fix(security): authorize site uploads and harden tokens, media and request identity
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Simo committed 2026-09-13 19:24:43 +02:00
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@@ -16,6 +16,14 @@ Credentials are entered on the host, never in the dashboard. Do not paste `.env`
After startup, visit `/admin/devops/installation` with the appropriate permission. Verify database, Redis, storage and migration status. Worker heartbeat is a separate runtime signal: a healthy HTTP endpoint does not prove an import worker is processing jobs. Check the worker status and investigate a missing/stale heartbeat before scheduling imports. The dashboard is read-only and cannot start Docker, upgrade the host or grant registry access.
## Client IP trust at the reverse proxy
The application validates and normalizes client addresses from `cf-connecting-ip`, the first `x-forwarded-for` entry, then `x-real-ip`. It never accepts `x-real-client-ip`; that legacy derived header is also stripped by the Next.js proxy. Missing or invalid addresses resolve to `0.0.0.0` for rate limits and audit records. API routes use the same resolver even though they do not run through the Next.js proxy.
These headers are trustworthy only when the ingress sanitizes them. Configure the reverse proxy to discard client-supplied forwarding/derived headers and replace the accepted address from a verified connection or a specifically trusted upstream proxy. Do not append an untrusted incoming `x-forwarded-for` chain and then treat its first entry as authoritative. Forward `cf-connecting-ip` only after verifying that it came through your trusted CDN path; otherwise remove it.
Restrict direct access to the application port so requests must pass through that ingress. The provided Compose file uses host networking with `HOSTNAME=0.0.0.0`; it does not enforce this restriction or provision nginx/Traefik trust rules. Verify the host firewall and actual reverse-proxy configuration before relying on client IPs for blocking, auditing or abuse limits. Repository tests prove rejection of the derived-header bypass and malformed addresses; they do not certify the deployed forwarding trust chain.
## Routine and selected-release updates
```sh