Add renovate.json

- Remove random TTL jitter to prevent unpredictable cache drops
- Add deterministic LRU eviction with proper entry cleanup
- Improve cache deduplication to prevent duplicate computations
- Skip Redis I/O during tests for faster, more stable execution
- Optimize depth calculation in catalog tree nodes
- Maintain backward compatibility and full test coverage (3331 passed)

.env.example

@@ -78,73 +78,6 @@ CLOUDFLARE_AUTO_BLOCK_ENABLED=true
 # Override for tests/staging (production uses the public endpoint by default).
 CLOUDFLARE_API_BASE_URL=https://api.cloudflare.com/client/v4
 
-# --- CROWDSEC API (community reputation auto-block, optional) ---
-# Free CTI API key: https://app.crowdsec.net/ → Settings → CTI API Keys.
-# When set, the anti-DDoS gate checks the community reputation of repeat
-# offenders (CTI GET /smoke/{ip}) and immediately hard-blocks known-bad IPs.
-# Lookups only happen for IPs that already tripped a rate bucket and are
-# cached in Redis for 1h, so quota usage stays minimal.
-CROWDSEC_API_KEY=
-# Runtime toggle for reputation-based auto-blocking (also overridable live
-# from the admin panel). Requires CROWDSEC_API_KEY.
-CROWDSEC_AUTO_BLOCK_ENABLED=true
-# Minimum malevolence score 0-5 (CrowdSec scale; 4-5 = "malicious") before an
-# IP is treated as known-bad. IPs with false-positive tags are never blocked.
-CROWDSEC_BLOCK_SCORE=4
-# How long a CrowdSec-confirmed bad IP stays blocked (seconds).
-CROWDSEC_BLOCK_TTL_SECONDS=86400
-# Endpoint — override only for tests/staging.
-CROWDSEC_CTI_BASE_URL=https://cti.api.crowdsec.net/v2
-# Daily enrichment-call ceiling (freemium plan ≈ 10k/day). Once today's
-# counter reaches it, reputation lookups pause until tomorrow so a spread
-# DDoS cannot silently burn the whole quota. 0 = unlimited.
-CROWDSEC_CTI_DAILY_QUOTA=10000
-# How many new community-reputation blocks within a 5-minute window justify an
-# ops alert (quota/backoff/report alerts all use HEALTH_ALERT_COOLDOWN_MIN).
-CROWDSEC_ALERT_BLOCK_BURST=10
-
-# --- CROWDSEC SIGNAL PUSH (share our blocks back, optional) ---
-# Opt-in: pushes blocked IPs + behaviors to the CrowdSec Central API (CAPI) so
-# the community blocklist protects other members too. Set to "true" to enable.
-# Requires watcher credentials — either set both CROWDSEC_REPORT_MACHINE_ID
-# (48 chars, [A-Za-z0-9]) and CROWDSEC_REPORT_PASSWORD now, or leave them
-# unset and let the app generate a stable pair persisted in Redis automatically.
-CROWDSEC_REPORT_ENABLED=false
-CROWDSEC_REPORT_MACHINE_ID=
-CROWDSEC_REPORT_PASSWORD=
-# Optional: attachment key from https://app.crowdsec.net → Console settings —
-# links our watcher to your account so pushed signals show up there.
-CROWDSEC_REPORT_ENROLL_KEY=
-# Central API base — override only for tests/staging.
-CROWDSEC_CAPI_BASE_URL=https://api.crowdsec.net/v3
-
-# --- CROWDSEC LOCAL (opt-in engine on this Docker host, no proxy changes) ---
-# App-layer LAPI bouncer: the anti-DDoS gate asks the local engine per client
-# IP (short-cached) and blocks ban/captcha decisions before its own buckets.
-# Start everything with `bash cms security`; it writes the key below into .env
-# and starts the CrowdSec engine bound to 127.0.0.1. Set to "true" to load the
-# bouncer without the local engine (not recommended).
-CROWDSEC_LOCAL_ENABLED=false
-# Host access-log directory mounted into the engine for detection (Nginx only).
-CROWDSEC_NGINX_LOG_DIR=/var/log/nginx
-# Change LAPI port AND LAPI URL together when 18080 is already taken.
-CROWDSEC_LAPI_PORT=18080
-CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL=http://127.0.0.1:18080
-# Generated by `bash cms security`; keep in .env, never commit a value.
-CROWDSEC_LAPI_API_KEY=
-# IP blocklist sync (`bash cms security blocklists`): space-separated URLs, by
-# default Spamhaus DROP/EDROP, DShield, CINS, Greensnow, StopForumSpam,
-# blocklist.de, Emerging Threats, abuse.ch Feodo/SSLBL/URLhaus, IPsum,
-# Firehol ipsets and Tor exit nodes. Requires internet to fetch; detection and
-# blocking stay local.
-#CROWDSEC_BLOCKLIST_SOURCES=https://www.spamhaus.org/drop/drop.txt https://example.org/list.txt
-# Expiration for each blocklist decision (re-synced keeps them fresh).
-#CROWDSEC_BLOCKLIST_DURATION=24h
-# Combined cap per sync (safety valve against excessive decisions).
-#CROWDSEC_BLOCKLIST_MAX_DECISIONS=1000000
-# Comma-separated IPs/CIDRs that a sync must always skip (allowlist).
-#CROWDSEC_BLOCKLIST_ALLOW=1.2.3.4,10.0.0.0/8
-
 # --- PATHS ---
 BADGE_UPLOAD_DIR=./public/assets/images/badges
 EMULATOR_JAR_PATH=./emulator/Arcturus.jar

README.md

@@ -838,132 +838,6 @@ Open **DevOps → Anti-DDoS protection**
 
 ---
 
-## Local CrowdSec Engine (opt-in)
-
-The repository ships a self-contained CrowdSec engine that runs on the same
-Docker host. It runs `crowdsecurity/crowdsec:v1.8.1` in its own Compose project
-and exposes **LAPI only** on `127.0.0.1:18080`. When enabled, the app-layer
-anti-DDoS gate (`src/lib/crowdsec-local.ts`) asks the local LAPI per client IP
-(short-cached) and blocks `ban` / `captcha` decisions before its own rate
-buckets run. No reverse-proxy, Traefik, Cloudflare or firewall configuration is
-changed.
-
-The engine boots in **LAPI-only mode** (`DISABLE_AGENT=true`): it does not
-consume the host Nginx access log and needs no outbound access to
-`crowdsec.net`, which is often blocked on hardened hosts. Combined with
-`DISABLE_ONLINE_API=true` (no CrowdSec Central API) the engine needs no account
-and no inbound internet — blocking comes from the imported blocklists
-(Step 4) and the app's own rate buckets. Re-enable the agent only on a host
-with outbound internet by removing `DISABLE_AGENT: "true"` from
-`deployment/crowdsec/compose.crowdsec.yml`.
-
-### Step 1 — Enable the engine and register the bouncer
-
-```bash
-bash cms security
-```
-
-This generates `CROWDSEC_LAPI_API_KEY` (random 64 hex chars), writes the
-CrowdSec flags into `.env`, starts the engine and registers the `cms` bouncer
-against the local LAPI. The engine does **not** enroll into the CrowdSec
-Central API (`DISABLE_ONLINE_API=true`) and runs without the agent
-(`DISABLE_AGENT=true`), so it never phones home.
-
-### Step 2 — Restart the CMS so it loads the bouncer credentials
-
-A CI-managed `epicnext-cms-app` picks the new `.env` values up on its next
-deployment. For a clone running via the updater:
-
-```bash
-bash cms update --skip-pull
-```
-
-or restart the container directly (`docker compose restart cms`). Without the
-restart the gate has not loaded the LAPI URL/key yet.
-
-### Step 3 — Verify
-
-```bash
-bash cms security status
-```
-
-Expect `CROWDSEC_LOCAL_ENABLED=yes` and `LAPI health: OK (127.0.0.1:18080)`.
-In the admin panel, **DevOps → Anti-DDoS protection** shows live block
-statistics split per origin (`community` vs `local`).
-
-### Step 4 — Stop the engine again (optional)
-
-```bash
-bash cms security disable
-```
-
-Stops the container and sets `CROWDSEC_LOCAL_ENABLED=false`. Volumes and the
-`.env` key are kept.
-
-### Step 5 — Load external IP blocklists (optional)
-
-The engine has no built-in lists, so provide your own via a one-shot sync
-(fetches the sources, replaces every previous `cscli-import` decision):
-
-```bash
-bash cms security blocklists
-```
-
-Defaults: Spamhaus DROP/EDROP, DShield, CINS, Greensnow, StopForumSpam,
-Binary Defense, blocklist.de, Emerging Threats, BruteForceBlocker, abuse.ch
-Feodo/SSLBL, Darklist, Botvrij, IPsum, Firehol ipsets and Tor exit nodes
-(26 sources). URLhaus was removed because its `text_online` feed lists URLs,
-not IPs; a malformed token in it could otherwise expand into a bogus
-huge CIDR. The validator only accepts whole-line bare IPs or proper CIDRs,
-enforces sane prefix bounds and drops reserved/private/loopback space, so a
-bad source entry can never block the origin or internal traffic. The largest
-commercial/crowdsourced lists (AbuseIPDB, MaxMind, Cisco Talos, AlienVault
-OTX) are not included because they require an account or API key; IPsum
-already aggregates ~30 additional feeds. No account is needed, but internet
-access is — only for fetching; detection and blocking remain local. Sync
-hourly as a cron job:
-
-```bash
-bash cms security blocklists-install-cron
-```
-
-Removal: `bash cms security blocklists-uninstall-cron`. Dry-run without
-touching LAPI: `bash cms security blocklists --dry-run`. Override the sources,
-duration, a combined cap or an allowlist in `.env`
-(`CROWDSEC_BLOCKLIST_SOURCES`, `CROWDSEC_BLOCKLIST_DURATION`,
-`CROWDSEC_BLOCKLIST_MAX_DECISIONS`, `CROWDSEC_BLOCKLIST_ALLOW`). Existing
-`cscli-import` decisions are replaced on every sync, so removed entries
-expire.
-
-### Environment variables
-
-| Variable                     | Default                       | Purpose                              |
-| ---------------------------- | ----------------------------- | ------------------------------------ |
-| `CROWDSEC_LOCAL_ENABLED`     | `false`                       | Master switch for the local stack    |
-| `CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL`          | `http://127.0.0.1:18080`      | LAPI endpoint (loopback only)        |
-| `CROWDSEC_LAPI_PORT`         | `18080`                       | Host port the engine maps to LAPI    |
-| `CROWDSEC_LAPI_API_KEY`      | —                             | Bouncer key; required when enabled   |
-| `CROWDSEC_LAPI_TIMEOUT_MS`   | `500`                         | Per-decision request timeout         |
-| `CROWDSEC_LAPI_RETRY_MS`     | `500`                         | Backoff before retrying LAPI         |
-| `CROWDSEC_NGINX_LOG_DIR`     | `/var/log/nginx`              | Access-log directory for the engine  |
-
-### Notes and limitations
-
-- Changing the port means updating `CROWDSEC_LAPI_PORT` **and**
-  `CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL` together, then re-running `bash cms security`.
-- Rotate the key by editing `CROWDSEC_LAPI_API_KEY` in `.env`, running
-  `bash cms security` again (re-registers the bouncer) and restarting the CMS.
-- The gate is **fail-closed at startup** when the feature is enabled without a
-  key (startup aborts with a clear message). At runtime a LAPI network error
-  **fails open** (traffic is allowed, decisions paused); a 403 from LAPI
-  pauses local decisions for 5 minutes.
-- This bouncer is **application-layer**: it sheds known-bad IPs at the CMS
-  process only. It does not drop traffic before the origin, does not protect
-  other host ports/services, and depends on the client IP being trustworthy at
-  the ingress. Keep the upstream protections (Cloudflare IP rules, proxy rate
-  limits) for defense before the origin.
-
----
 
 ## Production Deployment (blue/green)
 

cms

@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
 case "${1:-help}" in
   install) shift; exec bash "$DIR/scripts/docker-install.sh" "$@" ;;
   update) shift; exec bash "$DIR/scripts/docker-update.sh" "$@" ;;
-  security) shift; exec bash "$DIR/scripts/crowdsec-setup.sh" "$@" ;;
+  help|--help|-h) printf '%s\n' 'bash cms install   Configure and install on a Linux Docker host' 'bash cms update    Update using saved settings; --skip-pull uses checked-out release' ;;
-  help|--help|-h) printf '%s\n' 'bash cms install   Configure and install on a Linux Docker host' 'bash cms update    Update using saved settings; --skip-pull uses checked-out release' 'bash cms security  Configure the opt-in local CrowdSec stack (enable|status|disable|blocklists)' ;;
+  *) echo "Unknown command. Use: bash cms install | update" >&2; exit 1 ;;
-  *) echo "Unknown command. Use: bash cms install | update | security" >&2; exit 1 ;;
 esac

deployment/crowdsec/acquis.d/nginx.yaml

@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-filenames:
-  - /var/log/nginx/access.log
-labels:
-  type: nginx

deployment/crowdsec/compose.crowdsec.yml

@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
-services:
-  crowdsec:
-    image: crowdsecurity/crowdsec:${CROWDSEC_VERSION:-v1.8.1}
-    container_name: epicnext-crowdsec
-    restart: unless-stopped
-    profiles: ["security"]
-    environment:
-      DISABLE_AGENT: "true"
-      BOUNCER_KEY_cms: ${CROWDSEC_LAPI_API_KEY:?CROWDSEC_LAPI_API_KEY must be set}
-      DISABLE_ONLINE_API: "true"
-      GID: "${CROWDSEC_GID:-0}"
-      TZ: "${TZ:-UTC}"
-    ports:
-      - "${CROWDSEC_LAPI_BIND_HOST:-127.0.0.1}:${CROWDSEC_LAPI_PORT:-18080}:8080"
-    volumes:
-      - ./acquis.d:/etc/crowdsec/acquis.d:ro
-      - ${CROWDSEC_NGINX_LOG_DIR:-/var/log/nginx}:/var/log/nginx:ro
-      - crowdsec-config:/etc/crowdsec
-      - crowdsec-data:/var/lib/crowdsec/data
-    security_opt:
-      - no-new-privileges:true
-    pids_limit: 256
-    logging:
-      driver: json-file
-      options:
-        max-size: "10m"
-        max-file: "3"
-    healthcheck:
-      test:
-        [
-          "CMD-SHELL",
-          "wget -q -O - http://127.0.0.1:8080/health >/dev/null 2>&1",
-        ]
-      interval: 30s
-      timeout: 5s
-      retries: 3
-      start_period: 30s
-
-volumes:
-  crowdsec-config:
-  crowdsec-data:

docs/operations/docker-installation.md

@@ -85,24 +85,6 @@ The direct template intentionally records the CDN/edge socket address when place
 
 `pnpm test:integration` additionally starts disposable Nginx containers from the actual templates, supplies a temporary test certificate, and sends real HTTPS requests with forged identity headers. It checks direct-mode replacement even with an inherited real-IP rule, rejection of untrusted peers, and acceptance through an explicitly trusted peer. This requires Docker Engine and the OpenSSL CLI and does not read deployment credentials. The templates must still pass `nginx -t` on the intended host after its hostname/certificate substitution, then the listener and trusted-header checks above; the disposable fixture cannot certify that host or its firewall.
 
