feat(security): drop scanner probes and hostile paths early in proxy
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+29
-6
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@@ -35,9 +35,29 @@ const HOSTILE_PATH_SEGMENTS = new Set([
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"server-status",
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".env",
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".git",
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"cmd.exe", // Windows command execution
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"shell", // Generic web shell indicator
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"jndi", // Log4j exploit attempts
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"tomcat", // Tomcat exploitation attempts
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"web-inf", // Java web app directory exposure
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"passwd", // Linux password file attempts
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"etc", // Linux configuration directory traversal
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]);
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const HOSTILE_PATH_EXTENSIONS = [".php", ".asp", ".aspx", ".jsp", ".cgi"];
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const HOSTILE_PATH_EXTENSIONS = [
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".php",
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".asp",
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".aspx",
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".jsp",
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".cgi",
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".env", // Direct .env file access
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".bak", // Backup files
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".sql", // Database dumps
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".zip", // Archives that may contain sensitive data
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".rar", // Archives that may contain sensitive data
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".7z", // Archives that may contain sensitive data
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".txt", // Generic text files that might contain sensitive data
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];
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/**
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* Cheap scanner/exploit triage. These paths are never routes in this app, so a
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+8
-5
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ import { NextResponse } from "next/server";
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import { getToken } from "next-auth/jwt";
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import { env } from "@/env";
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import { buildContentSecurityPolicy, createCspNonce } from "@/lib/csp";
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import { isSuspiciousPath } from "@/lib/ddos";
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import { ddosReject, enforceDdosRateLimit } from "@/lib/ddos-guard";
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import {
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isCacheableAssetPath,
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@@ -19,6 +20,13 @@ const SECURITY_HEADERS: Record<string, string> = {
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};
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export const proxy = async (req: import("next/server").NextRequest) => {
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const pathname = req.nextUrl.pathname;
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// Drop scanner probes immediately before performing any rate-limit or DB operations.
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if (isSuspiciousPath(pathname)) {
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return ddosReject(403);
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}
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// Server actions carry an opaque action id in this header. A malformed or
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// trivially short id (e.g. "x" sent by bots) can never resolve to a real
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// action; rejecting it here avoids the expensive lookup/render path.
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@@ -28,15 +36,10 @@ export const proxy = async (req: import("next/server").NextRequest) => {
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}
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const decision = await enforceDdosRateLimit(req);
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if (decision.outcome === "suspect") {
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return ddosReject(403);
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}
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if (decision.outcome === "block") {
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return ddosReject(429, decision.retryAfterSeconds);
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}
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const pathname = req.nextUrl.pathname;
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// Only /admin needs a real session token for the redirect guard; skipping
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// JWT decoding on every other request keeps the proxy cheap under load.
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const adminPath = pathname === "/admin" || pathname.startsWith("/admin/");
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