feat: harden atoms-nexst against review findings (37 items)

Second review pass covering security, performance, admin tooling and the
public/room flows. All HIGH and MEDIUM findings from the audit are resolved;
nothing in this commit changes the visible feature set.

Authentication & session security
- CSP is now set on the request headers in the proxy, which is what Next.js
  uses to derive the render nonce, so the nonce is effective.
- 2FA: an already-enabled user cannot re-enroll, the setup endpoint is
  rate-limited per account, and confirmed codes are persisted so the second
  secret no longer silently never applies.
- Password reset revokes the ticket, authTicket and all personal access
  tokens, and bumps the token version so existing sessions die. The same
  revocation is now wired into the staff-side password reset.
- /reset and /verify return a stable error code instead of raw text; the
  mail lookups are ordered by id so duplicates cannot vary between runs.
- Resending the verification mail gets a per-address cooldown on top of the
  per-user limit.
- Issue API tokens with the narrower radio/ticket ability set instead of "*".

Authorization & input handling
- Mid-rank staff can no longer keep dynamically granted non-view admin.*
  permissions: existing grants are revoked by migration and the grant lookup
  is restricted to "%.view". Rank guards use the dynamic super-admin check.
- Alerting a user is permission-checked and audited like the other tools.
- Material mutations (giveCredits/giveDuckets/giveDiamonds, the admin user
  actions route, bulk user actions) are capped and rank-guarded, and bulk
  ids are bounded.
- updateRoom / updateRoomItem write through a field allowlist, and items
  may only be edited through their own room.
- Classnames reaching the filesystem are validated before use so a crafted
  value cannot escape the asset directories.
- The word filter now also covers offline mails, guild forum threads and
  replies, and user mottos.
- Media uploads are validated by magic bytes, /api/media requires the page
  edit permission, APP_URL must be configured once mail is enabled, and the
  diagnostics error route checks the fetch site header.

Admin tooling
- Secret settings render masked and cannot be overwritten with a blank or
  an arbitrary raw key; radio credentials are new password inputs.
- Commandocentrum balance changes are audited.
- Admin list pagination reads the caller's per-page instead of the max, and
  the log exporter caps offset and search length.

Performance
- Catalog translations are cached per module, with a cheap revision hash;
  the public online count uses a stale window instead of hammering the DB.
- The cache warmup now primes the payload the home route actually reads.
- TopHeader batches its queries into one round trip, and LCP avatars load
  eagerly.
- motion/react and sonner are no longer part of the root layout; the nav
  dropdown and mobile nav panels are lazy client chunks. Anonymous visitors
  again get the navigation chrome, and public pages get an edge cacheable
  response.

Accessibility
- Nested <main> elements in phase pages became <section>; the page entrance
  and route progress animations are pure CSS that respect reduced motion.

src/lib/services/profile-privacy.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 import "server-only";
-import { eq } from "drizzle-orm";
+import { eq, inArray } from "drizzle-orm";
 import { WebsiteProfilePrivacy } from "@/db/profile-privacy";
 import { db } from "@/lib/db";
 export const profilePrivacyKeys = [
@@ -40,3 +40,64 @@ export async function loadProfilePrivacy(userId: number) {
 		return { values: hiddenProfilePrivacy, unavailable: true };
 	}
 }
+
+function privacyFromRow(
+	row: Record<string, unknown> | undefined,
+): ProfilePrivacy {
+	if (!row) return defaultProfilePrivacy;
+	return {
+		wallet:
+			row.wallet === undefined
+				? defaultProfilePrivacy.wallet
+				: Boolean(row.wallet),
+		online:
+			row.online === undefined
+				? defaultProfilePrivacy.online
+				: Boolean(row.online),
+		friends:
+			row.friends === undefined
+				? defaultProfilePrivacy.friends
+				: Boolean(row.friends),
+		photos:
+			row.photos === undefined
+				? defaultProfilePrivacy.photos
+				: Boolean(row.photos),
+		registered:
+			row.registered === undefined
+				? defaultProfilePrivacy.registered
+				: Boolean(row.registered),
+	};
+}
+
+/**
+ * Bulk variant for lists (leaderboard, search, rosters). One query for all ids
+ * and — exactly like the single-row loader — fails closed: a database error
+ * returns "hide everything" for every requested user rather than exposing
+ * wallet balances or online state of unknown visibility.
+ */
+export async function loadProfilePrivacyMap(
+	userIds: number[],
+): Promise<Map<number, ProfilePrivacy>> {
+	const ids = [...new Set(userIds)].filter(
+		(id) => Number.isInteger(id) && id > 0,
+	);
+	if (ids.length === 0) return new Map();
+	try {
+		const rows = await db
+			.select()
+			.from(WebsiteProfilePrivacy)
+			.where(inArray(WebsiteProfilePrivacy.userId, ids));
+		const map = new Map<number, ProfilePrivacy>(
+			ids.map((id) => [id, defaultProfilePrivacy]),
+		);
+		for (const row of rows) {
+			map.set(
+				row.userId,
+				privacyFromRow(row as unknown as Record<string, unknown>),
+			);
+		}
+		return map;
+	} catch {
+		return new Map(ids.map((id) => [id, hiddenProfilePrivacy]));
+	}
+}