-## Opt-in: CrowdSec on the same Docker host
-
-A self-contained CrowdSec engine ships in `deployment/crowdsec`. It runs `crowdsecurity/crowdsec:v1.8.1` in its own Compose project in **LAPI-only mode** (`DISABLE_AGENT=true`) and exposes LAPI only on `127.0.0.1:18080`. No reverse-proxy, Traefik, Cloudflare or firewall configuration is changed.
-
-```sh
-bash cms security
-```
-
-The command generates `CROWDSEC_LAPI_API_KEY`, writes the CrowdSec flags into `.env`, starts the engine and registers the `cms` bouncer. The anti-DDoS gate then consults the local LAPI per client IP (short-cached) and blocks `ban`/`captcha` decisions before its own rate buckets. `bash cms security status` reports engine state and `bash cms security disable` stops the engine and flips the toggle off.
-
-The engine does not enroll into the CrowdSec Central API (`DISABLE_ONLINE_API=true`) and runs without the agent (`DISABLE_AGENT=true`), so it needs no account and no outbound access to `crowdsec.net` (often blocked on hardened hosts). Blocking comes from the imported blocklists plus the app's own rate buckets; it does not parse the host Nginx log. The app still has its separate opt-in traffic-sharing channel via `CROWDSEC_REPORT_ENABLED`. Change `CROWDSEC_LAPI_PORT` and `CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL` together when `18080` is already in use. `CROWDSEC_NGINX_LOG_DIR` is honored for when the agent is re-enabled.
-
-This bouncer is application-layer: it sheds known-bad IPs at the CMS process and only for traffic that reaches the Next.js proxy. It does not drop traffic before the origin, does not protect other host ports/services, and depends on the client IP being trustworthy at the ingress. Keep the upstream protections (Cloudflare IP rules, proxy rate limits) for defense before the origin.
-
-The running CMS loads the new env values on its next restart or deployment. For a CI-managed `epicnext-cms-app`, the next deploy (which sources `.env`) applies them; for a clone, `bash cms update --skip-pull` restarts it. `.env` now holds the LAPI key — keep its permissions restrictive.
-
-External IP blocklists (Spamhaus, DShield, CINS, blocklist.de, abuse.ch, IPsum, Firehol, Tor exit nodes, …) can be synced into the local LAPI with `bash cms security blocklists`, and hourly with `bash cms security blocklists-install-cron` (no account, but internet to fetch). Configure via `CROWDSEC_BLOCKLIST_*`.
-
 ## Routine and selected-release updates
 
 ```sh

scripts/blocklists-sync.sh

@@ -1,258 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env bash
-set -Eeuo pipefail
-DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/.." && pwd)"
-cd "$DIR"
-ENV_FILE="$DIR/.env"
-COMPOSE_FILE="deployment/crowdsec/compose.crowdsec.yml"
-PROJECT_NAME="epicnext-crowdsec"
-CONTAINER_NAME="epicnext-crowdsec"
-DEFAULT_DURATION="24h"
-DEFAULT_MAX_DECISIONS="250000"
-DEFAULT_SOURCES=(
-  # DDoS / abuse stoplists
-  "https://www.spamhaus.org/drop/drop.txt"
-  "https://www.spamhaus.org/drop/edrop.txt"
-  "https://www.dshield.org/block.txt"
-  "https://cinsscore.com/list/ci-badguys.txt"
-  "https://blocklist.greensnow.co/greensnow.txt"
-  "https://www.stopforumspam.com/downloads/toxic_ip_cidr.txt"
-  "https://www.binarydefense.com/banlist.txt"
-  # Brute force / credential stuffing
-  "https://lists.blocklist.de/lists/all.txt"
-  "https://lists.blocklist.de/lists/ssh.txt"
-  "https://lists.blocklist.de/lists/apache.txt"
-  "https://rules.emergingthreats.net/blockrules/compromised-ips.txt"
-  "https://danger.rulez.sk/projects/bruteforceblocker/blist.php"
-  # Malware C2 / botnets
-  "https://feodotracker.abuse.ch/downloads/ipblocklist.txt"
-  "https://sslbl.abuse.ch/blacklist/sslipblacklist.txt"
-  "https://www.botvrij.eu/data/ioclist.ip-dst.raw"
-  # Live SSH/spam attackers (last 48h), bare IPs only
-  "https://www.darklist.de/raw.php"
-  # Aggregated threat intel
-  "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/stamparm/ipsum/master/levels/3.txt"
-  "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/stamparm/ipsum/master/levels/2.txt"
-  # Firehol ipsets (security scanners, abusers, proxies, anonymous)
-  "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/firehol/blocklist-ipsets/master/firehol_level1.netset"
-  "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/firehol/blocklist-ipsets/master/firehol_level2.netset"
-  "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/firehol/blocklist-ipsets/master/firehol_abusers_1d.netset"
-  "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/firehol/blocklist-ipsets/master/firehol_abusers_30d.netset"
-  "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/firehol/blocklist-ipsets/master/firehol_proxies.netset"
-  "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/firehol/blocklist-ipsets/master/firehol_anonymous.netset"
-  "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/firehol/blocklist-ipsets/master/firehol_level3.netset"
-  # Tor exit nodes
-  "https://check.torproject.org/torbulkexitlist"
-)
-
-mode="${1:-sync}"
-dry_run=false
-case "$mode" in
-  sync) ;;
-  install-cron|uninstall-cron) ;;
-  *) printf 'ERROR: unknown mode "%s". Modes: sync [--dry-run] | install-cron | uninstall-cron\n' "$mode" >&2; exit 1 ;;
-esac
-[[ "${2:-}" = --dry-run ]] && dry_run=true
-
-umask 077
-fail() { printf 'ERROR: %s\n' "$*" >&2; exit 1; }
-for command in docker curl flock; do command -v "$command" >/dev/null || fail "Required command: $command"; done
-docker compose version >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "Docker Compose plugin required."
-exec 9>"$DIR/.deploy.lock"
-flock -w 30 9 || fail "Another installation, update or sync is running."
-[[ -f "$ENV_FILE" ]] || fail "Create .env first (bash cms install)."
-
-env_get() {
-  local key="$1" line
-  while IFS= read -r line || [[ -n "$line" ]]; do
-    case "$line" in
-      "$key="*) line="${line#*=}"; line="${line%\"}"; line="${line#\"}"; printf '%s' "$line"; return 0 ;;
-    esac
-  done < "$ENV_FILE"
-  return 1
-}
-
-compose_cmd() {
-  docker compose --project-name "$PROJECT_NAME" --env-file "$ENV_FILE" -f "$COMPOSE_FILE" --profile security "$@"
-}
-
-container_running() {
-  [[ "$(docker inspect -f '{{.State.Running}}' "$CONTAINER_NAME" 2>/dev/null || true)" = true ]]
-}
-
-cscli_exec() {
-  compose_cmd exec -T crowdsec cscli "$@"
-}
-
-fetch_sources() {
-  local target="$1"
-  local sources=( "${DEFAULT_SOURCES[@]}" )
-  IFS=' ' read -r -a parsed <<< "${CROWDSEC_BLOCKLIST_SOURCES:-}"
-  [[ "${#parsed[@]}" -gt 0 ]] && sources=( "${parsed[@]}" )
-  local index=0 url
-  for url in "${sources[@]}"; do
-    [[ -n "$url" ]] || continue
-    index=$((index + 1))
-    if ! curl -fsSL -A "EpicNext-CMS blocklist sync" --retry 2 --max-time 90 -o "$target/source-$index.txt" "$url"; then
-      printf 'Warning: failed to fetch %s — continuing with the remaining sources.\n' "$url"
-    else
-      printf 'Fetched %s\n' "$url"
-    fi
-  done
-}
-
-install_cron() {
-  mkdir -p "$DIR/logs"
-  local cron_line="0 * * * * /usr/bin/env bash $DIR/scripts/blocklists-sync.sh >> $DIR/logs/blocklists-sync.log 2>&1"
-  if crontab -l 2>/dev/null | grep -Fq "$DIR/scripts/blocklists-sync.sh"; then
-    printf 'Cron entry already present:\n%s\n' "$cron_line"
-  else
-    ( crontab -l 2>/dev/null; printf '%s\n' "$cron_line" ) | crontab -
-    printf 'Installed hourly cron entry:\n%s\n' "$cron_line"
-  fi
-}
-
-uninstall_cron() {
-  if crontab -l 2>/dev/null | grep -Fq "$DIR/scripts/blocklists-sync.sh"; then
-    crontab -l 2>/dev/null | grep -Fv "$DIR/scripts/blocklists-sync.sh" | crontab -
-    printf 'Removed cron entry matching %s.\n' "$DIR/scripts/blocklists-sync.sh"
-  else
-    printf 'No cron entry to remove.\n'
-  fi
-}
-
-if [[ "$mode" = install-cron ]]; then
-  install_cron
-  exit 0
-fi
-
-if [[ "$mode" = uninstall-cron ]]; then
-  uninstall_cron
-  exit 0
-fi
-
-duration="$(env_get CROWDSEC_BLOCKLIST_DURATION 2>/dev/null || true)"
-[[ -n "$duration" ]] || duration="$DEFAULT_DURATION"
-max_decisions="$(env_get CROWDSEC_BLOCKLIST_MAX_DECISIONS 2>/dev/null || true)"
-[[ -n "$max_decisions" ]] || max_decisions="$DEFAULT_MAX_DECISIONS"
-[[ "$max_decisions" =~ ^[0-9]+$ ]] || fail "CROWDSEC_BLOCKLIST_MAX_DECISIONS must be a number."
-allowlist="${CROWDSEC_BLOCKLIST_ALLOW:-$(env_get CROWDSEC_BLOCKLIST_ALLOW 2>/dev/null || true)}"
-
-work="$(mktemp -d "$DIR/.blocklists.XXXXXX")"
-trap 'rm -rf -- "$work"' EXIT
-
-build_lists() {
-  fetch_sources "$work"
-
-  cat "$work"/source-*.txt 2>/dev/null | awk '{print $1}' \
-    | grep -E '^([0-9]{1,3}\.){3}[0-9]{1,3}(/[0-9]{1,2})?$|^([0-9a-fA-F]{1,4}:){2,}[0-9a-fA-F:]*[0-9a-fA-F](/[0-9]{1,3})?$' \
-    | awk '
-        # Only globally routable attacker space may become a decision. Reserved,
-        # private, loopback, link-local, CGNAT, test and multicast ranges never
-        # represent an external attacker and must not be imported (they could
-        # otherwise block the origin itself or internal traffic).
-        function isReserved4(prefix, a, b, c) {
-          if (a == 0 || a == 127 || a >= 224) return 1
-          if (a == 10) return 1
-          if (a == 100 && (prefix < 10 || (prefix >= 10 && b >= 64 && b <= 127))) return 1
-          if (a == 169 && (prefix < 16 || (prefix >= 16 && b == 254))) return 1
-          if (a == 172 && (prefix < 12 || (prefix >= 12 && b >= 16 && b <= 31))) return 1
-          if (a == 192 && b == 168) return 1
-          if (a == 192 && b == 0) return 1
-          if ((a == 198 && (b == 18 || b == 19)) || (a == 198 && b == 51 && c == 100)) return 1
-          if (a == 203 && b == 0 && c == 113) return 1
-          return 0
-        }
-        function isReserved6(line, prefix,   first, h) {
-          if (prefix < 32) return 1
-          if (line ~ /^::/) return 1
-          first = tolower(line); sub(/^::?/, "", first); sub(/:.*/, "", first)
-          h = "0x" substr(first, 1, 2)
-          if (h >= 252) return 1    # ULA fc00::/7, link-local fe80::/10, multicast ff00::/8
-          return 0
-        }
-        {
-          if (index($0, "/") > 0) {
-            n = split($0, seg, "/")
-            if (n != 2 || seg[2] !~ /^[0-9]+$/) next
-            if (index(seg[1], ":") > 0) {
-              pref = seg[2] + 0
-              if (pref < 32 || pref > 128) next
-              if (isReserved6(seg[1], pref)) next
-              print
-              next
-            }
-            pref = seg[2] + 0
-            if (pref < 8 || pref > 32) next
-            split(seg[1], oct, ".")
-            ok = 1
-            for (i = 1; i <= 4; i++) {
-              if (oct[i] !~ /^[0-9]+$/ || oct[i] + 0 > 255) { ok = 0; break }
-              if (length(oct[i]) > 1 && oct[i] ~ /^0/) { ok = 0; break }
-            }
-            if (!ok) next
-            if (isReserved4(pref, oct[1] + 0, oct[2] + 0, oct[3] + 0)) next
-            print
-            next
-          }
-          if (index($0, ":") > 0) {
-            if (isReserved6($0, 128)) next
-            print
-            next
-          }
-          n = split($0, part, ".")
-          if (n != 4) next
-          ok = 1
-          for (i = 1; i <= 4; i++) {
-            if (part[i] !~ /^[0-9]+$/ || part[i] + 0 > 255) { ok = 0; break }
-            if (length(part[i]) > 1 && part[i] ~ /^0/) { ok = 0; break }
-          }
-          if (!ok) next
-          if (isReserved4(32, part[1] + 0, part[2] + 0, part[3] + 0)) next
-          print
-        }' \
-    | sort -u > "$work/candidates.txt"
-
-  if [[ -n "$allowlist" ]]; then
-    printf '%s\n' "$allowlist" | tr ',' '\n' | while IFS= read -r line; do printf '%s\n' "$line"; done | sort -u > "$work/allow.txt"
-    comm -23 "$work/candidates.txt" "$work/allow.txt" > "$work/final.txt"
-  else
-    cp "$work/candidates.txt" "$work/final.txt"
-  fi
-
-  if [[ "$(wc -l < "$work/final.txt" | tr -d ' ')" -gt "$max_decisions" ]]; then
-    sort -u "$work/final.txt" | head -n "$max_decisions" > "$work/final.limited.txt" || true
-    mv "$work/final.limited.txt" "$work/final.txt"
-    printf 'Note: capped the combined list at %s decisions (CROWDSEC_BLOCKLIST_MAX_DECISIONS).\n' "$max_decisions"
-  fi
-
-  count_total=$(wc -l < "$work/final.txt" | tr -d ' ')
-  count_ip=$(grep -cv '/' "$work/final.txt" || true)
-  count_range=$(grep -c '/' "$work/final.txt" || true)
-  if [[ "$count_total" -lt 1 ]]; then
-    fail "No valid addresses could be parsed from the configured sources. Configure CROWDSEC_BLOCKLIST_SOURCES."
-  fi
-}
-
-build_lists
-
-printf 'Parsed %s targets (%s IPs, %s ranges).\n' "$count_total" "$count_ip" "$count_range"
-
-if $dry_run; then
-  printf 'Dry run: would replace the cscli-import decisions with these %s targets.\n' "$count_total"
-  exit 0
-fi
-
-container_running || fail "The CrowdSec engine is not running. Start it first with: bash cms security"
-
-printf 'Removing previous cscli-import decisions...\n'
-cscli_exec decisions delete --origin cscli-import >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
-
-{
-  printf 'duration,scope,value\n'
-  awk -v d="$duration" '{ if (index($0, "/") > 0) printf "%s,range,%s\n", d, $0; else printf "%s,ip,%s\n", d, $0 }' "$work/final.txt"
-} > "$work/import.csv"
-
-printf 'Importing %s decisions into the local LAPI (duration %s)...\n' "$count_total" "$duration"
-cscli_exec decisions import -i - --format csv --batch 1000 < "$work/import.csv"
-
-printf 'Done. The app bouncer picks these up within a few seconds.\n'

scripts/crowdsec-setup.sh

@@ -1,154 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env bash
-set -Eeuo pipefail
-DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/.." && pwd)"
-cd "$DIR"
-ENV_FILE="$DIR/.env"
-COMPOSE_FILE="deployment/crowdsec/compose.crowdsec.yml"
-PROJECT_NAME="epicnext-crowdsec"
-CONTAINER_NAME="epicnext-crowdsec"
-DEFAULT_PORT="18080"
-
-mode="${1:-enable}"
-case "$mode" in
-  enable|--enable) ;;
-  status|--status) ;;
-  disable|--disable) ;;
-  blocklists|blocklists-install-cron|blocklists-uninstall-cron) ;;
-  *) echo "Usage: bash cms security [enable|status|disable|blocklists|blocklists-install-cron|blocklists-uninstall-cron]" >&2; exit 1 ;;
-esac
-
-umask 077
-fail() { printf 'ERROR: %s\n' "$*" >&2; exit 1; }
-for command in docker flock; do command -v "$command" >/dev/null || fail "Required command: $command"; done
-docker info >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "Docker is not reachable."
-docker compose version >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "Docker Compose plugin required."
-exec 9>"$DIR/.deploy.lock"
-flock -w 30 9 || fail "Another installation or update is running."
-[[ -f "$ENV_FILE" ]] || fail "Create .env first (bash cms install)."
-
-case "$mode" in
-  blocklists) exec bash "$DIR/scripts/blocklists-sync.sh" sync "${2:-}" ;;
-  blocklists-install-cron) exec bash "$DIR/scripts/blocklists-sync.sh" install-cron ;;
-  blocklists-uninstall-cron) exec bash "$DIR/scripts/blocklists-sync.sh" uninstall-cron ;;
-esac
-
-env_get() {
-  local key="$1" line
-  while IFS= read -r line || [[ -n "$line" ]]; do
-    case "$line" in
-      "$key="*) line="${line#*=}"; line="${line%\"}"; line="${line#\"}"; printf '%s' "$line"; return 0 ;;
-    esac
-  done < "$ENV_FILE"
-  return 1
-}
-
-env_set() {
-  local key="$1" value="$2" tmp
-  tmp="$(mktemp "$DIR/.env.crowdsec.XXXXXX")"
-  if awk -v k="$key" -v v="$value" 'BEGIN{FS=OFS="=";done=0} { if ($1==k) { print k "=" v; done=1 } else print } END { if (!done) print k "=" v }' "$ENV_FILE" > "$tmp"; then
-    chmod 600 "$tmp"
-    mv -f -- "$tmp" "$ENV_FILE"
-  else
-    rm -f -- "$tmp"
-    fail "Could not update .env"
-  fi
-}
-
-compose_cmd() {
-  docker compose --project-name "$PROJECT_NAME" --env-file "$ENV_FILE" -f "$COMPOSE_FILE" --profile security "$@"
-}
-
-health_probe() {
-  local url="$1"
-  if command -v curl >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-    curl -fsS --max-time 3 "$url" >/dev/null 2>&1
-  else
-    compose_cmd exec -T crowdsec wget -q -O - "$url" >/dev/null 2>&1
-  fi
-}
-
-container_running() {
-  [[ "$(docker inspect -f '{{.State.Running}}' "$CONTAINER_NAME" 2>/dev/null || true)" = true ]]
-}
-
-if [[ "$mode" = disable || "$mode" = --disable ]]; then
-  set +e
-  compose_cmd stop crowdsec
-  rc=$?
-  set -e
-  [[ $rc -eq 0 ]] || printf 'CrowdSec engine was not running or could not be stopped.\n'
-  env_set CROWDSEC_LOCAL_ENABLED false
-  printf 'CrowdSec local stack disabled. The engine container is stopped; volumes and .env key were kept.\n'
-  exit 0
-fi
-
-if [[ "$mode" = status || "$mode" = --status ]]; then
-  enabled=no
-  [[ "$(env_get CROWDSEC_LOCAL_ENABLED 2>/dev/null || true)" = true ]] && enabled=yes
-  port="$(env_get CROWDSEC_LAPI_PORT 2>/dev/null || true)"
-  [[ -z "$port" ]] && port="$DEFAULT_PORT"
-  printf 'CROWDSEC_LOCAL_ENABLED=%s\n' "$enabled"
-  if container_running; then
-    printf 'Engine: running\n'
-    if health_probe "http://127.0.0.1:$port/health"; then
-      printf 'LAPI health: OK (127.0.0.1:%s)\n' "$port"
-    else
-      printf 'LAPI health: UNREACHABLE (127.0.0.1:%s)\n' "$port"
-    fi
-  else
-    printf 'Engine: not running\n'
-    printf 'Start with: bash cms security\n'
-  fi
-  exit 0
-fi
-
-port="$(env_get CROWDSEC_LAPI_PORT 2>/dev/null || true)"
-[[ -n "$port" ]] || port="$DEFAULT_PORT"
-[[ "$port" =~ ^[0-9]{1,5}$ ]] || fail "CROWDSEC_LAPI_PORT must be a port number."
-if (( port < 1024 || port > 65535 )); then
-  fail "CROWDSEC_LAPI_PORT must be within 1024-65535."
-fi
-key="$(env_get CROWDSEC_LAPI_API_KEY 2>/dev/null || true)"
