited.
- Admin list pagination reads the caller's per-page instead of the max, and
  the log exporter caps offset and search length.

Performance
- Catalog translations are cached per module, with a cheap revision hash;
  the public online count uses a stale window instead of hammering the DB.
- The cache warmup now primes the payload the home route actually reads.
- TopHeader batches its queries into one round trip, and LCP avatars load
  eagerly.
- motion/react and sonner are no longer part of the root layout; the nav
  dropdown and mobile nav panels are lazy client chunks. Anonymous visitors
  again get the navigation chrome, and public pages get an edge cacheable
  response.

Accessibility
- Nested <main> elements in phase pages became <section>; the page entrance
  and route progress animations are pure CSS that respect reduced motion.

src/actions/users.ts

@@ -3,8 +3,10 @@
 import crypto from "node:crypto";
 import { and, eq } from "drizzle-orm";
 import { z } from "zod";
+import { isDynamicSuperAdmin } from "@/lib/admin/authorization-policy";
 import { invalidateLoginCache } from "@/lib/auth";
 import { hashPassword } from "@/lib/auth/password";
+import { revokeUserCredentials } from "@/lib/auth/session-revocation";
 import {
 	Ban,
 	db,
@@ -13,7 +15,7 @@ import {
 	UsersCurrency,
 	UsersSettings,
 } from "@/lib/db";
-import { PERMS } from "@/lib/permissions";
+import { getHighestRank, PERMS } from "@/lib/permissions";
 import { adminAction } from "@/lib/safe-action";
 import { ActionError, actionOk } from "@/lib/safe-action-shared";
 import { logAudit } from "@/lib/services/audit";
@@ -54,8 +56,9 @@ export const createUser = adminAction(
 	{ permission: PERMS.USERS_EDIT, schema: createUserSchema },
 	async (ctx) => {
 		const { username, mail, password, rank, motto } = ctx.data;
-
-		if (rank >= ctx.session.user.rank && ctx.session.user.rank < 7) {
+		const actorRank = ctx.session.user.rank;
+		const highestRank = await getHighestRank();
+		if (rank >= actorRank && !isDynamicSuperAdmin(actorRank, highestRank)) {
 			throw new ActionError("Cannot assign rank equal or higher than your own");
 		}
 
@@ -130,7 +133,7 @@ export const updateUser = adminAction(
 		if (
 			userData.rank !== undefined &&
 			userData.rank >= ctx.session.user.rank &&
-			ctx.session.user.rank < 7
+			!isDynamicSuperAdmin(ctx.session.user.rank, await getHighestRank())
 		) {
 			throw new ActionError("Cannot assign rank equal or higher than your own");
 		}
@@ -144,7 +147,15 @@ export const updateUser = adminAction(
 			motto: string;
 			credits: number;
 			pixels: number;
+			mailVerified?: string;
 		}>;
+		// A changed address has to prove itself again: leaving mail_verified
+		// set would keep every mail send (resets, notifications) pointed at an
+		// inbox nobody confirmed, and would silently bypass the "verified
+		// accounts only" gate.
+		if (patch.mail !== undefined && patch.mail !== targetUser.mail) {
+			patch.mailVerified = "0";
+		}
 		if (Object.keys(patch).length > 0) {
 			await db.update(User).set(patch).where(eq(User.id, id));
 		}
@@ -331,7 +342,14 @@ async function guardRank(targetUserId: number, sessionRank: number) {
 		.where(eq(User.id, targetUserId))
 		.limit(1);
 	if (!target) throw new ActionError("User not found");
-	if (target.rank >= sessionRank && sessionRank < 7) {
+	// The owner is whoever holds the hotel's highest rank *today*. The old
+	// `sessionRank < 7` shortcut handed every rank-7 account owner powers on
+	// any hotel whose top rank is 8+, which makes it a plain escalation.
+	const highestRank = await getHighestRank();
+	if (
+		target.rank >= sessionRank &&
+		!isDynamicSuperAdmin(sessionRank, highestRank)
+	) {
 		throw new ActionError("Cannot modify user with equal or higher rank");
 	}
 	return target;
@@ -358,6 +376,9 @@ export const resetPassword = adminAction(
 			.update(User)
 			.set({ password: hashed })
 			.where(eq(User.id, ctx.data.userId));
+		// A staff-issued password must also end the user's live sessions: this
+		// action exists precisely for "account compromised" situations.
+		await revokeUserCredentials(ctx.data.userId);
 		invalidateLoginCache(target.username);
 
 		logAudit({
@@ -419,9 +440,19 @@ const alertUserSchema = z.object({
 export const alertUser = adminAction(
 	{ permission: PERMS.USERS_EDIT, schema: alertUserSchema },
 	async (ctx) => {
+		const target = await guardRank(ctx.data.userId, ctx.session.user.rank);
 		const success = await rcon.alertUser(ctx.data.userId, ctx.data.message);
 		if (!success)
 			throw new ActionError("Failed to send alert. Is the emulator running?");
+
+		logAudit({
+			userId: ctx.session.user.id,
+			action: "user_alert",
+			target: "User",
+			targetId: ctx.data.userId,
+			after: { message: ctx.data.message, username: target.username },
+		});
+
 		return actionOk();
 	},
 );