fix(proxy): keep admin login and assets working on plain-HTTP hosts
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The /admin guard always read the `__Secure-` session cookie, but Auth.js
only uses that name when AUTH_URL (or the request) is HTTPS. With an
http:// AUTH_URL a signed-in admin was bounced between /admin and /login
until the browser threw "too many history calls". The guard now picks the
cookie name the same way Auth.js does.

The CSP also sent `upgrade-insecure-requests` to plain-HTTP visitors, so
the browser rewrote same-origin fonts/scripts to https:// where nothing
listens. It is now only sent when the visitor reached us over HTTPS.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
This commit is contained in:
SimoandClaude Opus 5.5 committed 2026-10-28 22:00:20 +01:00
1 parent b816026bd3
commit fa34efd3f0
5 files changed
+94 -6

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+8
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@@ -35,4 +35,12 @@ describe("csp", () => {
expect(csp).not.toContain("upgrade-insecure-requests");
vi.unstubAllEnvs();
});
it("omits upgrade-insecure-requests for plain-HTTP visitors in production", () => {
vi.stubEnv("NODE_ENV", "production");
const csp = buildContentSecurityPolicy("n", { secure: false });
expect(csp).toContain("frame-ancestors 'none'");
expect(csp).not.toContain("upgrade-insecure-requests");
vi.unstubAllEnvs();
});
});
+10 -4
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@@ -2,8 +2,13 @@
* Build a Content-Security-Policy value.
* Scripts/styles: per-request nonce for Next.js and ThemeVars inline tags.
* style-src-attr keeps 'unsafe-inline' so React `style={{…}}` attributes work.
* `secure` reports whether the visitor reached us over HTTPS; it gates
* `upgrade-insecure-requests`.
*/
export function buildContentSecurityPolicy(nonce: string): string {
export function buildContentSecurityPolicy(
nonce: string,
{ secure = true }: { secure?: boolean } = {},
): string {
const isDev = process.env.NODE_ENV === "development";
const scriptSrc = [
"'self'",
@@ -30,15 +35,16 @@ export function buildContentSecurityPolicy(nonce: string): string {
"frame-src 'self' https://challenges.cloudflare.com https://www.google.com/recaptcha/",
// Clickjacking defence that also covers the `frame-ancestors`-aware
// browsers X-Frame-Options cannot reach. `upgrade-insecure-requests` is
// production-only: over plain-HTTP localhost it would rewrite same-origin
// asset URLs to https and break the dev server.
// only sent to HTTPS visitors outside development: over plain HTTP
// (localhost, a LAN/WSL IP without TLS) it rewrites same-origin asset
// URLs to https, where nothing listens, and fonts/scripts fail to load.
"frame-ancestors 'none'",
"connect-src 'self' https: wss:",
"font-src 'self' data: https://fonts.gstatic.com",
"object-src 'none'",
"base-uri 'self'",
"form-action 'self'",
...(isDev ? [] : ["upgrade-insecure-requests"]),
...(isDev || !secure ? [] : ["upgrade-insecure-requests"]),
].join("; ");
}
+31
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@@ -1,7 +1,9 @@
// @ts-nocheck
import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
import {
authUsesSecureCookies,
isCacheableAssetPath,
isHttpsRequest,
shouldRedirectAdminRequest,
} from "./proxy-access";
@@ -37,3 +39,32 @@ describe("isCacheableAssetPath", () => {
expect(isCacheableAssetPath("/admin/media")).toBe(false);
});
});
describe("isHttpsRequest", () => {
it("trusts the first forwarded proto over the internal hop", () => {
expect(isHttpsRequest("https", "http:")).toBe(true);
expect(isHttpsRequest("https, http", "http:")).toBe(true);
expect(isHttpsRequest("http", "http:")).toBe(false);
});
it("falls back to the URL Next saw", () => {
expect(isHttpsRequest(null, "https:")).toBe(true);
expect(isHttpsRequest(null, "http:")).toBe(false);
});
});
describe("authUsesSecureCookies", () => {
it("follows AUTH_URL when it is set, like Auth.js", () => {
expect(authUsesSecureCookies("http://172.23.71.35", "https", "http:")).toBe(
false,
);
expect(
authUsesSecureCookies("https://hotel.example", "http", "http:"),
).toBe(true);
});
it("uses the request scheme without AUTH_URL", () => {
expect(authUsesSecureCookies(undefined, "https", "http:")).toBe(true);
expect(authUsesSecureCookies(undefined, null, "http:")).toBe(false);
});
});
+31
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@@ -11,6 +11,37 @@ export function shouldRedirectAdminRequest(
return token === null;
}
/**
* Whether the visitor reached us over HTTPS. Behind Traefik/nginx Next only
* sees plain HTTP, so the first `X-Forwarded-Proto` value wins.
*/
export function isHttpsRequest(
forwardedProto: string | null,
requestProtocol: string,
): boolean {
const proto = forwardedProto?.split(",")[0]?.trim() || requestProtocol;
return proto.replace(/:$/, "").toLowerCase() === "https";
}
/**
* Mirrors how Auth.js picks the session cookie name (`__Secure-` prefix or
* not): AUTH_URL decides when set, otherwise the request scheme does.
*/
export function authUsesSecureCookies(
authUrl: string | undefined,
forwardedProto: string | null,
requestProtocol: string,
): boolean {
if (authUrl) {
try {
return new URL(authUrl).protocol === "https:";
} catch {
// Auth.js would reject a malformed AUTH_URL too; fall through.
}
}
return isHttpsRequest(forwardedProto, requestProtocol);
}
const CACHEABLE_ASSET_PREFIXES = ["/api/imaging/", "/api/media/"];
export function isCacheableAssetPath(pathname: string): boolean {
+14 -2
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@@ -5,8 +5,10 @@ import { buildContentSecurityPolicy, createCspNonce } from "@/lib/csp";
import { isSuspiciousPath } from "@/lib/ddos";
import { ddosReject, enforceDdosRateLimit } from "@/lib/ddos-guard";
import {
authUsesSecureCookies,
isCacheableAssetPath,
isEdgeCacheablePublicPath,
isHttpsRequest,
shouldRedirectAdminRequest,
} from "@/lib/proxy-access";
@@ -43,11 +45,19 @@ export const proxy = async (req: import("next/server").NextRequest) => {
// Only /admin needs a real session token for the redirect guard; skipping
// JWT decoding on every other request keeps the proxy cheap under load.
const adminPath = pathname === "/admin" || pathname.startsWith("/admin/");
const forwardedProto = req.headers.get("x-forwarded-proto");
const token = adminPath
? await getToken({
req,
secret: env.AUTH_SECRET,
secureCookie: true,
// Must match the cookie name Auth.js chose at sign-in, otherwise a
// signed-in admin on a plain-HTTP AUTH_URL is bounced between
// /admin and /login forever.
secureCookie: authUsesSecureCookies(
process.env.AUTH_URL ?? process.env.NEXTAUTH_URL,
forwardedProto,
req.nextUrl.protocol,
),
})
: null;
@@ -60,7 +70,9 @@ export const proxy = async (req: import("next/server").NextRequest) => {
}
const nonce = createCspNonce();
const csp = buildContentSecurityPolicy(nonce);
const csp = buildContentSecurityPolicy(nonce, {
secure: isHttpsRequest(forwardedProto, req.nextUrl.protocol),
});
const headers = new Headers(req.headers);
headers.set("x-pathname", pathname);