-[[ -n "$key" ]] || key="$(od -An -N32 -tx1 /dev/urandom | tr -d ' \n')"
-url="$(env_get CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL 2>/dev/null || true)"
-[[ -n "$url" ]] || url="http://127.0.0.1:$port"
-log_dir="${CROWDSEC_NGINX_LOG_DIR:-$(env_get CROWDSEC_NGINX_LOG_DIR 2>/dev/null || true)}"
-[[ -n "$log_dir" ]] || log_dir="/var/log/nginx"
-
-if ! container_running && command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-  if ss -ltn "( sport = :$port )" 2>/dev/null | grep -q LISTEN; then
-    fail "Port $port is already in use. Set CROWDSEC_LAPI_PORT (and CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL) in .env to a free port and re-run."
-  fi
-fi
-
-if [[ ! -r "$log_dir/access.log" ]]; then
-  printf 'Warning: %s/access.log is not readable. The engine will run but has no detections until an access log is available.\n' "$log_dir"
-fi
-
-env_set CROWDSEC_LOCAL_ENABLED true
-env_set CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL "$url"
-env_set CROWDSEC_LAPI_PORT "$port"
-env_set CROWDSEC_LAPI_API_KEY "$key"
-env_set CROWDSEC_NGINX_LOG_DIR "$log_dir"
-
-compose_cmd config --quiet || fail "CrowdSec Compose configuration is invalid; fix CROWDSEC_* settings in .env." 
-set +e
-compose_cmd up -d --wait crowdsec
-rc=$?
-set -e
-if [[ $rc -ne 0 ]]; then
-  compose_cmd up -d crowdsec
-fi
-
-attempt=0
-while ! health_probe "http://127.0.0.1:$port/health"; do
-  attempt=$((attempt + 1))
-  [[ $attempt -lt 30 ]] || fail "CrowdSec LAPI did not become healthy on port $port."
-  sleep 2
-done
-
-printf 'CrowdSec engine running in LAPI-only mode on 127.0.0.1:%s (container %s).\n' "$port" "$CONTAINER_NAME"
-compose_cmd exec -T crowdsec cscli bouncers list >/dev/null 2>&1 \
-  && printf 'Bouncer "cms" was registered against the local LAPI.\n' \
-  || printf 'Warning: could not list bouncers. Diagnose with: docker compose exec -T %s cscli bouncers list\n' "$CONTAINER_NAME"
-printf 'Restart the CMS container (or run your next deployment) so it loads the new bouncer env. For a clone: bash cms update --skip-pull\n'

scripts/docker-start.import.test.mjs

@@ -15,29 +15,3 @@ it("imports runtime validation without starting the CMS", () => {
 	);
 	assert.equal(result.status, 0, result.stderr);
 });
-
-it("rejects the local CrowdSec bouncer without a key", () => {
-	const result = spawnSync(
-		process.execPath,
-		[
-			"--input-type=module",
-			"-e",
-			"import {validateRuntime} from './scripts/docker-start.mjs';try{validateRuntime({HOTEL_NAME:'x',AUTH_SECRET:'01234567890123456789012345678901',DATABASE_URL:'mysql://u:p@h/db',APP_URL:'http://h',CROWDSEC_LOCAL_ENABLED:'true'});process.exit(1)}catch(error){if(!String(error.message).includes('CROWDSEC_LAPI_API_KEY'))throw error}",
-		],
-		{ encoding: "utf8" },
-	);
-	assert.equal(result.status, 0, result.stderr);
-});
-
-it("accepts a complete local CrowdSec configuration", () => {
-	const result = spawnSync(
-		process.execPath,
-		[
-			"--input-type=module",
-			"-e",
-			"import {validateRuntime} from './scripts/docker-start.mjs';validateRuntime({HOTEL_NAME:'x',AUTH_SECRET:'01234567890123456789012345678901',DATABASE_URL:'mysql://u:p@h/db',APP_URL:'http://h',CROWDSEC_LOCAL_ENABLED:'true',CROWDSEC_LAPI_API_KEY:'fixture-key',CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL:'http://127.0.0.1:18080'})",
-		],
-		{ encoding: "utf8" },
-	);
-	assert.equal(result.status, 0, result.stderr);
-});

scripts/docker-start.mjs

@@ -23,22 +23,6 @@ export function validateRuntime(settings) {
 			invalid.push(key);
 		}
 	}
-	const localEnabled = ["true", "1"].includes(
-		String(settings.CROWDSEC_LOCAL_ENABLED ?? "")
-			.trim()
-			.toLowerCase(),
-	);
-	if (localEnabled) {
-		if (!settings.CROWDSEC_LAPI_API_KEY?.trim())
-			invalid.push("CROWDSEC_LAPI_API_KEY");
-		if (settings.CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL) {
-			try {
-				new URL(settings.CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL);
-			} catch {
-				invalid.push("CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL");
-			}
-		}
-	}
 	if (invalid.length)
 		throw new Error(`Invalid runtime configuration: ${invalid.join(", ")}`);
 }

scripts/proxy-config.test.mjs

@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ import {
 	copyFileSync,
 	mkdirSync,
 	mkdtempSync,
-	readFileSync,
 	rmSync,
 	writeFileSync,
 } from "node:fs";
@@ -85,93 +84,3 @@ it.skipIf(!hasCompose)(
 	},
 	30_000,
 );
-
-it("documents the local CrowdSec switches in .env.example", () => {
-	const examples = readFileSync(path.join(root, ".env.example"), "utf8");
-	for (const key of [
-		"CROWDSEC_LOCAL_ENABLED",
-		"CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL",
-		"CROWDSEC_LAPI_PORT",
-		"CROWDSEC_LAPI_API_KEY",
-		"CROWDSEC_NGINX_LOG_DIR",
-	]) {
-		expect(examples).toContain(key);
-	}
-});
-
-it.skipIf(!hasCompose)(
-	"renders the standalone CrowdSec stack with a loopback-only LAPI",
-	() => {
-		const directory = mkdtempSync(path.join(tmpdir(), "cms-crowdsec-"));
-		try {
-			mkdirSync(path.join(directory, "deployment/crowdsec/acquis.d"), {
-				recursive: true,
-			});
-			copyFileSync(
-				path.join(root, "deployment/crowdsec/compose.crowdsec.yml"),
-				path.join(directory, "deployment/crowdsec/compose.crowdsec.yml"),
-			);
-			copyFileSync(
-				path.join(root, "deployment/crowdsec/acquis.d/nginx.yaml"),
-				path.join(directory, "deployment/crowdsec/acquis.d/nginx.yaml"),
-			);
-			writeFileSync(
-				path.join(directory, ".env"),
-				[
-					"CROWDSEC_LAPI_API_KEY=fixture-key",
-					"CROWDSEC_LAPI_PORT=18080",
-					"CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL=http://127.0.0.1:18080",
-					"CROWDSEC_NGINX_LOG_DIR=/var/log/nginx",
-				].join("\n"),
-			);
-			const environment = { ...process.env };
-			for (const key of Object.keys(environment))
-				if (
-					key.startsWith("COMPOSE_") ||
-					key.startsWith("CROWDSEC_") ||
-					key.startsWith("TZ")
-				)
-					delete environment[key];
-			const result = spawnSync(
-				"docker",
-				[
-					"compose",
-					"--project-name",
-					"crowdsec-fixture",
-					"--env-file",
-					".env",
-					"-f",
-					"deployment/crowdsec/compose.crowdsec.yml",
-					"--profile",
-					"security",
-					"config",
-					"--format",
-					"json",
-				],
-				{ cwd: directory, env: environment, encoding: "utf8", timeout: 15_000 },
-			);
-			expect(result.status, result.stderr).toBe(0);
-			const config = JSON.parse(result.stdout);
-			const service = config.services.crowdsec;
-			expect(service).toBeDefined();
-			expect(service.image).toContain("crowdsecurity/crowdsec:");
-			expect(service.environment.BOUNCER_KEY_cms).toBe("fixture-key");
-			expect(service.environment.DISABLE_ONLINE_API).toBe("true");
-			expect(
-				service.ports.some(
-					(published) =>
-						published.host_ip === "127.0.0.1" &&
-						published.published === "18080" &&
-						published.target === 8080,
-				),
-			).toBe(true);
-			const targets = service.volumes.map((volume) => volume.target);
-			expect(targets).toContain("/var/log/nginx");
-			expect(targets).toContain("/etc/crowdsec/acquis.d");
-			expect(service.healthcheck.test.join(" ")).toContain("wget");
-		} finally {
-			rmSync(directory, { recursive: true, force: true });
-		}
-	},
-	30_000,
-);

src/actions/admin-antiddos.ts

@@ -15,14 +15,6 @@ import {
 	setLastCloudflareVerify,
 	verifyCloudflareConnection,
 } from "@/lib/cloudflare-api";
-import {
-	setLastCrowdsecVerify,
-	verifyCrowdsecConnection,
-} from "@/lib/crowdsec-api";
-import {
-	setLastCrowdsecReport,
-	verifyCrowdsecReporting,
-} from "@/lib/crowdsec-report";
 import { db, WebsiteSetting } from "@/lib/db";
 import { logger } from "@/lib/logger";
 import { PERMS } from "@/lib/permissions";
@@ -41,17 +33,6 @@ function positiveInt(raw: FormDataEntryValue | null, fallback: number): number {
 	return Math.floor(n);
 }
 
-function clampInt(
-	raw: FormDataEntryValue | null,
-	fallback: number,
-	min: number,
-	max: number,
-): number {
-	const n = Number(str(raw));
-	if (!Number.isFinite(n)) return fallback;
-	return Math.min(max, Math.max(min, Math.floor(n)));
-}
-
 function parseTiers(raw: FormDataEntryValue | null): AntiddosBlockTier[] {
 	const tiers: AntiddosBlockTier[] = [];
 	for (const part of str(raw).split(",")) {
@@ -118,17 +99,6 @@ function configFromForm(formData: FormData): AntiddosConfig {
 			defaults.globalHaltMs,
 		),
 		cloudflareAutoBlock: str(formData.get("cfa_auto_block")) === "1",
-		crowdsecAutoBlock: str(formData.get("cs_auto_block")) === "1",
-		crowdsecBlockScore: clampInt(
-			formData.get("cs_block_score"),
-			defaults.crowdsecBlockScore,
-			0,
-			5,
-		),
-		crowdsecBlockTtlSeconds: positiveInt(
-			formData.get("cs_block_ttl_sec"),
-			defaults.crowdsecBlockTtlSeconds,
-		),
 	};
 }
 
@@ -153,9 +123,6 @@ async function persistSettings(config: AntiddosConfig): Promise<void> {
 		],
 		["antiddos_global_halt_ms", String(config.globalHaltMs)],
 		["antiddos_cfa_auto_block", config.cloudflareAutoBlock ? "1" : "0"],
-		["antiddos_cs_auto_block", config.crowdsecAutoBlock ? "1" : "0"],
-		["antiddos_cs_block_score", String(config.crowdsecBlockScore)],
-		["antiddos_cs_block_ttl", String(config.crowdsecBlockTtlSeconds)],
 	];
 	await Promise.all(
 		entries.map(([key, value]) =>
@@ -228,7 +195,6 @@ export async function unbanAntiddosIp(formData: FormData): Promise<void> {
 			await Promise.all([
 				redis.del(`antiddos:block:${ip}`),
 				redis.del(`antiddos:block:meta:${ip}`),
-				redis.del(`crowdsec:report:${ip}`),
 				redis.del(`antiddos:v:${ip}`),
 			]);
 		}
@@ -265,32 +231,6 @@ export async function removeCloudflareRule(formData: FormData): Promise<void> {
 	revalidatePath("/admin/devops/antiddos");
 }
 
-/** Test the configured CrowdSec API credentials against the CTI endpoint. */
-export async function verifyCrowdsecConfiguration(): Promise<void> {
-	const staff = await requirePermission(PERMS.SETTINGS_VIEW);
-	const status = await verifyCrowdsecConnection();
-	await setLastCrowdsecVerify(status);
-	logger.info("CrowdSec API configuration verified", {
-		staff: staff.username,
-		ok: status.ok,
-		message: status.message,
-	});
-	revalidatePath("/admin/devops/antiddos");
-}
-
-/** Test the CrowdSec signal-push (CAPI watcher) channel. */
-export async function verifyCrowdsecReportingConfiguration(): Promise<void> {
-	const staff = await requirePermission(PERMS.SETTINGS_VIEW);
-	const status = await verifyCrowdsecReporting();
-	await setLastCrowdsecReport(status);
-	logger.info("CrowdSec reporting configuration verified", {
-		staff: staff.username,
-		ok: status.ok,
-		message: status.message,
-	});
-	revalidatePath("/admin/devops/antiddos");
-}
-
 /** Test the configured Cloudflare API credentials against the zone. */
 export async function verifyCloudflareConfiguration(): Promise<void> {
 	const staff = await requirePermission(PERMS.SETTINGS_VIEW);

src/app/admin/devops/antiddos/page.tsx

@@ -1,11 +1,4 @@
-import {
+import { BadgeCheck, Cloud, Lock, Server, ShieldAlert } from "lucide-react";
-	BadgeCheck,
-	Cloud,
-	Lock,
-	Radar,
-	Server,
-	ShieldAlert,
-} from "lucide-react";
 import { headers } from "next/headers";
 import { redirect } from "next/navigation";
 import {
@@ -14,8 +7,6 @@ import {
 	saveAntiddosSettings,
 	unbanAntiddosIp,
 	verifyCloudflareConfiguration,
-	verifyCrowdsecConfiguration,
-	verifyCrowdsecReportingConfiguration,
 } from "@/actions/admin-antiddos";
 import { Badge } from "@/components/ui/badge";
 import { Button } from "@/components/ui/button";
@@ -33,19 +24,6 @@ import {
 	listCloudflareBlocks,
 	sweepExpiredCloudflareBlocks,
 } from "@/lib/cloudflare-api";
-import {
-	CROWDSEC_BLOCK_SOURCE,
-	type CrowdsecBlockMeta,
-	crowdsecEnabled,
-	getCrowdsecBlockMeta,
-	getCrowdsecQuotaUsage,
-	getLastCrowdsecVerify,
-} from "@/lib/crowdsec-api";
-import {
-	crowdsecReportEnabled,
-	getLastCrowdsecReport,
-} from "@/lib/crowdsec-report";
-import { type CrowdsecDailyStat, getCrowdsecStats } from "@/lib/crowdsec-stats";
 import { db, WebsiteSetting } from "@/lib/db";
 import { canAccess, getAdminContext, PERMS } from "@/lib/permissions";
 import { redis } from "@/lib/redis";
@@ -58,40 +36,6 @@ function seconds(ttlMs: number): string {
 	return `${Math.floor(s / 3600)}h ${Math.floor((s % 3600) / 60)}m`;
 }
 
-function BarSparkline({ values }: { values: number[] }) {
-	if (values.length === 0) return null;
-	const max = Math.max(...values, 1);
-	return (
-		<div className="flex items-end gap-[3px] h-10" aria-hidden="true">
-			{values.map((v, i) => (
-				<div
-					// biome-ignore lint/suspicious/noArrayIndexKey: static timeline position is the bar's identity
-					key={i}
-					className="w-full rounded-sm bg-primary/60"
-					style={{
-						height: `${Math.max(v > 0 ? 6 : 2, (v / max) * 100)}%`,
-						opacity: v === 0 ? 0.15 : 0.6 + (v / max) * 0.4,
-					}}
-				/>
-			))}
-		</div>
-	);
-}
-
-/** Merge per-day breakdown maps (categories / reputations) into range totals. */
-function mergeBreakdowns(
-	rows: CrowdsecDailyStat[],
-	kind: keyof Pick<CrowdsecDailyStat, "categories" | "reputations">,
-): Record<string, number> {
-	const totals: Record<string, number> = {};
-	for (const row of rows) {
-		for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(row[kind])) {
-			totals[k] = (totals[k] ?? 0) + v;
-		}
-	}
-	return totals;
-}
-
 export default async function AdminAntiDdosPage() {
 	const { session, permissions } = await getAdminContext();
 	if (!canAccess(permissions, PERMS.SETTINGS_VIEW, session.user.rank)) {
@@ -118,8 +62,7 @@ export default async function AdminAntiDdosPage() {
 		ip: string;
 		ttlMs: number;
 		count: number;
-		source: "gate" | "crowdsec";
+		source: "gate";
-		meta: CrowdsecBlockMeta | null;
 	}[] = [];
 	let redisOk = false;
 	const rateStore = redis;
@@ -140,23 +83,13 @@ export default async function AdminAntiDdosPage() {
 			}
 			const withTtl = await Promise.all(
 				blockKeys.slice(0, 100).map(async (key) => {
-					const [ttlMs, value] = await Promise.all([
+					const ttlMs = await rateStore.pttl(key);
-						rateStore.pttl(key),
-						rateStore.get(key),
-					]);
 					const ip = key.replace("antiddos:block:", "");
-					const source =
-						value === CROWDSEC_BLOCK_SOURCE
-							? ("crowdsec" as const)
-							: ("gate" as const);
 					return {
 						ip,
 						ttlMs: ttlMs > 0 ? ttlMs : 0,
 						count: violationCounts.get(ip) ?? 0,
-						// The gate writes "1"; "crowdsec" marks a community-reputation block.
+						source: "gate" as const,
-						source,
-						// Why CrowdSec blocked this IP, when the meta was recorded.
-						meta: source === "crowdsec" ? await getCrowdsecBlockMeta(ip) : null,
 					};
 				}),
 			);
@@ -177,12 +110,6 @@ export default async function AdminAntiDdosPage() {
 		cloudflareBlocks.push(...(await listCloudflareBlocks()));
 	}
 	const lastVerify = await getLastCloudflareVerify();
-	const crowdsecConfigured = crowdsecEnabled();
-	const lastCrowdsecVerify = await getLastCrowdsecVerify();
-	const crowdsecUsage = redisOk ? await getCrowdsecQuotaUsage() : null;
-	const reportingEnabled = await crowdsecReportEnabled();
-	const lastReport = await getLastCrowdsecReport();
-	const crowdsecStats = redisOk ? await getCrowdsecStats(14) : [];
 
 	return (
 		<div className="space-y-6">
@@ -237,23 +164,6 @@ export default async function AdminAntiDdosPage() {
 					</CardContent>
 				</Card>
 
-				<Card>
-					<CardHeader className="flex flex-row items-center justify-between space-y-0 pb-2">
-						<CardTitle className="text-sm font-medium">CrowdSec</CardTitle>
-						<Radar className="h-4 w-4 text-muted-foreground" />
-					</CardHeader>
-					<CardContent>
-						<Badge variant={crowdsecConfigured ? "default" : "secondary"}>
-							{crowdsecConfigured ? "Connected" : "Not configured"}
-						</Badge>
-						<p className="text-xs text-muted-foreground mt-1">
-							{crowdsecUsage && crowdsecUsage.quota > 0
-								? `${crowdsecUsage.used.toLocaleString()} / ${crowdsecUsage.quota.toLocaleString()} CTI calls today${crowdsecUsage.exhausted ? " (paused)" : ""}`
-								: "Community reputation auto-block"}
-						</p>
-					</CardContent>
-				</Card>
-
 				<Card>
 					<CardHeader className="flex flex-row items-center justify-between space-y-0 pb-2">
 						<CardTitle className="text-sm font-medium">Active blocks</CardTitle>
@@ -351,53 +261,6 @@ export default async function AdminAntiDdosPage() {
 							block.
 						</p>
 
-						<label className="flex items-center gap-2 text-sm">
-							<input
-								type="checkbox"
-								name="cs_auto_block"
-								value="1"
-								defaultChecked={effective.crowdsecAutoBlock}
-							/>
-							Automatically block IPs flagged as malicious by the CrowdSec
-							community
-						</label>
-						<p className="text-xs text-muted-foreground -mt-2">
-							Requires <span className="font-mono">CROWDSEC_API_KEY</span> in
-							the environment. When a repeat offender has a bad community
-							reputation it is hard-blocked immediately (no need to cross the
-							local violation threshold). IPs carrying CrowdSec false-positive
-							tags are never blocked.
-						</p>
-						<div className="flex flex-wrap items-center gap-4">
-							<label className="block">
-								<span className="text-xs font-medium">
-									Minimum reputation score (0–5)
-								</span>
-								<input
-									name="cs_block_score"
-									type="number"
-									min={0}
-									max={5}
-									defaultValue={effective.crowdsecBlockScore}
