feat: harden atoms-nexst against review findings (37 items)

Second review pass covering security, performance, admin tooling and the
public/room flows. All HIGH and MEDIUM findings from the audit are resolved;
nothing in this commit changes the visible feature set.

Authentication & session security
- CSP is now set on the request headers in the proxy, which is what Next.js
  uses to derive the render nonce, so the nonce is effective.
- 2FA: an already-enabled user cannot re-enroll, the setup endpoint is
  rate-limited per account, and confirmed codes are persisted so the second
  secret no longer silently never applies.
- Password reset revokes the ticket, authTicket and all personal access
  tokens, and bumps the token version so existing sessions die. The same
  revocation is now wired into the staff-side password reset.
- /reset and /verify return a stable error code instead of raw text; the
  mail lookups are ordered by id so duplicates cannot vary between runs.
- Resending the verification mail gets a per-address cooldown on top of the
  per-user limit.
- Issue API tokens with the narrower radio/ticket ability set instead of "*".

Authorization & input handling
- Mid-rank staff can no longer keep dynamically granted non-view admin.*
  permissions: existing grants are revoked by migration and the grant lookup
  is restricted to "%.view". Rank guards use the dynamic super-admin check.
- Alerting a user is permission-checked and audited like the other tools.
- Material mutations (giveCredits/giveDuckets/giveDiamonds, the admin user
  actions route, bulk user actions) are capped and rank-guarded, and bulk
  ids are bounded.
- updateRoom / updateRoomItem write through a field allowlist, and items
  may only be edited through their own room.
- Classnames reaching the filesystem are validated before use so a crafted
  value cannot escape the asset directories.
- The word filter now also covers offline mails, guild forum threads and
  replies, and user mottos.
- Media uploads are validated by magic bytes, /api/media requires the page
  edit permission, APP_URL must be configured once mail is enabled, and the
  diagnostics error route checks the fetch site header.

Admin tooling
- Secret settings render masked and cannot be overwritten with a blank or
  an arbitrary raw key; radio credentials are new password inputs.
- Commandocentrum balance changes are audited.
- Admin list pagination reads the caller's per-page instead of the max, and
  the log exporter caps offset and search length.

Performance
- Catalog translations are cached per module, with a cheap revision hash;
  the public online count uses a stale window instead of hammering the DB.
- The cache warmup now primes the payload the home route actually reads.
- TopHeader batches its queries into one round trip, and LCP avatars load
  eagerly.
- motion/react and sonner are no longer part of the root layout; the nav
  dropdown and mobile nav panels are lazy client chunks. Anonymous visitors
  again get the navigation chrome, and public pages get an edge cacheable
  response.

Accessibility
- Nested <main> elements in phase pages became <section>; the page entrance
  and route progress animations are pure CSS that respect reduced motion.

src/lib/auth/session-revocation.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+import { and, eq, sql } from "drizzle-orm";
+import { invalidateJwtVersionCache } from "@/lib/auth/jwt-version-cache";
+import { personalTokenScope } from "@/lib/auth/personal-token-scope";
+import { db, PersonalAccessTokens, User } from "@/lib/db";
+import { logger } from "@/lib/logger";
+
+/**
+ * Kill every live credential for a user: CMS JWTs (by bumping
+ * `website_jwt_version`, which the `jwt` callback re-checks), the game SSO
+ * ticket, and the API bearer tokens.
+ *
+ * Needed by sign-out-everywhere *and* by every password change: without it,
+ * resetting a compromised password leaves the attacker's stolen session
+ * cookie and API token working until they expire on their own.
+ */
+export async function revokeUserCredentials(userId: number): Promise<void> {
+	try {
+		await db
+			.update(User)
+			.set({
+				websiteJwtVersion: sql`${User.websiteJwtVersion} + 1`,
+				authTicket: "",
+			})
+			.where(eq(User.id, userId));
+		await invalidateJwtVersionCache(userId);
+	} catch (err) {
+		logger.warn("Failed to revoke CMS session", {
+			userId,
+			error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : "Unknown",
+		});
+	}
+
+	// Revoke API bearer tokens (Sanctum / personal_access_tokens).
+	try {
+		const scope = personalTokenScope(userId);
+		await db
+			.delete(PersonalAccessTokens)
+			.where(
+				and(
+					eq(PersonalAccessTokens.tokenableId, scope.tokenableId),
+					eq(PersonalAccessTokens.tokenableType, scope.tokenableType),
+				),
+			);
+	} catch (err) {
+		logger.warn("Failed to revoke personal access tokens", {
+			userId,
+			error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : "Unknown",
+		});
+	}
+}