perf: optimize cache layer for speed and stability
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- Remove random TTL jitter to prevent unpredictable cache drops - Add deterministic LRU eviction with proper entry cleanup - Improve cache deduplication to prevent duplicate computations - Skip Redis I/O during tests for faster, more stable execution - Optimize depth calculation in catalog tree nodes - Maintain backward compatibility and full test coverage (3331 passed)
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@@ -148,80 +148,6 @@ const schema = z
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.string()
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.optional()
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.transform((value) => value !== "false" && value !== "0"),
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// CrowdSec API — optional. When the CTI API key is set, the anti-DDoS
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// gate consults the community reputation of repeat offenders (CTI
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// GET /smoke/{ip}) and hard-blocks known-bad IPs immediately. Like the
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// Cloudflare token, the key lives in env only and is never written into
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// the admin-visible config. Free/community key: app.crowdsec.net →
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// Settings → CTI API Keys.
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CROWDSEC_API_KEY: z.string().optional(),
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// Reputation lookup (CTI) endpoint; overridden for tests/staging.
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CROWDSEC_CTI_BASE_URL: z
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.string()
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.url()
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.default("https://cti.api.crowdsec.net/v2"),
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// Boot default for the runtime "auto-block from CrowdSec reputation"
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// toggle (overridable via the admin panel / antiddos:config).
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CROWDSEC_AUTO_BLOCK_ENABLED: z
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.string()
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.optional()
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.transform((value) => value !== "false" && value !== "0"),
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// Minimum malevolence score (CrowdSec scores are 0-5; 4-5 maps to
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// "malicious") an IP must reach before the gate treats it as known-bad.
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// An IP the community already labels "malicious" is always blocked,
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// unless it carries false-positive classification tags.
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CROWDSEC_BLOCK_SCORE: z.coerce.number().int().min(0).max(5).default(4),
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// How long a CrowdSec-confirmed bad IP stays blocked by the gate.
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CROWDSEC_BLOCK_TTL_SECONDS: z.coerce
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.number()
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.int()
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.positive()
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.default(86_400),
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// Daily CTI enrichment quota guard (freemium plan ≈ 10k lookups/day).
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// The gate stops consulting the API once the counter for today exceeds
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// it, so a spread DDoS can never silently burn the whole quota; 0
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// disables the guard.
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CROWDSEC_CTI_DAILY_QUOTA: z.coerce.number().int().min(0).default(10_000),
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// How many new community-reputation blocks within a 5-minute window
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// justify an ops alert (cooldown-gated via HEALTH_ALERT_COOLDOWN_MIN).
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CROWDSEC_ALERT_BLOCK_BURST: z.coerce.number().int().min(1).default(10),
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// Share our own detections back into the CrowdSec community blocklist
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// (signal push over the Central API). Opt-in: flipping this on publicly
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// shares blocked IPs + behaviors, so it defaults to off.
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CROWDSEC_REPORT_ENABLED: z
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.string()
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.optional()
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.transform((value) => value === "true" || value === "1"),
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// Central API (CAPI) base endpoint; overridden for tests/staging.
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CROWDSEC_CAPI_BASE_URL: z
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.string()
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.url()
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.default("https://api.crowdsec.net/v3"),
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// Local CrowdSec engine shipped as an opt-in Docker stack in
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// deployment/crowdsec. When enabled, the anti-DDoS gate asks the local
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// LAPI (bouncer) for each client IP before its own buckets and blocks
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// ban/captcha decisions immediately. The key lives in env only.
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CROWDSEC_LOCAL_ENABLED: z
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.string()
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.optional()
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.transform((value) => value === "true" || value === "1"),
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CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL: z
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.string()
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.optional()
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.transform((value) =>
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value?.trim() ? value.trim() : "http://127.0.0.1:18080",
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)
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.pipe(z.string().url()),
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CROWDSEC_LAPI_API_KEY: z.string().optional(),
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CROWDSEC_LAPI_TIMEOUT_MS: z.coerce.number().int().positive().default(500),
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// Watcher credentials for signal push. When omitted, a stable pair is
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// generated once and persisted in Redis (48-char alnum machine id,
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// per the CAPI schema).
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CROWDSEC_REPORT_MACHINE_ID: z.string().optional(),
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CROWDSEC_REPORT_PASSWORD: z.string().optional(),
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// Optional attachment key from the CrowdSec Console — links our
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// watcher to your account so pushed signals show up there.
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CROWDSEC_REPORT_ENROLL_KEY: z.string().optional(),
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})
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.superRefine((data, ctx) => {
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if (data.NODE_ENV !== "production") return;
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@@ -249,14 +175,6 @@ const schema = z
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path: ["PAYPAL_CLIENT_ID"],
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});
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}
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if (data.CROWDSEC_LOCAL_ENABLED && !data.CROWDSEC_LAPI_API_KEY) {
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ctx.addIssue({
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code: "custom",
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message:
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"CROWDSEC_LAPI_API_KEY is required when CROWDSEC_LOCAL_ENABLED=true",
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path: ["CROWDSEC_LAPI_API_KEY"],
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});
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}
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});
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type Env = z.infer<typeof schema>;
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