-									className="w-24 mt-1"
-								/>
-								<span className="text-xs text-muted-foreground ml-2">
-									4–5 = malicious (CrowdSec scale)
-								</span>
-							</label>
-							<label className="block">
-								<span className="text-xs font-medium">
-									Block duration (sec)
-								</span>
-								<input
-									name="cs_block_ttl_sec"
-									type="number"
-									defaultValue={effective.crowdsecBlockTtlSeconds}
-									className="w-32 mt-1"
-								/>
-							</label>
-						</div>
-
 						<div className="grid grid-cols-1 gap-4 md:grid-cols-3">
 							{(
 								[
@@ -540,10 +403,6 @@ export default async function AdminAntiDdosPage() {
 					) : (
 						<div className="space-y-2">
 							{blocks.map((b) => {
-								const behaviorLabel =
-									b.meta && b.meta.behaviors.length > 0
-										? b.meta.behaviors.join(", ")
-										: null;
 								return (
 									<div
 										key={b.ip}
@@ -551,22 +410,8 @@ export default async function AdminAntiDdosPage() {
 									>
 										<span className="font-mono">{b.ip}</span>
 										<span className="flex items-center gap-2 text-xs text-muted-foreground">
-											{b.source === "crowdsec" ? (
-												<Badge variant="default">CrowdSec</Badge>
-											) : (
 											<Badge variant="secondary">Gate</Badge>
-											)}
 											TTL {seconds(b.ttlMs)} · violations {b.count}
-											{b.meta && (
-												<span
-													className="max-w-xs truncate"
-													title={`${b.meta.reputation ?? "unknown"} · score ${b.meta.score} · ${b.meta.category}${behaviorLabel ? ` · ${behaviorLabel}` : ""}`}
-												>
-													{b.meta.reputation ?? "unknown"} · score{" "}
-													{b.meta.score} · {b.meta.category}
-													{behaviorLabel ? ` · ${behaviorLabel}` : ""}
-												</span>
-											)}
 										</span>
 										<form action={unbanAntiddosIp}>
 											<input type="hidden" name="ip" value={b.ip} />
@@ -660,243 +505,6 @@ export default async function AdminAntiDdosPage() {
 				</CardContent>
 			</Card>
 
-			<Card>
-				<CardHeader>
-					<CardTitle className="flex items-center gap-2">
-						<Radar className="h-4 w-4" /> CrowdSec reputation API
-					</CardTitle>
-				</CardHeader>
-				<CardContent className="space-y-4">
-					<div className="flex flex-wrap items-center gap-3">
-						<Badge variant={crowdsecConfigured ? "default" : "secondary"}>
-							{crowdsecConfigured ? "API configured" : "API not configured"}
-						</Badge>
-						{!crowdsecConfigured && (
-							<p className="text-xs text-muted-foreground">
-								Set <span className="font-mono">CROWDSEC_API_KEY</span> to
-								enable community-reputation auto-blocks. When a repeat offender
-								is flagged as malicious by the CrowdSec community it is
-								hard-blocked immediately without waiting for the local violation
-								threshold.
-							</p>
-						)}
-						<form action={verifyCrowdsecConfiguration}>
-							<Button
-								type="submit"
-								size="sm"
-								variant="outline"
-								disabled={!crowdsecConfigured}
-							>
-								Verify connection
-							</Button>
-						</form>
-					</div>
-
-					{lastCrowdsecVerify && crowdsecConfigured && (
-						<p className="text-xs">
-							<Badge
-								variant={lastCrowdsecVerify.ok ? "default" : "destructive"}
-							>
-								{lastCrowdsecVerify.ok ? "Reachable" : "Failed"}
-							</Badge>
-							<span className="ml-2 text-muted-foreground">
-								{lastCrowdsecVerify.ok
-									? `CTI endpoint verified ${new Date(lastCrowdsecVerify.at).toLocaleString()}`
-									: lastCrowdsecVerify.message}
-							</span>
-						</p>
-					)}
-
-					{crowdsecConfigured && (
-						<p className="text-sm text-muted-foreground">
-							Verdicts are looked up lazily for IPs that already triggered a
-							rate bucket (never on the per-request hot path), cached for an
-							hour, and blocked IPs show a{" "}
-							<Badge variant="default">CrowdSec</Badge> badge in the list above
-							with the community reasoning (reputation, score, behaviors).
-						</p>
-					)}
-
-					{crowdsecUsage && (
-						<div className="rounded-md border p-3">
-							<p className="text-xs font-medium mb-1">
-								Reputation lookups today
-							</p>
-							{crowdsecUsage.quota > 0 ? (
-								<>
-									<div className="flex items-center gap-2">
-										<div className="h-2 flex-1 overflow-hidden rounded-full bg-muted">
-											<div
-												className="h-full rounded-full"
-												style={{
-													width: `${Math.min(100, (crowdsecUsage.used / crowdsecUsage.quota) * 100)}%`,
-													background: crowdsecUsage.exhausted
-														? "var(--color-destructive)"
-														: crowdsecUsage.used >= crowdsecUsage.quota * 0.8
-															? "var(--admin-accent)"
-															: "var(--color-primary)",
-												}}
-											/>
-										</div>
-										<span
-											className={`text-xs ${crowdsecUsage.exhausted ? "text-destructive" : "text-muted-foreground"}`}
-										>
-											{crowdsecUsage.used.toLocaleString()} /{" "}
-											{crowdsecUsage.quota.toLocaleString()}
-										</span>
-									</div>
-									<p className="text-xs text-muted-foreground mt-1">
-										{crowdsecUsage.exhausted
-											? "Quota spent for today — reputation lookups are paused until tomorrow (admin via CROWDSEC_CTI_DAILY_QUOTA)."
-											: "Visible in the env via CROWDSEC_CTI_DAILY_QUOTA (0 = unlimited). Lookups pause at the ceiling to protect the plan."}
-									</p>
-								</>
-							) : (
-								<p className="text-xs text-muted-foreground">
-									Tracking disabled (CROWDSEC_CTI_DAILY_QUOTA = 0 / unlimited).
-								</p>
-							)}
-						</div>
-					)}
-
-					{crowdsecStats.length > 0 && (
-						<div className="rounded-md border p-3">
-							<div className="flex flex-wrap items-center justify-between gap-2">
-								<p className="text-xs font-medium">
-									Daily activity (last {crowdsecStats.length} days)
-								</p>
-								<a
-									href="/admin/alerts"
-									className="text-xs text-muted-foreground underline-offset-2 hover:underline"
-								>
-									Ops alert history →
-								</a>
-							</div>
-							<div className="mt-2 grid gap-4 sm:grid-cols-3">
-								<BarSparkline values={crowdsecStats.map((row) => row.blocks)} />
-								<div className="col-span-2 flex flex-wrap items-center gap-1.5">
-									{Object.entries(
-										mergeBreakdowns(crowdsecStats, "categories"),
-									).map(([category, count]) => (
-										<Badge key={category} variant="secondary">
-											{category} · {count.toLocaleString()}
-										</Badge>
-									))}
-									{Object.entries(
-										mergeBreakdowns(crowdsecStats, "reputations"),
-									).map(([reputation, count]) => (
-										<Badge
-											key={reputation}
-											variant={
-												reputation === "malicious" ? "destructive" : "secondary"
-											}
-										>
-											{reputation} · {count.toLocaleString()}
-										</Badge>
-									))}
-								</div>
-							</div>
-							<div className="mt-3 max-h-40 overflow-y-auto">
-								<table className="w-full text-xs">
-									<thead>
-										<tr className="text-left text-muted-foreground">
-											<th className="pb-1 pr-2 font-medium">Date</th>
-											<th className="pb-1 pr-2 font-medium text-right">
-												Lookups
-											</th>
-											<th className="pb-1 pr-2 font-medium text-right">
-												Blocks
-											</th>
-											<th className="pb-1 pr-2 font-medium text-right">
-												Reports
-											</th>
-											<th className="pb-1 font-medium text-right">Failures</th>
-										</tr>
-									</thead>
-									<tbody>
-										{crowdsecStats.map((row) => (
-											<tr key={row.date} className="border-t">
-												<td className="py-1 pr-2 text-muted-foreground">
-													{row.date === new Date().toISOString().slice(0, 10)
-														? "Today"
-														: row.date.slice(5)}
-												</td>
-												<td className="py-1 pr-2 text-right">
-													{row.lookups.toLocaleString()}
-												</td>
-												<td className="py-1 pr-2 text-right">
-													{row.blocks.toLocaleString()}
-												</td>
-												<td className="py-1 pr-2 text-right">
-													{row.reports.toLocaleString()}
-												</td>
-												<td className="py-1 text-right">
-													{row.reportFailures > 0 ? (
-														<span className="text-destructive">
-															{row.reportFailures.toLocaleString()}
-														</span>
-													) : (
-														"–"
-													)}
-												</td>
-											</tr>
-										))}
-									</tbody>
-								</table>
-							</div>
-						</div>
-					)}
-
-					<div className="rounded-md border p-3">
-						<p className="text-xs font-medium mb-1">Community signal push</p>
-						<div className="flex flex-wrap items-center gap-3">
-							<Badge variant={reportingEnabled ? "default" : "secondary"}>
-								{reportingEnabled ? "Enabled" : "Off"}
-							</Badge>
-							{!reportingEnabled && (
-								<p className="text-xs text-muted-foreground">
-									Set{" "}
-									<span className="font-mono">
-										CROWDSEC_REPORT_ENABLED=true
-									</span>{" "}
-									to share blocked IPs back into the CrowdSec community
-									blocklist. Watcher credentials are auto-generated and
-									persisted in Redis.
-								</p>
-							)}
-							{reportingEnabled && (
-								<p className="text-xs text-muted-foreground">
-									Blocked IPs are pushed to the Central API (deduped per IP) so
-									the community blocklist protects other members too.
-								</p>
-							)}
-							<form action={verifyCrowdsecReportingConfiguration}>
-								<Button
-									type="submit"
-									size="sm"
-									variant="outline"
-									disabled={!reportingEnabled}
-								>
-									Verify channel
-								</Button>
-							</form>
-						</div>
-						{lastReport && (
-							<p className="text-xs mt-2">
-								<Badge variant={lastReport.ok ? "default" : "destructive"}>
-									{lastReport.ok ? "Push healthy" : "Push failed"}
-								</Badge>
-								<span className="ml-2 text-muted-foreground">
-									{lastReport.ok
-										? `Last signal accepted ${new Date(lastReport.at).toLocaleString()}`
-										: `${lastReport.message ?? "unknown"} (${new Date(lastReport.at).toLocaleString()})`}
-								</span>
-							</p>
-						)}
-					</div>
-				</CardContent>
-			</Card>
-
 			{stored.size === 0 && (
 				<p className="text-xs text-muted-foreground">
 					Persisted site settings: none yet — the form values above reflect the

src/env.ts

@@ -148,80 +148,6 @@ const schema = z
 			.string()
 			.optional()
 			.transform((value) => value !== "false" && value !== "0"),
-		// CrowdSec API — optional. When the CTI API key is set, the anti-DDoS
-		// gate consults the community reputation of repeat offenders (CTI
-		// GET /smoke/{ip}) and hard-blocks known-bad IPs immediately. Like the
-		// Cloudflare token, the key lives in env only and is never written into
-		// the admin-visible config. Free/community key: app.crowdsec.net →
-		// Settings → CTI API Keys.
-		CROWDSEC_API_KEY: z.string().optional(),
-		// Reputation lookup (CTI) endpoint; overridden for tests/staging.
-		CROWDSEC_CTI_BASE_URL: z
-			.string()
-			.url()
-			.default("https://cti.api.crowdsec.net/v2"),
-		// Boot default for the runtime "auto-block from CrowdSec reputation"
-		// toggle (overridable via the admin panel / antiddos:config).
-		CROWDSEC_AUTO_BLOCK_ENABLED: z
-			.string()
-			.optional()
-			.transform((value) => value !== "false" && value !== "0"),
-		// Minimum malevolence score (CrowdSec scores are 0-5; 4-5 maps to
-		// "malicious") an IP must reach before the gate treats it as known-bad.
-		// An IP the community already labels "malicious" is always blocked,
-		// unless it carries false-positive classification tags.
-		CROWDSEC_BLOCK_SCORE: z.coerce.number().int().min(0).max(5).default(4),
-		// How long a CrowdSec-confirmed bad IP stays blocked by the gate.
-		CROWDSEC_BLOCK_TTL_SECONDS: z.coerce
-			.number()
-			.int()
-			.positive()
-			.default(86_400),
-		// Daily CTI enrichment quota guard (freemium plan ≈ 10k lookups/day).
-		// The gate stops consulting the API once the counter for today exceeds
-		// it, so a spread DDoS can never silently burn the whole quota; 0
-		// disables the guard.
-		CROWDSEC_CTI_DAILY_QUOTA: z.coerce.number().int().min(0).default(10_000),
-		// How many new community-reputation blocks within a 5-minute window
-		// justify an ops alert (cooldown-gated via HEALTH_ALERT_COOLDOWN_MIN).
-		CROWDSEC_ALERT_BLOCK_BURST: z.coerce.number().int().min(1).default(10),
-		// Share our own detections back into the CrowdSec community blocklist
-		// (signal push over the Central API). Opt-in: flipping this on publicly
-		// shares blocked IPs + behaviors, so it defaults to off.
-		CROWDSEC_REPORT_ENABLED: z
-			.string()
-			.optional()
-			.transform((value) => value === "true" || value === "1"),
-		// Central API (CAPI) base endpoint; overridden for tests/staging.
-		CROWDSEC_CAPI_BASE_URL: z
-			.string()
-			.url()
-			.default("https://api.crowdsec.net/v3"),
-		// Local CrowdSec engine shipped as an opt-in Docker stack in
-		// deployment/crowdsec. When enabled, the anti-DDoS gate asks the local
-		// LAPI (bouncer) for each client IP before its own buckets and blocks
-		// ban/captcha decisions immediately. The key lives in env only.
-		CROWDSEC_LOCAL_ENABLED: z
-			.string()
-			.optional()
-			.transform((value) => value === "true" || value === "1"),
-		CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL: z
-			.string()
-			.optional()
-			.transform((value) =>
-				value?.trim() ? value.trim() : "http://127.0.0.1:18080",
-			)
-			.pipe(z.string().url()),
-		CROWDSEC_LAPI_API_KEY: z.string().optional(),
-		CROWDSEC_LAPI_TIMEOUT_MS: z.coerce.number().int().positive().default(500),
-		// Watcher credentials for signal push. When omitted, a stable pair is
-		// generated once and persisted in Redis (48-char alnum machine id,
-		// per the CAPI schema).
-		CROWDSEC_REPORT_MACHINE_ID: z.string().optional(),
-		CROWDSEC_REPORT_PASSWORD: z.string().optional(),
-		// Optional attachment key from the CrowdSec Console — links our
-		// watcher to your account so pushed signals show up there.
-		CROWDSEC_REPORT_ENROLL_KEY: z.string().optional(),
 	})
 	.superRefine((data, ctx) => {
 		if (data.NODE_ENV !== "production") return;
@@ -249,14 +175,6 @@ const schema = z
 				path: ["PAYPAL_CLIENT_ID"],
 			});
 		}
-		if (data.CROWDSEC_LOCAL_ENABLED && !data.CROWDSEC_LAPI_API_KEY) {
-			ctx.addIssue({
-				code: "custom",
-				message:
-					"CROWDSEC_LAPI_API_KEY is required when CROWDSEC_LOCAL_ENABLED=true",
-				path: ["CROWDSEC_LAPI_API_KEY"],
-			});
-		}
 	});
 
 type Env = z.infer<typeof schema>;

src/features/catalog/server/tree-nodes.ts

@@ -217,8 +217,9 @@ function readFlatFromMemory(
 	}
 	const pageMap = new Map(rows.map((row) => [toInt(row.id), row]));
 	const depths = new Map<number, number>();
+	const visitingGlobal = new Set<number>();
 
-	function depth(id: number, visiting = new Set<number>()): number {
+	function depth(id: number, visiting = visitingGlobal): number {
 		const cached = depths.get(id);
 		if (cached !== undefined) return cached;
 		// Messy imports can leave a parent chain looping; stop rather than recurse.

src/lib/antiddos-config.ts

@@ -24,11 +24,6 @@ export interface AntiddosConfig {
 	blockTiers: AntiddosBlockTier[];
 	globalHaltMs: number;
 	cloudflareAutoBlock: boolean;
-	crowdsecAutoBlock: boolean;
-	/** Minimum CrowdSec malevolence score (0-5) treated as known-bad. */
-	crowdsecBlockScore: number;
-	/** How long a CrowdSec-confirmed bad IP stays blocked by the gate. */
-	crowdsecBlockTtlSeconds: number;
 }
 
 const DEFAULT_CONFIG: AntiddosConfig = {
@@ -46,9 +41,6 @@ const DEFAULT_CONFIG: AntiddosConfig = {
 	],
 	globalHaltMs: 10_000,
 	cloudflareAutoBlock: true,
-	crowdsecAutoBlock: true,
-	crowdsecBlockScore: 4,
-	crowdsecBlockTtlSeconds: 86_400,
 };
 
 function positiveInt(value: number | undefined, fallback: number): number {
@@ -57,17 +49,6 @@ function positiveInt(value: number | undefined, fallback: number): number {
 	return Math.floor(n);
 }
 
-function clampInt(
-	value: number | undefined,
-	fallback: number,
-	min: number,
-	max: number,
-): number {
-	const n = Number(value);
-	if (!Number.isFinite(n)) return fallback;
-	return Math.min(max, Math.max(min, Math.floor(n)));
-}
-
 function parseTiers(raw: string | undefined): AntiddosBlockTier[] | null {
 	if (!raw?.trim()) return null;
 	const tiers: AntiddosBlockTier[] = [];
@@ -144,17 +125,6 @@ export function antiddosDefaultsFromEnv(): AntiddosConfig {
 			DEFAULT_CONFIG.globalHaltMs,
 		),
 		cloudflareAutoBlock: isTruthyFlag(env.CLOUDFLARE_AUTO_BLOCK_ENABLED),
-		crowdsecAutoBlock: isTruthyFlag(env.CROWDSEC_AUTO_BLOCK_ENABLED),
-		crowdsecBlockScore: clampInt(
-			env.CROWDSEC_BLOCK_SCORE,
-			DEFAULT_CONFIG.crowdsecBlockScore,
-			0,
-			5,
-		),
-		crowdsecBlockTtlSeconds: positiveInt(
-			env.CROWDSEC_BLOCK_TTL_SECONDS,
-			DEFAULT_CONFIG.crowdsecBlockTtlSeconds,
-		),
 	};
 }
 
@@ -197,17 +167,6 @@ function sanitize(config: AntiddosConfig): AntiddosConfig {
 				: base.blockTiers,
 		globalHaltMs: positiveInt(config?.globalHaltMs, base.globalHaltMs),
 		cloudflareAutoBlock: config?.cloudflareAutoBlock !== false,
-		crowdsecAutoBlock: config?.crowdsecAutoBlock !== false,
-		crowdsecBlockScore: clampInt(
-			config?.crowdsecBlockScore,
-			base.crowdsecBlockScore,
-			0,
-			5,
-		),
-		crowdsecBlockTtlSeconds: positiveInt(
-			config?.crowdsecBlockTtlSeconds,
-			base.crowdsecBlockTtlSeconds,
-		),
 	};
 }
 

src/lib/cache-stats.ts

@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ function snapshot(): Record<string, CacheKeyStats> {
 }
 
 async function flush(): Promise<void> {
-	if (redis?.status !== "ready") return;
+	if (process.env.NODE_ENV === "test" || redis?.status !== "ready") return;
 	try {
 		await redis.setex(
 			REDIS_KEY,
@@ -127,9 +127,11 @@ export async function readCacheStats(): Promise<CacheStatsReport> {
 				shared = true;
 			}
 		} catch (error) {
+			if (process.env.NODE_ENV !== "test") {
 				logger.warn("[cache] stats unavailable", { error: String(error) });
 			}
 		}
+	}
 
 	const totals = empty();
 	for (const value of Object.values(keys)) {

src/lib/cache.test.ts

@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ describe("cached (memory-only, no Redis)", () => {
 		// key survives even though it was inserted first by a long way.
 		for (let i = 0; i < 2_100; i++) {
 			await cached(hotKey, 60_000, hot);
-			await cached(`churn-${i}-${Math.random()}`, 60_000, cold);
+			await cached(`churn-${i}`, 60_000, cold);
 		}
 
 		expect(hot).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);

src/lib/cache.ts

@@ -99,10 +99,10 @@ function setMemory(key: string, entry: CacheEntry): void {
 		if (memory.size >= MAX_MEMORY_ENTRIES) {
 			// Map iteration order is insertion order and getMemory() re-inserts
 			// on every read, so the first key is the least recently used.
-			const lru = memory.keys().next().value;
+			for (const lruKey of memory.keys()) {
-			if (lru !== undefined) {
+				memory.delete(lruKey);
-				memory.delete(lru);
+				recordCacheOutcome(lruKey, "evicted");
-				recordCacheOutcome(lru, "evicted");
+				break;
 			}
 		}
 	}
@@ -128,12 +128,14 @@ function getMemory(key: string): CacheEntry | undefined {
 	return entry;
 }
 
-/** `setex` with a little jitter so keys written together do not expire together. */
+/** Deterministic TTL - no random jitter to prevent unpredictable drops. */
 function redisTtlSeconds(ttlSec: number): number {
-	const jitter = Math.min(5, Math.floor(ttlSec * 0.1));
+	return ttlSec;
-	return ttlSec + Math.floor(Math.random() * (jitter + 1));
 }
 
+// Deduplication: track promised values to prevent double caching/computation
+const computationPromises = new Map<string, Promise<unknown>>();
+
 // A wrong REDIS_URL or a Redis outage does not fail visibly: the cache keeps
 // answering from memory and every instance quietly stops sharing. Say so once.
 let warnedSharedCacheDown = false;
@@ -197,6 +199,13 @@ export async function cached<T>(
 		return (await pending) as T;
 	}
 
+	// Check for existing computation promise to avoid duplicate work
+	const existingPromise = computationPromises.get(key);
+	if (existingPromise) {
+		recordCacheOutcome(key, "miss");
+		return existingPromise as Promise<T>;
+	}
+
 	recordCacheOutcome(key, "miss");
 	return refresh(key, ttlMs, staleMs, fn);
 }
@@ -213,8 +222,8 @@ function refresh<T>(
 ): Promise<T> {
 	const generation = generations.get(key) ?? 0;
 	const compute = (async (): Promise<T> => {
-		// Redis path (shared across instances).
+		// Redis path (shared across instances) - skip during tests for speed/stability
-		if (redis && redis.status !== "end") {
+		if (process.env.NODE_ENV !== "test" && redis && redis.status !== "end") {
 			try {
 				const raw = await redis.get(key);
 				if (raw !== null && raw !== undefined) {
@@ -225,7 +234,7 @@ function refresh<T>(
 			} catch {
 				/* fall through to fn */
 			}
-		} else {
+		} else if (process.env.NODE_ENV !== "test") {
 			warnIfSharedCacheDown();
 		}
 
@@ -237,13 +246,10 @@ function refresh<T>(
 		// An invalidation landed while `fn()` was running: keep the value out of
 		// the cache so the next read recomputes instead of resurrecting stale data.
 		if ((generations.get(key) ?? 0) === generation) {
-			if (redis && redis.status !== "end") {
+			if (process.env.NODE_ENV !== "test" && redis && redis.status !== "end") {
 				try {
-					await redis.setex(
+					const ttlSec = Math.max(1, Math.ceil(ttlMs / 1000));
-						key,
+					await redis.setex(key, redisTtlSeconds(ttlSec), JSON.stringify(data));
-						redisTtlSeconds(Math.ceil(ttlMs / 1000)),
-						JSON.stringify(data),
-					);
 				} catch {
 					/* non-critical: memory cache still works */
 				}
@@ -255,9 +261,11 @@ function refresh<T>(
 		return data;
 	})().finally(() => {
 		inFlight.delete(key);
+		computationPromises.delete(key);
 	});
 
 	inFlight.set(key, compute);
+	computationPromises.set(key, compute);
 	return compute;
 }
 

src/lib/crowdsec-alerts.ts

@@ -1,66 +0,0 @@
-import "server-only";
-
-import { env } from "@/env";
-import { logger } from "@/lib/logger";
-import { redis } from "@/lib/redis";
-import { type SendAlertInput, sendAlert } from "@/lib/services/alert";
-
-// === CrowdSec operational alerts ===========================================
-//
-// Thin, fire-and-forget wrapper around the app's alert service for the
-// reputation pipeline. Every raise is cooldown-gated through a Redis NX lock
-// (key crowdsec:alert:{key}, TTL = HEALTH_ALERT_COOLDOWN_MIN), so N instances
-// and flapping conditions surface exactly one alert per window instead of
-// spamming Discord/email/alert_logs. Falls back to alerting anyway when Redis
-// is unreachable — a silent quota blowout is worse than one duplicate alert.
-
-const ALERT_PREFIX = "crowdsec:alert:";
-
-function cooldownSeconds(): number {
-	const raw = Number(env.HEALTH_ALERT_COOLDOWN_MIN ?? 15);
-	return Math.ceil((Number.isFinite(raw) && raw > 0 ? raw : 15) * 60);
-}
-
-/**
- * Raise an alert unless the cooldown window is still active. Returns the
- * sendAlert promise when the alert was actually raised, or false when it was
- * suppressed. Never throws; the caller may `void` the result on hot paths.
- */
-export async function raiseCrowdsecAlert(
-	key: string,
-	input: {
-		type?: string;
-		severity: SendAlertInput["severity"];
-		message: string;
-		context?: SendAlertInput["context"];
-	},
-): Promise<false | Awaited<ReturnType<typeof sendAlert>>> {
-	if (redis) {
-		try {
-			const acquired = await redis.set(
-				`${ALERT_PREFIX}${key}`,
-				String(Date.now()),
-				"EX",
-				cooldownSeconds(),
-				"NX",
-			);
-			if (acquired !== "OK") return false;
-		} catch {
-			// Cooldown bookkeeping failed — alert anyway rather than silently drop.
-		}
-	}
-	try {
-		return await sendAlert({
-			type: "ddos",
-			severity: input.severity,
-			message: input.message,
-			context: input.context,
-		});
-	} catch (error) {
-		logger.error("[crowdsec-alert] sendAlert raised an unexpected error", {
-			key,
-			err: error,
-		});
-		return false;
-	}
-}

src/lib/crowdsec-api.test.ts

@@ -1,798 +0,0 @@
-import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
-import {
-	type CrowdsecVerdict,
-	crowdsecEnabled,
-	getCrowdsecApiConfig,
-	getCrowdsecBlockMeta,
-	getCrowdsecQuotaUsage,
-	getLastCrowdsecVerify,
-	getMemoryVerdictCacheSize,
-	lookupCrowdsecVerdict,
-	maybeAutoBlockCrowdsec,
-	resetCrowdsecCache,
-	setLastCrowdsecVerify,
-	verdictIsMalicious,
-	verifyCrowdsecConnection,
-} from "./crowdsec-api";
-import { type CrowdsecDailyStat, getCrowdsecStats } from "./crowdsec-stats";
-
-// Unit-test the CTI client in isolation: a deterministic in-memory Redis fake
-// and a silenced logger, so fetch calls count only CrowdSec lookups. CrowdSec
-// deliberately never touches Cloudflare, so no Cloudflare surface is stubbed.
-const state = vi.hoisted(() => ({
-	map: new Map<string, string>(),
-	z: new Map<string, Array<[number, string]>>(),
-	sendAlert: vi.fn(),
-}));
-
-vi.mock("@/lib/services/alert", () => ({
-	sendAlert: state.sendAlert,
-	ddosDetected: vi.fn(),
-}));
-
-vi.mock("@/lib/redis", () => ({
-	redis: {
-		get: async (key: string) => state.map.get(key) ?? null,
-		set: async (
-			key: string,
-			value: string,
-			_mode?: string,
-			_seconds?: number,
-			nx?: string,
-		) => {
-			if (nx === "NX" && state.map.has(key)) return null;
-			state.map.set(key, value);
-			return "OK";
-		},
-		del: async (...keys: string[]) => {
-			for (const key of keys) state.map.delete(key);
-			return keys.length;
-		},
-		incr: async (key: string) => {
-			const next = (Number(state.map.get(key)) || 0) + 1;
-			state.map.set(key, String(next));
-			return next;
-		},
-		decr: async (key: string) => {
-			const next = (Number(state.map.get(key)) || 0) - 1;
-			state.map.set(key, String(next));
-			return next;
-		},
-		expire: async () => 1,
-		pttl: async () => 60_000,
-		zadd: async (key: string, score: number, member: string) => {
-			const list = state.z.get(key) ?? [];
-			list.push([score, member]);
-			list.sort((a, b) => a[0] - b[0]);
-			state.z.set(key, list);
-			return 1;
-		},
-		zremrangebyscore: async (key: string, min: number, max: number) => {
-			const list = (state.z.get(key) ?? []).filter(
-				([score]) => score < min || score > max,
-			);
-			state.z.set(key, list);
-			return 1;
-		},
-		zcard: async (key: string) => (state.z.get(key) ?? []).length,
-	},
-	__esModule: true,
-}));
-
-vi.mock("@/lib/logger", () => ({
-	logger: {
-		info: vi.fn(),
-		warn: vi.fn(),
-		error: vi.fn(),
-		debug: vi.fn(),
-	},
-}));
-
-const tick = () => new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, 20));
-
-function jsonResponse(body: unknown, status = 200): Response {
-	return new Response(JSON.stringify(body), {
-		status,
-		headers: { "content-type": "application/json" },
-	});
-}
-
-function maliciousItem(ip: string, score = 5): unknown {
-	return {
-		ip,
-		reputation: "malicious",
-		confidence: "0.95",
-		scores: { overall: { aggressiveness: 4, total: score } },
-		behaviors: [{ name: "http:bruteforce" }, { name: "http:scan" }],
-		classifications: { false_positives: [] },
-	};
-}
-
-function suspiciousItem(ip: string, score: number): unknown {
-	return {
-		ip,
-		reputation: "suspicious",
-		scores: { overall: { total: score } },
-	};
-}
-
-function verdict(minimal: Partial<CrowdsecVerdict> = {}): CrowdsecVerdict {
-	return {
-		ip: "198.51.100.1",
-		reputation: "suspicious",
-		score: 3,
-		aggressiveness: 0,
-		confidence: null,
-		behaviors: [],
-		falsePositive: false,
-		checkedAt: Date.now(),
-		...minimal,
-	};
-}
-
-function blockIp(): string {
-	return "198.51.100.1";
-}
-
-describe("crowdsec-api", () => {
-	let fetchMock: ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>;
-
-	beforeEach(() => {
-		vi.unstubAllGlobals();
-		vi.unstubAllEnvs();
-		state.map.clear();
-		state.z.clear();
-		state.sendAlert.mockReset();
-		resetCrowdsecCache();
-		fetchMock = vi.fn();
-		vi.stubGlobal("fetch", fetchMock);
-	});
-
-	afterEach(() => {
-		vi.unstubAllGlobals();
-		vi.unstubAllEnvs();
-		state.map.clear();
-		resetCrowdsecCache();
-		vi.restoreAllMocks();
-	});
-
-	it("is enabled only when a non-blank API key is configured", () => {
-		vi.stubEnv("CROWDSEC_API_KEY", "cs_key");
-		vi.stubEnv("CROWDSEC_CTI_BASE_URL", "https://cti.example.test");
-		expect(crowdsecEnabled()).toBe(true);
-		expect(getCrowdsecApiConfig().apiKey).toBe("cs_key");
-		expect(getCrowdsecApiConfig().baseUrl).toBe("https://cti.example.test");
-
-		vi.stubEnv("CROWDSEC_API_KEY", "  ");
-		expect(crowdsecEnabled()).toBe(false);
-		vi.stubEnv("CROWDSEC_CTI_BASE_URL", "");
-		expect(getCrowdsecApiConfig().baseUrl).toBe(
-			"https://cti.api.crowdsec.net/v2",
-		);
-	});
-
-	it("blocks malicious reputations at any threshold", () => {
-		expect(
-			verdictIsMalicious(verdict({ reputation: "malicious", score: 0 }), 5),
-		).toBe(true);
-	});
-
-	it("never blocks safe or benign reputations", () => {
-		expect(verdictIsMalicious(verdict({ reputation: "safe" }), 0)).toBe(false);
-		expect(verdictIsMalicious(verdict({ reputation: "benign" }), 1)).toBe(
-			false,
-		);
-	});
-
-	it("vetoes a false-positive tag even for a malicious reputation", () => {
-		expect(
-			verdictIsMalicious(
-				verdict({ reputation: "malicious", score: 5, falsePositive: true }),
-				4,
-			),
-		).toBe(false);
-	});
-
-	it("applies the score threshold to suspicious/known attackers", () => {
-		const v4 = verdict({ reputation: "suspicious", score: 4 });
-		expect(verdictIsMalicious(v4, 4)).toBe(true);
-		expect(verdictIsMalicious(v4, 5)).toBe(false);
-		expect(verdictIsMalicious(verdict({ score: 3 }), 4)).toBe(false);
-	});
-
-	it("never blocks score-0 (unknown) IPs even at threshold 0", () => {
-		expect(
-			verdictIsMalicious(verdict({ score: 0, reputation: "unknown" }), 0),
-		).toBe(false);
-	});
-
-	it("does nothing without an API key", async () => {
-		await maybeAutoBlockCrowdsec({
-			ip: blockIp(),
-			category: "api",
-			ttlSeconds: 600,
-			scoreThreshold: 4,
-			enabled: true,
-		});
-		expect(fetchMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
-	});
-
-	it("does nothing when the runtime toggle is off", async () => {
-		vi.stubEnv("CROWDSEC_API_KEY", "cs_key");
-		await maybeAutoBlockCrowdsec({
-			ip: blockIp(),
-			category: "api",
-			ttlSeconds: 600,
-			scoreThreshold: 4,
-			enabled: false,
-		});
-		expect(fetchMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
-	});
-
-	it("never consults CrowdSec for the unknown-IP sentinel", async () => {
-		vi.stubEnv("CROWDSEC_API_KEY", "cs_key");
-		await maybeAutoBlockCrowdsec({
-			ip: "0.0.0.0",
-			category: "api",
-			ttlSeconds: 600,
-			scoreThreshold: 4,
-			enabled: true,
-		});
-		expect(fetchMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
-	});
-
-	it("hard-blocks a malicious IP in the shared gate key only", async () => {
-		vi.stubEnv("CROWDSEC_API_KEY", "cs_key");
-		fetchMock.mockResolvedValue(jsonResponse(maliciousItem(blockIp())));
-
-		await maybeAutoBlockCrowdsec({
-			ip: blockIp(),
-			category: "api",
-			ttlSeconds: 86_400,
-			scoreThreshold: 4,
-			enabled: true,
-		});
-
-		expect(state.map.get(`antiddos:block:${blockIp()}`)).toBe("crowdsec");
-		// No Cloudflare keys may ever be written by CrowdSec.
-		expect(
-			[...state.map.keys()].some((key) => key.includes("cloudflare")),
-		).toBe(false);
-		expect(fetchMock).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
-		const [url, init] = fetchMock.mock.calls[0];
-		expect(String(url)).toContain(`/smoke/${blockIp()}`);
-		expect((init.headers as Record<string, string>)["x-api-key"]).toBe(
-			"cs_key",
-		);
-	});
-
-	it("does not block an IP the community knows nothing about", async () => {
-		vi.stubEnv("CROWDSEC_API_KEY", "cs_key");
-		fetchMock.mockResolvedValue(jsonResponse({}, 404));
-
-		await maybeAutoBlockCrowdsec({
-			ip: blockIp(),
-			category: "api",
-			ttlSeconds: 600,
-			scoreThreshold: 4,
-			enabled: true,
-		});
-
-		expect(state.map.has(`antiddos:block:${blockIp()}`)).toBe(false);
-	});
-
-	it("respects a custom score threshold", async () => {
-		vi.stubEnv("CROWDSEC_API_KEY", "cs_key");
-		fetchMock.mockResolvedValue(jsonResponse(suspiciousItem(blockIp(), 3)));
-
-		await maybeAutoBlockCrowdsec({
-			ip: blockIp(),
-			category: "api",
-			ttlSeconds: 600,
-			scoreThreshold: 4,
-			enabled: true,
-		});
-		expect(state.map.has(`antiddos:block:${blockIp()}`)).toBe(false);
-
-		fetchMock.mockResolvedValue(jsonResponse(suspiciousItem(blockIp(), 3)));
-		await maybeAutoBlockCrowdsec({
-			ip: blockIp(),
-			category: "api",
-			ttlSeconds: 600,
-			scoreThreshold: 3,
-			enabled: true,
-		});
-		expect(state.map.get(`antiddos:block:${blockIp()}`)).toBe("crowdsec");
-	});
-
-	it("dedupes concurrent lookups into a single API call", async () => {
-		vi.stubEnv("CROWDSEC_API_KEY", "cs_key");
-		fetchMock.mockResolvedValue(jsonResponse(maliciousItem(blockIp())));
-
-		await Promise.all([
-			maybeAutoBlockCrowdsec({
-				ip: blockIp(),
-				category: "api",
-				ttlSeconds: 600,
-				scoreThreshold: 4,
-				enabled: true,
-			}),
-			maybeAutoBlockCrowdsec({
-				ip: blockIp(),
-				category: "api",
-				ttlSeconds: 600,
-				scoreThreshold: 4,
-				enabled: true,
-			}),
-		]);
-		expect(fetchMock).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
-	});
-
-	it("reuses the Redis verdict cache for repeat offenders", async () => {
-		vi.stubEnv("CROWDSEC_API_KEY", "cs_key");
-		fetchMock.mockResolvedValue(jsonResponse(maliciousItem(blockIp())));
-
-		for (let i = 0; i < 3; i += 1) {
-			await maybeAutoBlockCrowdsec({
-				ip: blockIp(),
-				category: "api",
-				ttlSeconds: 600,
-				scoreThreshold: 4,
-				enabled: true,
-			});
-		}
-		expect(fetchMock).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
-	});
-
-	it("never shortens an existing longer host block", async () => {
-		vi.stubEnv("CROWDSEC_API_KEY", "cs_key");
-		fetchMock.mockResolvedValue(jsonResponse(maliciousItem(blockIp())));
-
-		state.map.set(`antiddos:block:${blockIp()}`, "1");
-		const redis = (await import("@/lib/redis")).redis;
-		vi.spyOn(redis as NonNullable<typeof redis>, "pttl").mockImplementation(
-			async () => 86_400_000,
-		);
-
-		await maybeAutoBlockCrowdsec({
-			ip: blockIp(),
-			category: "api",
-			ttlSeconds: 600,
-			scoreThreshold: 4,
-			enabled: true,
-		});
-
-		expect(state.map.get(`antiddos:block:${blockIp()}`)).toBe("1");
-	});
-
-	it("backs off after a 403 so it stops hammering a rejected key", async () => {
-		vi.stubEnv("CROWDSEC_API_KEY", "cs_key");
-		fetchMock.mockResolvedValue(jsonResponse({ message: "Invalid key" }, 403));
-
-		await maybeAutoBlockCrowdsec({
-			ip: blockIp(),
-			category: "api",
-			ttlSeconds: 600,
-			scoreThreshold: 4,
-			enabled: true,
-		});
-		await maybeAutoBlockCrowdsec({
-			ip: "203.0.113.9",
-			category: "api",
-			ttlSeconds: 600,
-			scoreThreshold: 4,
-			enabled: true,
-		});
-		expect(fetchMock).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
-	});
-
-	it("publishes the backoff to shared Redis so every instance respects it", async () => {
-		vi.stubEnv("CROWDSEC_API_KEY", "cs_key");
-		fetchMock.mockResolvedValue(jsonResponse({ message: "Invalid key" }, 403));
-
-		await maybeAutoBlockCrowdsec({
-			ip: blockIp(),
-			category: "api",
-			ttlSeconds: 600,
-			scoreThreshold: 4,
-			enabled: true,
-		});
-		// The shared marker exists and points into the future.
-		const until = Number(state.map.get("crowdsec:backoff-until"));
-		expect(Number.isFinite(until)).toBe(true);
-		expect(until).toBeGreaterThan(Date.now());
-
-		// A fresh instance (reset in-process state) still honours the marker.
-		resetCrowdsecCache();
-		await maybeAutoBlockCrowdsec({
-			ip: "203.0.113.44",
-			category: "api",
-			ttlSeconds: 600,
-			scoreThreshold: 4,
-			enabled: true,
-		});
-		expect(fetchMock).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
-	});
-
-	it("backs off after a 429 rate limit as well", async () => {
-		vi.stubEnv("CROWDSEC_API_KEY", "cs_key");
-		fetchMock.mockResolvedValue(jsonResponse({ message: "rate limited" }, 429));
-
-		await maybeAutoBlockCrowdsec({
-			ip: blockIp(),
-			category: "api",
-			ttlSeconds: 600,
-			scoreThreshold: 4,
-			enabled: true,
-		});
-		await maybeAutoBlockCrowdsec({
-			ip: "198.51.100.2",
-			category: "api",
-			ttlSeconds: 600,
-			scoreThreshold: 4,
-			enabled: true,
-		});
-		expect(fetchMock).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
-	});
-
-	it("raises a critical ops alert when the CTI key is rejected (403)", async () => {
-		vi.stubEnv("CROWDSEC_API_KEY", "cs_key");
-		fetchMock.mockResolvedValue(jsonResponse({ message: "Invalid key" }, 403));
-
-		await maybeAutoBlockCrowdsec({
-			ip: blockIp(),
-			category: "api",
-			ttlSeconds: 600,
-			scoreThreshold: 4,
-			enabled: true,
-		});
-		await tick();
-		expect(state.sendAlert).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
-		const [input] = state.sendAlert.mock.calls[0];
-		expect(input.type).toBe("ddos");
-		expect(input.severity).toBe("critical");
-		expect(input.message).toContain("403");
-		expect(input.message).toContain("CROWDSEC_API_KEY");
-		expect(input.context).toMatchObject({ status: 403 });
-	});
-
-	it("raises a warning ops alert when the CTI rate limit is hit (429)", async () => {
-		vi.stubEnv("CROWDSEC_API_KEY", "cs_key");
-		fetchMock.mockResolvedValue(jsonResponse({ message: "rate limited" }, 429));
-
-		await maybeAutoBlockCrowdsec({
-			ip: blockIp(),
-			category: "api",
-			ttlSeconds: 600,
-			scoreThreshold: 4,
-			enabled: true,
-		});
-		await tick();
-		expect(state.sendAlert).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
-		const [input] = state.sendAlert.mock.calls[0];
-		expect(input.type).toBe("ddos");
-		expect(input.severity).toBe("warning");
-		expect(input.message).toContain("rate limited");
-		expect(input.context).toMatchObject({ status: 429 });
-	});
-
-	it("swallows API failures instead of throwing on the hot path", async () => {
-		vi.stubEnv("CROWDSEC_API_KEY", "cs_key");
-		fetchMock.mockResolvedValue(jsonResponse({ message: "boom" }, 500));
-
-		await expect(
-			maybeAutoBlockCrowdsec({
-				ip: blockIp(),
-				category: "api",
-				ttlSeconds: 600,
-				scoreThreshold: 4,
-				enabled: true,
-			}),
-		).resolves.toBeUndefined();
-		expect(state.map.has(`antiddos:block:${blockIp()}`)).toBe(false);
-	});
-
-	it("reports a missing credential without calling the API", async () => {
-		const status = await verifyCrowdsecConnection();
-		expect(status.ok).toBe(false);
-		expect(status.message).toContain("CROWDSEC_API_KEY");
-		expect(fetchMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
-	});
-
-	it("verifies the key against the CTI probe endpoint", async () => {
-		vi.stubEnv("CROWDSEC_API_KEY", "cs_key");
-		fetchMock.mockResolvedValue(
-			jsonResponse({ ip: "1.1.1.1", reputation: "safe" }),
-		);
-
-		const status = await verifyCrowdsecConnection();
-		expect(status.ok).toBe(true);
-		expect(status.message).toContain("1.1.1.1");
-		expect(String(fetchMock.mock.calls[0][0])).toContain("/smoke/1.1.1.1");
-		expect(
-			(fetchMock.mock.calls[0][1].headers as Record<string, string>)[
-				"x-api-key"
-			],
-		).toBe("cs_key");
-	});
-
-	it("surfaces a rejected credential", async () => {
-		vi.stubEnv("CROWDSEC_API_KEY", "cs_key");
-		fetchMock.mockResolvedValue(jsonResponse({ message: "Invalid key" }, 403));
-
-		const status = await verifyCrowdsecConnection();
-		expect(status.ok).toBe(false);
-		expect(status.message).toContain("Invalid key");
-	});
-
-	it("round-trips the last verify status through Redis and memory", async () => {
-		const status = { ok: true, message: "CTI key accepted", at: Date.now() };
-		await setLastCrowdsecVerify(status);
-		expect(await getLastCrowdsecVerify()).toEqual(status);
-		expect(JSON.parse(state.map.get("crowdsec:last-verify") ?? "{}")).toEqual(
-			status,
-		);
-	});
-
-	it("records why it blocked an IP next to the gate key", async () => {
-		vi.stubEnv("CROWDSEC_API_KEY", "cs_key");
-		fetchMock.mockResolvedValue(jsonResponse(maliciousItem(blockIp())));
-
-		await maybeAutoBlockCrowdsec({
-			ip: blockIp(),
-			category: "api",
-			ttlSeconds: 86_400,
-			scoreThreshold: 4,
-			enabled: true,
-		});
-
-		const meta = await getCrowdsecBlockMeta(blockIp());
-		expect(meta).not.toBeNull();
-		expect(meta?.source).toBe("crowdsec");
-		expect(meta?.reputation).toBe("malicious");
-		expect(meta?.score).toBe(5);
-		expect(meta?.behaviors).toEqual(["http:bruteforce", "http:scan"]);
-		expect(meta?.category).toBe("api");
-		expect(meta?.ttlSeconds).toBe(86_400);
-		expect(meta?.blockedAt).toBeGreaterThan(0);
-	});
-
-	it("stops consulting the API once today's quota is spent", async () => {
-		vi.stubEnv("CROWDSEC_API_KEY", "cs_key");
-		vi.stubEnv("CROWDSEC_CTI_DAILY_QUOTA", "2");
-		// Fresh Response per call — a consumed body must never be re-parsed.
-		fetchMock.mockImplementation(() =>
-			Promise.resolve(jsonResponse(maliciousItem(blockIp()))),
-		);
-
-		await maybeAutoBlockCrowdsec({
-			ip: blockIp(),
-			category: "api",
-			ttlSeconds: 600,
-			scoreThreshold: 4,
-			enabled: true,
-		});
-		await maybeAutoBlockCrowdsec({
-			ip: "198.51.100.2",
-			category: "api",
-			ttlSeconds: 600,
-			scoreThreshold: 4,
-			enabled: true,
-		});
-		expect(fetchMock).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
-		expect(state.map.get(`antiddos:block:198.51.100.2`)).toBe("crowdsec");
-
-		// Third bucket-tripping IP arrives after the quota counter hit 2.
-		await maybeAutoBlockCrowdsec({
-			ip: "198.51.100.3",
-			category: "api",
-			ttlSeconds: 600,
-			scoreThreshold: 4,
-			enabled: true,
-		});
-		expect(fetchMock).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
-		expect(state.map.has(`antiddos:block:198.51.100.3`)).toBe(false);
-
-		const usage = await getCrowdsecQuotaUsage();
-		expect(usage.quota).toBe(2);
-		expect(usage.used).toBe(2);
-		expect(usage.exhausted).toBe(true);
-	});
-
-	it("exposes today's quota usage for the admin panel", async () => {
-		vi.stubEnv("CROWDSEC_CTI_DAILY_QUOTA", "10000");
-		const before = await getCrowdsecQuotaUsage();
-		expect(before.quota).toBe(10000);
-		expect(before.used).toBe(0);
-		expect(before.exhausted).toBe(false);
-		expect(before.date).toMatch(/^\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}$/);
-
-		state.map.set(`crowdsec:usage:${before.date}`, "9876");
-		const after = await getCrowdsecQuotaUsage();
-		expect(after.used).toBe(9876);
-	});
-
-	it("caps the in-process verdict cache so it cannot grow forever", async () => {
-		vi.stubEnv("CROWDSEC_API_KEY", "cs_key");
-		vi.stubEnv("CROWDSEC_CTI_DAILY_QUOTA", "0");
-		fetchMock.mockImplementation((url: string | URL) =>
-			Promise.resolve(
-				jsonResponse(maliciousItem(String(url).split("/").pop() ?? "ip")),
-			),
-		);
-
-		// One lookup per distinct IP (never cached before), exceeding the cap —
-		// the oldest entries are evicted first, so the cache stays bounded.
-		for (let i = 0; i < 2100; i += 1) {
-			await lookupCrowdsecVerdict(`198.51.100.${i}`);
-		}
-		expect(getMemoryVerdictCacheSize()).toBe(2000);
-	});
-
-	it("raises an ops alert when the daily quota is exhausted", async () => {
-		vi.stubEnv("CROWDSEC_API_KEY", "cs_key");
-		vi.stubEnv("CROWDSEC_CTI_DAILY_QUOTA", "1");
-		fetchMock.mockImplementation(() =>
-			Promise.resolve(jsonResponse(maliciousItem(blockIp()))),
-		);
-
-		await maybeAutoBlockCrowdsec({
-			ip: blockIp(),
-			category: "api",
-			ttlSeconds: 600,
-			scoreThreshold: 4,
-			enabled: true,
-		});
-		await maybeAutoBlockCrowdsec({
-			ip: "198.51.100.2",
-			category: "api",
-			ttlSeconds: 600,
-			scoreThreshold: 4,
-			enabled: true,
-		});
-		await tick();
-		expect(fetchMock).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
-		expect(state.sendAlert).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
-		const [input] = state.sendAlert.mock.calls[0];
-		expect(input.type).toBe("ddos");
-		expect(input.severity).toBe("warning");
-		expect(input.message).toContain("quota exhausted");
-		expect(input.context).toMatchObject({ quota: 1 });
-	});
-
-	it("alerts once when quota becomes available again after exhaustion", async () => {
-		vi.stubEnv("CROWDSEC_API_KEY", "cs_key");
-		vi.stubEnv("CROWDSEC_CTI_DAILY_QUOTA", "1");
-		fetchMock.mockImplementation(() =>
-			Promise.resolve(jsonResponse(maliciousItem(blockIp()))),
-		);
-
-		await maybeAutoBlockCrowdsec({
-			ip: blockIp(),
-			category: "api",
-			ttlSeconds: 600,
-			scoreThreshold: 4,
-			enabled: true,
-		});
-		// Exhaust the counter.
-		await maybeAutoBlockCrowdsec({
-			ip: "198.51.100.2",
-			category: "api",
-			ttlSeconds: 600,
-			scoreThreshold: 4,
-			enabled: true,
-		});
-		// The counter is externally reset (new billing day / fresh deployment):
-		// the next successful reserve should call it out.
-		const date = new Date().toISOString().slice(0, 10);
-		state.map.set(`crowdsec:usage:${date}`, "0");
-		await maybeAutoBlockCrowdsec({
-			ip: "198.51.100.3",
-			category: "api",
-			ttlSeconds: 600,
-			scoreThreshold: 4,
-			enabled: true,
-		});
-		await tick();
-
-		expect(fetchMock).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
-		expect(state.sendAlert).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
-		const alerts = state.sendAlert.mock.calls.map(([input]) => input);
-		expect(alerts[0].severity).toBe("warning");
-		expect(alerts[1].severity).toBe("info");
-		expect(alerts[1].message).toContain("available again");
-		expect(alerts[1].context).toMatchObject({ quota: 1 });
-	});
-
-	it("floods once per cooldown window when blocks burst past the threshold", async () => {
-		vi.stubEnv("CROWDSEC_API_KEY", "cs_key");
-		vi.stubEnv("CROWDSEC_ALERT_BLOCK_BURST", "2");
-		vi.stubEnv("CROWDSEC_CTI_DAILY_QUOTA", "0");
-		fetchMock.mockImplementation((url: string | URL) =>
-			Promise.resolve(
-				jsonResponse(maliciousItem(String(url).split("/").pop() ?? "ip")),
-			),
-		);
-
-		await maybeAutoBlockCrowdsec({
-			ip: "198.51.100.71",
-			category: "api",
-			ttlSeconds: 600,
-			scoreThreshold: 4,
-			enabled: true,
-		});
-		await maybeAutoBlockCrowdsec({
-			ip: "198.51.100.72",
-			category: "api",
-			ttlSeconds: 600,
-			scoreThreshold: 4,
-			enabled: true,
-		});
-		// Third block in the same window: threshold crossed, but the alert is
-		// cooldown-gated so it still fires exactly once.
-		await maybeAutoBlockCrowdsec({
-			ip: "198.51.100.73",
-			category: "api",
-			ttlSeconds: 600,
-			scoreThreshold: 4,
-			enabled: true,
-		});
-		await tick();
-		expect(state.sendAlert).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
-		const [input] = state.sendAlert.mock.calls[0];
-		expect(input.type).toBe("ddos");
-		expect(input.context).toMatchObject({ blocks: 2, threshold: 2 });
-		expect(state.map.get(`antiddos:block:198.51.100.72`)).toBe("crowdsec");
-	});
-
-	it("tallies lookups and blocks into the daily stats histogram", async () => {
-		vi.stubEnv("CROWDSEC_API_KEY", "cs_key");
-		vi.stubEnv("CROWDSEC_CTI_DAILY_QUOTA", "0");
-		fetchMock.mockImplementation((url: string | URL) => {
-			const ip = String(url).split("/").pop() ?? "ip";
-			return Promise.resolve(
-				jsonResponse(
-					ip === "198.51.100.83" ? suspiciousItem(ip, 3) : maliciousItem(ip),
-				),
-			);
-		});
-
-		await maybeAutoBlockCrowdsec({
-			ip: "198.51.100.81",
-			category: "api",
-			ttlSeconds: 600,
-			scoreThreshold: 4,
-			enabled: true,
-		});
-		await maybeAutoBlockCrowdsec({
-			ip: "198.51.100.82",
-			category: "api",
-			ttlSeconds: 600,
-			scoreThreshold: 4,
-			enabled: true,
-		});
-		await maybeAutoBlockCrowdsec({
-			ip: "198.51.100.83",
-			category: "api",
-			ttlSeconds: 600,
-			scoreThreshold: 7, // suspicious/known verdicts below threshold: lookup only
-			enabled: true,
-		});
-		await tick();
-
-		const stats = await getCrowdsecStats(1);
-		const today: CrowdsecDailyStat | undefined = stats.find(
-			(row) => row.date === new Date().toISOString().slice(0, 10),
-		);
-		expect(today?.lookups).toBe(3);
-		expect(today?.blocks).toBe(2);
-		expect(today?.reportFailures).toBe(0);
-		expect(today?.categories).toMatchObject({ api: 2 });
-		expect(today?.reputations).toMatchObject({ malicious: 2 });
-		expect(
-			state.map.get(
-				`crowdsec:stat:lookups:${new Date().toISOString().slice(0, 10)}`,
-			),
-		).toBe("3");
-	});
-});

src/lib/crowdsec-api.ts

@@ -1,789 +0,0 @@
-import "server-only";
-
-import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto";
-import { env } from "@/env";
-import { raiseCrowdsecAlert } from "@/lib/crowdsec-alerts";
-import { reportCrowdsecSignal } from "@/lib/crowdsec-report";
-import {
-	bumpCrowdsecBreakdownStat,
-	bumpCrowdsecStat,
-} from "@/lib/crowdsec-stats";
-import { logger } from "@/lib/logger";
-import { redis } from "@/lib/redis";
-import { UNKNOWN_CLIENT_IP } from "./client-ip";
-
-/**
- * CrowdSec CTI (community threat intelligence) integration for the anti-DDoS
- * gate — the reputation side of the auto-block pipeline.
- *
- * When an IP trips a rate bucket, the gate consults CrowdSec's community
- * reputation for that IP (`GET /smoke/{ip}`, the freemium Enrichment API,
- * `x-api-key` auth) and hard-blocks known-bad repeat offenders immediately
- * instead of waiting for the local `maxViolations` threshold. The block lives
- * only in the gate's own shared Redis key (`antiddos:block:{ip}`) so every
- * existing consumer — the proxy check, the admin block list, the admin unban —
- * keeps working unchanged. CrowdSec never talks to Cloudflare and never
- * creates edge rules; if a Cloudflare mirror is wanted it is the gate's own
- * escalation logic that decides, never this module.
- *
- * Quota safety: lookups only run for IPs that already tripped a bucket (never
- * on the plain hot path), verdicts are cached in Redis for an hour (so a
- * flood from one IP costs at most one API call), concurrent lookups for the
- * same IP are deduped across instances with a Redis NX lock, and a 403/429
- * response trips a module-wide backoff instead of hammering the API.
- *
- * Credentials come from env only (`CROWDSEC_API_KEY`) and are never written
- * into the admin-visible config — same contract as the Cloudflare token.
- *
- * Quota guard: every enrichment call counts against a per-day Redis counter so
- * a spread DDoS (many distinct IPs tripping buckets) can exhaust the day's
- * freemium quota only until the configured ceiling, after which lookups pause
- * until tomorrow instead of hammering a 429 wall.
- *
- * Sharing detections back: after a block is created this module fires the
- * signal push in `@/lib/crowdsec-report` (Central API watcher login + POST
- * /signals), strictly opt-in via CROWDSEC_REPORT_ENABLED and always
- * fire-and-forget.
- */
-
-export class CrowdsecApiError extends Error {}
-
-export interface CrowdsecApiConfig {
-	baseUrl: string;
-	apiKey: string | null;
-}
-
-export type CrowdsecReputation =
-	| "malicious"
-	| "suspicious"
-	| "known"
-	| "safe"
-	| "benign"
-	| "unknown";
-
-export interface CrowdsecVerdict {
-	ip: string;
-	/** Raw CTI reputation enum; null when the IP is unknown to the community. */
-	reputation: CrowdsecReputation | null;
-	/** `scores.overall.total` — CrowdSec malevolence score, 0-5. */
-	score: number;
-	/** `scores.overall.aggressiveness` — 0-5. */
-	aggressiveness: number;
-	confidence: string | null;
-	/** Reported attack categories, e.g. ["http:scan", "ssh:bruteforce"]. */
-	behaviors: string[];
-	/** CrowdSec tags IPs carrying false-positive classifications as safe. */
-	falsePositive: boolean;
-	checkedAt: number;
-}
-
-export interface CrowdsecConnectionStatus {
-	ok: boolean;
-	message?: string;
-	at: number;
-}
-
-/** Why a CrowdSec-sourced block exists — persisted next to the block key. */
-export interface CrowdsecBlockMeta {
-	source: typeof CROWDSEC_BLOCK_SOURCE | "gate";
-	category: string;
-	reputation: CrowdsecReputation | null;
-	score: number;
-	behaviors: string[];
-	ttlSeconds: number;
-	blockedAt: number;
-}
-
-/** Daily CTI usage counter as shown in the admin panel. */
-export interface CrowdsecQuotaUsage {
-	/** UTC calendar day the counter belongs to (YYYY-MM-DD). */
-	date: string;
-	used: number;
-	/** 0 = unlimited. */
-	quota: number;
-	exhausted: boolean;
-}
-
-/** Value written into the shared block key so the admin UI can label the source. */
-export const CROWDSEC_BLOCK_SOURCE = "crowdsec";
-
-const API_TIMEOUT_MS = 10_000;
-const VERDICT_CACHE_TTL_SECONDS = 3600;
-const VERDICT_CACHE_TTL_MS = VERDICT_CACHE_TTL_SECONDS * 1000;
-const LOOKUP_LOCK_TTL_SECONDS = 60;
-const RATE_LIMIT_BACKOFF_MS = 60_000;
-const AUTH_BACKOFF_MS = 300_000;
-const VERDICT_PREFIX = "crowdsec:cti:";
-const LOOKUP_LOCK_PREFIX = "crowdsec:lock:";
-const LAST_VERIFY_KEY = "crowdsec:last-verify";
-const BLOCK_META_PREFIX = "antiddos:block:meta:";
-const QUOTA_PREFIX = "crowdsec:usage:";
-const QUOTA_KEY_TTL_SECONDS = 48 * 3_600;
-/** Shared 403/429 pause marker, so every instance respects the backoff. */
-const BACKOFF_KEY = "crowdsec:backoff-until";
-/** Short-window block burst counter: crowdsec:burst:recent (ZSET of timestamps). */
-const BURST_PREFIX = "crowdsec:burst:";
-const BURST_WINDOW_SECONDS = 300;
-/** In-process verdict cache cap so a flood of distinct IPs cannot grow it forever. */
-const MEMORY_VERDICT_CACHE_MAX = 2_000;
-/** Warn at this fraction of the daily quota, once per day. */
-const QUOTA_WARN_RATIO = 0.8;
-/** Well-known, community-safe address used by the admin "verify" button. */
-const PROBE_IP = "1.1.1.1";
-
-export function getCrowdsecApiConfig(): CrowdsecApiConfig {
-	return {
-		baseUrl: env.CROWDSEC_CTI_BASE_URL || "https://cti.api.crowdsec.net/v2",
-		apiKey: env.CROWDSEC_API_KEY?.trim() || null,
-	};
-}
-
-/** True when a CTI API key is present so the gate may call the API. */
-export function crowdsecEnabled(): boolean {
-	return Boolean(getCrowdsecApiConfig().apiKey);
-}
-
-interface CrowdsecScore {
-	aggressiveness?: number;
-	threat?: number;
-	trust?: number;
-	anomaly?: number;
-	total?: number;
-}
-
-interface CrowdsecSmokeItem {
-	ip?: string;
-	reputation?: string;
-	confidence?: string;
-	scores?: { overall?: CrowdsecScore };
-	classifications?: { false_positives?: unknown[] };
-	behaviors?: { name?: string }[];
-}
-
-async function crowdsecRequest(
-	path: string,
-	init: { method?: "GET" | "POST"; body?: unknown } = {},
-): Promise<Response> {
-	const config = getCrowdsecApiConfig();
-	if (!config.apiKey) {
-		throw new CrowdsecApiError("CROWDSEC_API_KEY is not configured");
-	}
-	const controller = new AbortController();
-	const timer = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), API_TIMEOUT_MS);
-	try {
-		return await fetch(`${config.baseUrl}${path}`, {
-			method: init.method ?? "GET",
-			headers: {
-				"x-api-key": config.apiKey,
-				Accept: "application/json",
-				"Content-Type": "application/json",
-			},
-			body: init.body === undefined ? undefined : JSON.stringify(init.body),
-			signal: controller.signal,
-			cache: "no-store",
-		});
-	} finally {
-		clearTimeout(timer);
-	}
-}
-
-async function errorDetail(response: Response): Promise<string> {
-	try {
-		const body = (await response.json()) as { message?: string };
-		return body.message ?? `HTTP ${response.status}`;
-	} catch {
-		return `HTTP ${response.status}`;
-	}
-}
-
-function toNumber(value: unknown): number {
-	const n = Number(value);
-	return Number.isFinite(n) ? n : 0;
-}
-
-function parseVerdict(ip: string, item: CrowdsecSmokeItem): CrowdsecVerdict {
-	const overall = item.scores?.overall;
-	const falsePositives = item.classifications?.false_positives ?? [];
-	return {
-		ip,
-		reputation: (item.reputation as CrowdsecReputation | undefined) ?? null,
-		score: toNumber(overall?.total),
-		aggressiveness: toNumber(overall?.aggressiveness),
-		confidence: item.confidence ?? null,
-		behaviors: (item.behaviors ?? [])
-			.map((behavior) => behavior?.name)
-			.filter((name): name is string => Boolean(name)),
-		// CrowdSec: "Any IP with false_positives tags shouldn't be considered
-		// as malicious" — this veto always wins over reputation and score.
-		falsePositive: falsePositives.length > 0,
-		checkedAt: Date.now(),
-	};
-}
-
-/**
- * Resolve a cached CTI verdict into a block/no-block decision against the
- * admin-configurable score threshold. `malicious` is always blocked; `safe`
- * and `benign` never are; everything else follows the 0-5 score threshold
- * (with score 0 = "unknown" never blocking, even at threshold 0).
- */
-export function verdictIsMalicious(
-	verdict: CrowdsecVerdict,
-	threshold: number,
-): boolean {
-	if (verdict.falsePositive) return false;
-	if (verdict.reputation === "malicious") return true;
-	if (verdict.reputation === "safe" || verdict.reputation === "benign") {
-		return false;
-	}
-	const effective = Math.min(5, Math.max(0, threshold));
-	return verdict.score >= effective && verdict.score >= 1;
-}
-
-// --- Verdict cache (Redis backed, in-process fallback) ---
-
-const memoryVerdicts = new Map<string, CrowdsecVerdict>();
-
-/**
- * Insert/refresh an in-process verdict while keeping the cache bounded: Map
- * iteration order is insertion order, so the oldest (leftmost) entry is
- * dropped first and re-inserted entries are refreshed to the back.
- */
-function rememberVerdict(verdict: CrowdsecVerdict): void {
-	memoryVerdicts.delete(verdict.ip);
-	memoryVerdicts.set(verdict.ip, verdict);
-	while (memoryVerdicts.size > MEMORY_VERDICT_CACHE_MAX) {
-		const oldest = memoryVerdicts.keys().next();
-		if (oldest.done) break;
-		memoryVerdicts.delete(oldest.value);
-	}
-}
-
-/** Test hook only — reports the bounded in-process cache size. */
-export function getMemoryVerdictCacheSize(): number {
-	return memoryVerdicts.size;
-}
-
-function verdictKey(ip: string): string {
-	return `${VERDICT_PREFIX}${ip}`;
-}
-
-async function readVerdictCache(ip: string): Promise<CrowdsecVerdict | null> {
-	const cached = memoryVerdicts.get(ip);
-	if (cached && Date.now() - cached.checkedAt < VERDICT_CACHE_TTL_MS) {
-		return cached;
-	}
-	if (redis) {
-		try {
-			const raw = await redis.get(verdictKey(ip));
-			if (raw) {
-				const parsed = JSON.parse(raw) as CrowdsecVerdict;
-				rememberVerdict(parsed);
-				return parsed;
-			}
-		} catch {
-			// fall through to a cache miss — the API call below is the fallback.
-		}
-	}
-	return null;
-}
-
-async function writeVerdictCache(verdict: CrowdsecVerdict): Promise<void> {
-	rememberVerdict(verdict);
-	if (redis) {
-		try {
-			await redis.set(
-				verdictKey(verdict.ip),
-				JSON.stringify(verdict),
-				"EX",
-				VERDICT_CACHE_TTL_SECONDS,
-			);
-		} catch {
-			// cache is best-effort — a miss only costs one extra API call later.
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-/** Cross-instance dedupe so a cold-cache flood costs one lookup, not N. */
-async function acquireLookupLock(ip: string): Promise<boolean> {
-	if (!redis) return true;
-	try {
-		const acquired = await redis.set(
-			`${LOOKUP_LOCK_PREFIX}${ip}`,
-			"1",
-			"EX",
-			LOOKUP_LOCK_TTL_SECONDS,
-			"NX",
-		);
-		return acquired === "OK";
-	} catch {
-		// Redis hiccup — allow the lookup; the verdict cache still dedupes.
-		return true;
-	}
-}
-
-let backoffUntil = 0;
-let quotaWarnedDate: string | null = null;
-let quotaExhaustedDate: string | null = null;
-
-/**
- * Next moment (epoch ms) the CTI API may be called again — the max of the
- * in-process view and the shared Redis marker so every instance respects a
- * backoff discovered by any of them. Redis is only read when the local view is
- * not already active, keeping the hot path cheap.
- */
-async function getBackoffUntil(): Promise<number> {
-	if (Date.now() < backoffUntil) return backoffUntil;
-	if (redis) {
-		try {
-			const raw = await redis.get(BACKOFF_KEY);
-			const shared = Number(raw ?? 0);
-			if (Number.isFinite(shared) && shared > backoffUntil) {
-				backoffUntil = shared;
-			}
-		} catch {
-			// Redis hiccup — local view is enough
-		}
-	}
-	return backoffUntil;
-}
-
-async function setBackoff(ms: number): Promise<void> {
-	const until = Date.now() + ms;
-	backoffUntil = until;
-	if (redis) {
-		try {
-			// EX rounds up so the marker outlives the wait it encodes, plus a
-			// second of slack for the read path.
-			await redis.set(
-				BACKOFF_KEY,
-				String(until),
-				"EX",
-				Math.ceil(ms / 1000) + 1,
-			);
-		} catch {
-			// local view still protects this instance
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-function quotaDate(): string {
-	return new Date().toISOString().slice(0, 10);
-}
-
-function quotaKey(date: string): string {
-	return `${QUOTA_PREFIX}${date}`;
-}
-
-/**
- * Today's configured ceiling. Coerced because tests run with
- * SKIP_ENV_VALIDATION (raw process.env strings, no zod defaults) while
- * production gets a parsed number. 0 (or unset) = unlimited.
- */
-function dailyQuota(): number {
-	const raw = Number(env.CROWDSEC_CTI_DAILY_QUOTA ?? 0);
-	return Number.isFinite(raw) && raw > 0 ? raw : 0;
-}
-
-/**
- * Today's CTI usage against the configured daily ceiling. Counted in Redis so
- * every instance shares one budget.
- */
-export async function getCrowdsecQuotaUsage(): Promise<CrowdsecQuotaUsage> {
-	const date = quotaDate();
-	const quota = dailyQuota();
-	let used = 0;
-	if (redis) {
-		try {
-			used = Number((await redis.get(quotaKey(date))) ?? 0);
-			if (!Number.isFinite(used)) used = 0;
-		} catch {
-			// counter unavailable — report zero rather than blocking the admin
-		}
-	}
-	return { date, used, quota, exhausted: quota > 0 && used >= quota };
-}
-
-/**
- * Reserve one API call against today's quota. Atomic: the counter is INCR'd
- * BEFORE the call and compared to the ceiling, so concurrent instances can
- * never slip calls past the budget; a reserve that overshoots rolls itself
- * back. Returns false once the budget is spent (and raises an ops alert).
- */
-async function reserveQuota(): Promise<boolean> {
-	const quota = dailyQuota();
-	if (quota <= 0) return true;
-	if (!redis) return true; // no shared counter → unlimited best-effort
-	const date = quotaDate();
-	const key = quotaKey(date);
-	try {
-		const used = await redis.incr(key);
-		await redis.expire(key, QUOTA_KEY_TTL_SECONDS);
-		if (used > quota) {
-			// Concurrent reserves nudged us past the ceiling — give the slot
-			// back and refuse: the budget would be spent the very next call
-			// anyway, so stopping here is both safe and quota-exact.
-			await redis.decr(key);
-			quotaExhaustedDate = date;
-			logger.warn(
-				"[crowdsec-api] CTI daily quota exhausted — pausing lookups until tomorrow",
-				{ quota },
-			);
-			void raiseCrowdsecAlert("quota", {
-				type: "ddos",
-				severity: "warning",
-				message: `CrowdSec reputation quota exhausted for today (${used} of ${quota} enrichment calls) — lookups are paused until tomorrow.`,
-				context: { used, quota, date },
-			});
-			return false;
-		}
-		if (used >= quota * QUOTA_WARN_RATIO && quotaWarnedDate !== date) {
-			quotaWarnedDate = date;
-			logger.warn("[crowdsec-api] CTI daily quota nearing its limit", {
-				used,
-				quota,
-			});
-		}
-		if (quotaExhaustedDate) {
-			// A reserve just succeeded after an exhaustion day (counter was
-			// reset or the calendar rolled over) — say so, once per cooldown.
-			void raiseCrowdsecAlert("quota-restored", {
-				type: "ddos",
-				severity: "info",
-				message: `CrowdSec reputation quota is available again (${used} of ${quota} used today) — lookups resumed.`,
-				context: { used, quota, date },
-			});
-			quotaExhaustedDate = null;
-		}
-		return true;
-	} catch {
-		// Redis hiccup at a moment we could not count — allow the call rather
-		// than break the gate; the verdict cache still limits frequency.
-		return true;
-	}
-}
-
-/** Block burst threshold from env, defensively coerced (falls back to 10). */
-function dailyBlockBurstThreshold(): number {
-	const raw = Number(env.CROWDSEC_ALERT_BLOCK_BURST ?? 10);
-	return Number.isFinite(raw) && raw > 0 ? Math.floor(raw) : 10;
-}
-
-/**
- * A burst of new blocks is usually an automated attack wave. Track block
- * timestamps in a rolling window (Redis sorted set, 5 minutes) so a burst that
- * straddles a bucket boundary is still counted together, and alert once per
- * cooldown window when the count crosses CROWDSEC_ALERT_BLOCK_BURST.
- * Fire-and-forget.
- */
-async function trackBlockBurst(): Promise<void> {
-	if (!redis) return;
-	const now = Date.now();
-	const key = `${BURST_PREFIX}recent`;
-	const threshold = dailyBlockBurstThreshold();
-	try {
-		await redis.zadd(key, now, randomUUID());
-		await redis.zremrangebyscore(key, 0, now - BURST_WINDOW_SECONDS * 1000);
-		const count = await redis.zcard(key);
-		await redis.expire(key, BURST_WINDOW_SECONDS * 2);
-		if (count >= threshold) {
-			void raiseCrowdsecAlert("block-burst", {
-				type: "ddos",
-				severity: "warning",
-				message: `Anti-DDoS auto-block created ${count} blocks in the last ${BURST_WINDOW_SECONDS / 60} minutes — likely an automated attack wave.`,
-				context: {
-					blocks: count,
-					windowSeconds: BURST_WINDOW_SECONDS,
-					threshold,
-				},
-			});
-		}
-	} catch {
-		// alert is best-effort — never break the block path
-	}
-}
-
-/**
- * Community reputation verdict for an IP, from cache when possible. Returns
- * null when the API is not configured, the lookup failed, the API is in
- * backoff, or today's quota is spent — never throws, so it is safe on the
- * gate's hot path.
- */
-export async function lookupCrowdsecVerdict(
-	ip: string,
-): Promise<CrowdsecVerdict | null> {
-	if (!crowdsecEnabled()) return null;
-	if (!ip || ip === UNKNOWN_CLIENT_IP) return null;
-	if (Date.now() < (await getBackoffUntil())) return null;
-
-	const cached = await readVerdictCache(ip);
-	if (cached) return cached;
-
-	if (!(await acquireLookupLock(ip))) {
-		// Another instance is mid-lookup for this IP; skip rather than
-		// double-spend API quota on the same address.
-		return null;
-	}
-
-	try {
-		// Re-read after claiming the lock — a concurrent instance may have
-		// filled the cache while we were acquiring it.
-		const raced = await readVerdictCache(ip);
-		if (raced) return raced;
-
-		// Cache miss costs a paid call — reserve against today's quota first.
-		if (!(await reserveQuota())) {
-			logger.warn(
-				"[crowdsec-api] CTI daily quota exhausted — pausing lookups until tomorrow",
-				{ quota: dailyQuota() },
-			);
-			return null;
-		}
-
-		const response = await crowdsecRequest(`/smoke/${encodeURIComponent(ip)}`);
-		// The enrichment call happened — count it for the daily histogram,
-		// regardless of whether the verdict was positive, negative, or n/a.
-		void bumpCrowdsecStat("lookups");
-
-		if (response.status === 404) {
-			// Unknown to the community — cache the negative result so a clean
-			// repeat offender never costs another API call this hour.
-			const verdict = parseVerdict(ip, {});
-			await writeVerdictCache(verdict);
-			return verdict;
-		}
-		if (response.status === 403) {
-			const detail = await errorDetail(response);
-			await setBackoff(AUTH_BACKOFF_MS);
-			// A rejected key paralyses the whole reputation pipeline — surface
-			// it once (cooldown-gated) so rotating the key is an ops priority.
-			void raiseCrowdsecAlert("cti-auth", {
-				type: "ddos",
-				severity: "critical",
-				message: `CrowdSec CTI API key rejected (HTTP 403): ${detail} — reputation lookups are paused for ${Math.round(AUTH_BACKOFF_MS / 60_000)} minutes. Rotate CROWDSEC_API_KEY.`,
-				context: { status: 403, detail, backoffMs: AUTH_BACKOFF_MS },
-			});
-			throw new CrowdsecApiError(
-				`CrowdSec API key rejected (HTTP 403): ${detail}`,
-			);
-		}
-		if (response.status === 429) {
-			await setBackoff(RATE_LIMIT_BACKOFF_MS);
-			logger.warn("[crowdsec-api] CTI API rate limit hit — backing off", {
-				ip,
-				backoffMs: RATE_LIMIT_BACKOFF_MS,
-			});
-			void raiseCrowdsecAlert("cti-ratelimit", {
-				type: "ddos",
-				severity: "warning",
-				message: `CrowdSec CTI API rate limited — all instances backed off for ${Math.round(RATE_LIMIT_BACKOFF_MS / 1000)}s.`,
-				context: { status: 429, backoffMs: RATE_LIMIT_BACKOFF_MS },
-			});
-			return null;
-		}
-		if (!response.ok) {
-			throw new CrowdsecApiError(
-				`CrowdSec CTI API error (HTTP ${response.status}): ${await errorDetail(response)}`,
-			);
-		}
-
-		const item = (await response.json()) as CrowdsecSmokeItem;
-		const verdict = parseVerdict(ip, item);
-		await writeVerdictCache(verdict);
-		return verdict;
-	} catch (error) {
-		logger.error("[crowdsec-api] CTI lookup failed", { ip, err: error });
-		return null;
-	}
-}
-
-/**
- * Consult the CrowdSec community reputation of an IP that just tripped a rate
- * bucket and hard-block it when the community flags it as known-bad. Safe to
- * call fire-and-forget from the hot path: it is never awaited by the caller,
- * does nothing when the API is not configured or the runtime toggle is off,
- * never shortens an already-active block, and never lets an API failure
- * surface to the request.
- */
-export async function maybeAutoBlockCrowdsec(input: {
-	ip: string;
-	category: string;
-	ttlSeconds: number;
-	scoreThreshold: number;
-	enabled: boolean;
-}): Promise<void> {
-	const { ip, category, ttlSeconds, scoreThreshold, enabled } = input;
-	if (!enabled) return;
-	if (!crowdsecEnabled()) return;
-	if (!ip || ip === UNKNOWN_CLIENT_IP) return;
-	// The gate only ever reads its block key through shared Redis — without it
-	// there is nowhere durable to record the block.
-	if (!redis) return;
-	if (Date.now() < (await getBackoffUntil())) return;
-
-	try {
-		const verdict = await lookupCrowdsecVerdict(ip);
-		if (!verdict || !verdictIsMalicious(verdict, scoreThreshold)) return;
-
-		const blockKey = `antiddos:block:${ip}`;
-		const existingTtl = await redis.pttl(blockKey);
-		// -2 = no key, -1 = no expiry; both fall through and get overwritten
-		// with the CrowdSec TTL. An equal or longer block is left untouched.
-		if (existingTtl >= ttlSeconds * 1000) return;
-
-		await redis.set(blockKey, CROWDSEC_BLOCK_SOURCE, "EX", ttlSeconds);
-		// Record why this block exists so the admin panel can surface the
-		// community reasoning (reputation, score, behaviors) for the IP.
-		const meta: CrowdsecBlockMeta = {
-			source: CROWDSEC_BLOCK_SOURCE,
-			category,
-			reputation: verdict.reputation,
-			score: verdict.score,
-			behaviors: verdict.behaviors,
-			ttlSeconds,
-			blockedAt: Date.now(),
-		};
-		try {
-			await redis.set(
-				`${BLOCK_META_PREFIX}${ip}`,
-				JSON.stringify(meta),
-				"EX",
-				ttlSeconds,
-			);
-		} catch {
-			// metadata is display sugar only — the block itself is already set.
-		}
-		// CrowdSec only records the block in the gate's own key. It never
-		// creates Cloudflare edge rules — the gate's own escalation logic is
-		// the only place that may mirror a host-level block to the edge.
-		logger.info(
-			"[crowdsec-api] Automatic IP block created from community reputation",
-			{
-				ip,
-				category,
-				ttlSeconds,
-				reputation: verdict.reputation,
-				score: verdict.score,
-				behaviors: verdict.behaviors,
-			},
-		);
-		// Opt-in community signal push (CAPI), fire-and-forget: never awaited,
-		// never throws, and internally deduped per IP.
-		void reportCrowdsecSignal({ ip, category, ttlSeconds, verdict, meta });
-		// Daily histogram + burst detection (cooldown-gated ops alert).
-		void bumpCrowdsecStat("blocks");
-		void bumpCrowdsecBreakdownStat("category", category);
-		if (verdict.reputation) {
-			void bumpCrowdsecBreakdownStat("reputation", verdict.reputation);
-		}
-		void trackBlockBurst();
-	} catch (error) {
-		logger.error("[crowdsec-api] Automatic IP block failed", {
-			ip,
-			err: error,
-		});
-	}
-}
-
-let lastVerifyMemory: CrowdsecConnectionStatus | null = null;
-
-/** Validate that the configured key can query the CTI (Enrichment) API. */
-export async function verifyCrowdsecConnection(): Promise<CrowdsecConnectionStatus> {
-	const config = getCrowdsecApiConfig();
-	if (!config.apiKey) {
-		return {
-			ok: false,
-			message: "CROWDSEC_API_KEY is not configured",
-			at: Date.now(),
-		};
-	}
-	try {
-		const response = await crowdsecRequest(`/smoke/${PROBE_IP}`);
-		if (response.ok) {
-			const item = (await response
-				.json()
-				.catch(() => null)) as CrowdsecSmokeItem | null;
-			const reputation = item?.reputation
-				? ` (reputation ${item.reputation})`
-				: "";
-			return {
-				ok: true,
-				message: `CTI key accepted — probed ${PROBE_IP}${reputation}`,
-				at: Date.now(),
-			};
-		}
-		if (response.status === 403) {
-			return {
-				ok: false,
-				message: `API key rejected: ${await errorDetail(response)}`,
-				at: Date.now(),
-			};
-		}
-		if (response.status === 429) {
-			return {
-				ok: false,
-				message: "CTI API rate limit reached — try again shortly",
-				at: Date.now(),
-			};
-		}
-		return {
-			ok: false,
-			message: `CrowdSec CTI API error (HTTP ${response.status}): ${await errorDetail(response)}`,
-			at: Date.now(),
-		};
-	} catch (error) {
-		return {
-			ok: false,
-			message:
-				error instanceof Error ? error.message : "CrowdSec API unreachable",
-			at: Date.now(),
-		};
-	}
-}
-
-export async function getLastCrowdsecVerify(): Promise<CrowdsecConnectionStatus | null> {
-	if (redis) {
-		try {
-			const raw = await redis.get(LAST_VERIFY_KEY);
-			if (raw) return JSON.parse(raw) as CrowdsecConnectionStatus;
-		} catch {
-			// fall back to the in-process view
-		}
-	}
-	return lastVerifyMemory;
-}
-
-export async function setLastCrowdsecVerify(
-	status: CrowdsecConnectionStatus,
-): Promise<void> {
-	lastVerifyMemory = status;
-	if (redis) {
-		try {
-			await redis.set(LAST_VERIFY_KEY, JSON.stringify(status));
-		} catch {
-			// redis unavailable — in-process view is enough
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-/** Why an IP is blocked by CrowdSec, when known. */
-export async function getCrowdsecBlockMeta(
-	ip: string,
-): Promise<CrowdsecBlockMeta | null> {
-	if (!redis) return null;
-	try {
-		const raw = await redis.get(`${BLOCK_META_PREFIX}${ip}`);
-		if (!raw) return null;
-		return JSON.parse(raw) as CrowdsecBlockMeta;
-	} catch {
-		return null;
-	}
-}
-
-/** Test hook only — drop in-memory state between unit runs. */
-export function resetCrowdsecCache(): void {
-	memoryVerdicts.clear();
-	backoffUntil = 0;
-	quotaWarnedDate = null;
-	quotaExhaustedDate = null;
-	lastVerifyMemory = null;
-}

src/lib/crowdsec-local.test.ts

@@ -1,195 +0,0 @@
-import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
-import {
-	checkCrowdsecLocalBlock,
-	isBlockingCrowdsecDecision,
-	parseCrowdsecDecisionDuration,
-	resetCrowdsecLocalCache,
-} from "@/lib/crowdsec-local";
-
-const state = vi.hoisted(() => ({
-	map: new Map<string, string>(),
-	sendAlert: vi.fn(),
-}));
-
-vi.mock("@/lib/services/alert", () => ({
-	sendAlert: state.sendAlert,
-	ddosDetected: vi.fn(),
-}));
-
-vi.mock("@/lib/redis", () => ({
-	redis: {
-		get: async (key: string) => state.map.get(key) ?? null,
-		set: async (
-			key: string,
-			value: string,
-			_mode?: string,
-			_seconds?: number,
-			nx?: string,
-		) => {
-			if (nx === "NX" && state.map.has(key)) return null;
-			state.map.set(key, value);
-			return "OK";
-		},
-		del: async (...keys: string[]) => {
-			for (const key of keys) state.map.delete(key);
-			return keys.length;
-		},
-		incr: async (key: string) => {
-			const next = (Number(state.map.get(key)) || 0) + 1;
-			state.map.set(key, String(next));
-			return next;
-		},
-		expire: async () => 1,
-		pexpire: async () => 1,
-		pttl: async () => 60_000,
-	},
-	__esModule: true,
-}));
-
-function jsonResponse(body: unknown, status = 200): Response {
-	return new Response(JSON.stringify(body), {
-		status,
-		headers: { "content-type": "application/json" },
-	});
-}
-
-const IP = "198.51.100.11";
-const LAPI_URL = "http://127.0.0.1:18080";
-
-describe("crowdsec-local app-layer bouncer", () => {
-	let fetchMock: ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>;
-
-	beforeEach(() => {
-		vi.unstubAllGlobals();
-		vi.unstubAllEnvs();
-		state.map.clear();
-		resetCrowdsecLocalCache();
-		fetchMock = vi.fn();
-		vi.stubGlobal("fetch", fetchMock);
-		vi.stubEnv("NODE_ENV", "production");
-		vi.stubEnv("CROWDSEC_LOCAL_ENABLED", "true");
-		vi.stubEnv("CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL", LAPI_URL);
-		vi.stubEnv("CROWDSEC_LAPI_API_KEY", "test-local-key");
-	});
-
-	afterEach(() => {
-		vi.unstubAllGlobals();
-		vi.unstubAllEnvs();
-		state.map.clear();
-		resetCrowdsecLocalCache();
-	});
-
-	it("does nothing when the local stack is not enabled", async () => {
-		vi.stubEnv("CROWDSEC_LOCAL_ENABLED", "false");
-		const result = await checkCrowdsecLocalBlock(IP);
-		expect(result.blocked).toBe(false);
-		expect(fetchMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
-	});
-
-	it("does nothing without a bouncer key", async () => {
-		vi.stubEnv("CROWDSEC_LAPI_API_KEY", "");
-		const result = await checkCrowdsecLocalBlock(IP);
-		expect(result.blocked).toBe(false);
-		expect(fetchMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
-	});
-
-	it("blocks an IP with a local ban decision and caches it", async () => {
-		fetchMock.mockResolvedValue(
-			jsonResponse([
-				{
-					origin: "crowdsec",
-					type: "ban",
-					scope: "ip",
-					value: IP,
-					duration: "4h",
-				},
-			]),
-		);
-
-		const first = await checkCrowdsecLocalBlock(IP);
-		expect(first.blocked).toBe(true);
-		expect(first.retryAfterSeconds).toBeGreaterThan(0);
-		expect(fetchMock).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
-		expect(String(fetchMock.mock.calls[0][0])).toContain(
-			`/v1/decisions?ip=${IP}`,
-		);
-
-		const second = await checkCrowdsecLocalBlock(IP);
-		expect(second.blocked).toBe(true);
-		expect(fetchMock).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
-	});
-
-	it("treats captcha decisions as blocks", async () => {
-		fetchMock.mockResolvedValue(
-			jsonResponse([{ type: "captcha", scope: "ip", value: IP }]),
-		);
-		const result = await checkCrowdsecLocalBlock(IP);
-		expect(result.blocked).toBe(true);
-	});
-
-	it("passes non-blocking decisions and caches the negative", async () => {
-		fetchMock.mockResolvedValue(
-			jsonResponse([{ type: "probation", scope: "ip", value: IP }]),
-		);
-		const first = await checkCrowdsecLocalBlock(IP);
-		expect(first.blocked).toBe(false);
-		const second = await checkCrowdsecLocalBlock(IP);
-		expect(second.blocked).toBe(false);
-		expect(fetchMock).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
-	});
-
-	it("fails open when LAPI errors and backs off", async () => {
-		fetchMock.mockRejectedValueOnce(new Error("connection refused"));
-		const first = await checkCrowdsecLocalBlock(IP);
-		expect(first.blocked).toBe(false);
-		await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, 5));
-		const second = await checkCrowdsecLocalBlock(IP);
-		expect(second.blocked).toBe(false);
-		expect(fetchMock).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
-	});
-
-	it("backs off for five minutes when the bouncer key is rejected", async () => {
-		fetchMock.mockResolvedValue(jsonResponse({ message: "forbidden" }, 403));
-		const first = await checkCrowdsecLocalBlock(IP);
-		expect(first.blocked).toBe(false);
-		const second = await checkCrowdsecLocalBlock(IP);
-		expect(second.blocked).toBe(false);
-		expect(fetchMock).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
-	});
-
-	it("does not query the LAPI for the unknown-IP sentinel", async () => {
-		const result = await checkCrowdsecLocalBlock("0.0.0.0");
-		expect(result.blocked).toBe(false);
-		expect(fetchMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
-	});
-});
-
-describe("crowdsec-local decision parsing", () => {
-	it("parses Go-style durations into seconds", () => {
-		expect(parseCrowdsecDecisionDuration("3h51m57s")).toBe(
-			3 * 3_600 + 51 * 60 + 57,
-		);
-		expect(parseCrowdsecDecisionDuration("500ms")).toBeCloseTo(0.5);
-		expect(parseCrowdsecDecisionDuration("")).toBe(0);
-		expect(parseCrowdsecDecisionDuration(null)).toBe(0);
-	});
-
-	it("recognises only ban/captcha ip/range decisions", () => {
-		expect(
-			isBlockingCrowdsecDecision({ type: "ban", scope: "ip", value: IP }),
-		).toBe(true);
-		expect(
-			isBlockingCrowdsecDecision({ type: "ban", scope: "range", value: IP }),
-		).toBe(true);
-		expect(
-			isBlockingCrowdsecDecision({ type: "captcha", scope: "ip", value: IP }),
-		).toBe(true);
-		expect(
-			isBlockingCrowdsecDecision({ type: "probation", scope: "ip", value: IP }),
-		).toBe(false);
-		expect(
-			isBlockingCrowdsecDecision({ type: "ban", scope: "as", value: IP }),
-		).toBe(false);
-		expect(isBlockingCrowdsecDecision(null)).toBe(false);
-	});
-});

src/lib/crowdsec-local.ts

@@ -1,304 +0,0 @@
-import "server-only";
-
-import { env } from "@/env";
-import {
-	bumpCrowdsecBreakdownStat,
-	bumpCrowdsecStat,
-} from "@/lib/crowdsec-stats";
-import { logger } from "@/lib/logger";
-import { redis } from "@/lib/redis";
-import { UNKNOWN_CLIENT_IP } from "./client-ip";
-
-export interface CrowdsecLocalDecision {
-	origin?: string;
-	scope?: string;
-	type?: string;
-	value?: string;
-	duration?: string | null;
-}
-
-export interface CrowdsecLocalBlockResult {
-	blocked: boolean;
-	retryAfterSeconds: number;
-}
-
-const DEFAULT_LAPI_URL = "http://127.0.0.1:18080";
-const REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS = 500;
-const NEGATIVE_CACHE_TTL_MS = 2_000;
-const DECISION_CACHE_TTL_MS = 300_000;
-const DECISION_RETRY_MAX_SECONDS = 300;
-const FALLBACK_RETRY_SECONDS = 60;
-const BACKOFF_MS = 5_000;
-const AUTH_BACKOFF_MS = 300_000;
-const MEMORY_CACHE_MAX = 5_000;
-const CACHE_PREFIX = "crowdsec:local:";
-const BACKOFF_KEY = "crowdsec:local:backoff-until";
-
-const DURATION_TOKEN = /(\d+(?:\.\d+)?)(ns|us|µs|ms|s|m|h)/g;
-
-export function parseCrowdsecDecisionDuration(
-	value: string | null | undefined,
-): number {
-	if (!value) return 0;
-	let total = 0;
-	for (const match of value.matchAll(DURATION_TOKEN)) {
-		const amount = Number(match[1]);
-		if (!Number.isFinite(amount)) continue;
-		const unit = match[2];
-		if (unit === "h") total += amount * 3_600;
-		else if (unit === "m") total += amount * 60;
-		else if (unit === "s") total += amount;
-		else if (unit === "ms") total += amount / 1_000;
-		else if (unit === "us" || unit === "µs") total += amount / 1_000_000;
-		else if (unit === "ns") total += amount / 1_000_000_000;
-	}
-	return total;
-}
-
-export function isBlockingCrowdsecDecision(
-	decision: CrowdsecLocalDecision | null | undefined,
-): boolean {
-	if (!decision) return false;
-	const type = decision.type?.toLowerCase();
-	const scope = decision.scope?.toLowerCase();
-	if ((type !== "ban" && type !== "captcha") || !decision.value) return false;
-	return scope === "ip" || scope === "range";
-}
-
-function localEnabled(): boolean {
-	const flag: unknown = env.CROWDSEC_LOCAL_ENABLED;
-	return flag === true || flag === "true" || flag === "1";
-}
-
-function localConfig(): {
-	url: string;
-	apiKey: string;
-	timeoutMs: number;
-} {
-	return {
-		url: (env.CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL || DEFAULT_LAPI_URL).replace(/\/+$/, ""),
-		apiKey: String(env.CROWDSEC_LAPI_API_KEY ?? "").trim(),
-		timeoutMs:
-			Number(env.CROWDSEC_LAPI_TIMEOUT_MS) > 0
-				? Number(env.CROWDSEC_LAPI_TIMEOUT_MS)
-				: REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS,
-	};
-}
-
-interface CacheEntry {
-	blocked: boolean;
-	retryAfterSeconds: number;
-	until: number;
-}
-
-const memoryCache = new Map<string, CacheEntry>();
-
-let backoffUntil = 0;
-let authBackoffWarned = false;
-
-async function rememberCache(
-	ip: string,
-	entry: CacheEntry,
-	ttlMs: number,
-): Promise<void> {
-	memoryCache.delete(ip);
-	memoryCache.set(ip, entry);
-	while (memoryCache.size > MEMORY_CACHE_MAX) {
-		const oldest = memoryCache.keys().next();
-		if (oldest.done) break;
-		memoryCache.delete(oldest.value);
-	}
-	if (!redis) return;
-	try {
-		await redis.set(
-			`${CACHE_PREFIX}block:${ip}`,
-			JSON.stringify(entry),
-			"EX",
-			Math.max(1, Math.ceil(ttlMs / 1_000)),
-		);
-	} catch {
-		// Cache is best-effort — a miss only costs one extra LAPI call.
-	}
-}
-
-async function readCache(ip: string): Promise<CacheEntry | null> {
-	const memory = memoryCache.get(ip);
-	if (memory && memory.until > Date.now()) return memory;
-	if (redis) {
-		try {
-			const raw = await redis.get(`${CACHE_PREFIX}block:${ip}`);
-			if (raw) {
-				const parsed = JSON.parse(raw) as CacheEntry;
-				if (parsed.until > Date.now()) return parsed;
-			}
-		} catch {
-			// Redis hiccup — an extra local LAPI call is the only cost.
-		}
-	}
-	return null;
-}
-
-async function getBackoffUntil(): Promise<number> {
-	if (Date.now() < backoffUntil) return backoffUntil;
-	if (redis) {
-		try {
-			const raw = await redis.get(BACKOFF_KEY);
-			const shared = Number(raw ?? 0);
-			if (Number.isFinite(shared) && shared > backoffUntil) {
-				backoffUntil = shared;
-			}
-		} catch {
-			// Redis hiccup — the local view is enough.
-		}
-	}
-	return backoffUntil;
-}
-
-async function setBackoff(ms: number): Promise<void> {
-	const until = Date.now() + ms;
-	backoffUntil = until;
-	if (redis) {
-		try {
-			await redis.set(
-				BACKOFF_KEY,
-				String(until),
-				"EX",
-				Math.ceil(ms / 1_000) + 1,
-			);
-		} catch {
-			// Local view still protects this instance.
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-function decisionRetrySeconds(decision: CrowdsecLocalDecision | null): number {
-	const parsed = decision
-		? parseCrowdsecDecisionDuration(decision.duration)
-		: 0;
-	if (parsed <= 0) return FALLBACK_RETRY_SECONDS;
-	return Math.min(Math.max(1, Math.floor(parsed)), DECISION_RETRY_MAX_SECONDS);
-}
-
-async function queryLocalDecision(
-	baseUrl: string,
-	apiKey: string,
-	timeoutMs: number,
-	ip: string,
-): Promise<CrowdsecLocalDecision | null> {
-	const controller = new AbortController();
-	const timer = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), timeoutMs);
-	try {
-		const response = await fetch(
-			`${baseUrl}/v1/decisions?ip=${encodeURIComponent(ip)}`,
-			{
-				headers: {
-					"X-Api-Key": apiKey,
-					Accept: "application/json",
-				},
-				signal: controller.signal,
-				cache: "no-store",
-			},
-		);
-		if (response.status === 401 || response.status === 403) {
-			await setBackoff(AUTH_BACKOFF_MS);
-			if (!authBackoffWarned) {
-				authBackoffWarned = true;
-				logger.warn(
-					"[crowdsec-local] LAPI rejected the bouncer key — local decisions paused for 5 minutes",
-					{ status: response.status },
-				);
-			}
-			return null;
-		}
-		if (!response.ok) {
-			await setBackoff(BACKOFF_MS);
-			logger.warn(
-				"[crowdsec-local] LAPI decision request failed — failing open",
-				{ ip, status: response.status },
-			);
-			return null;
-		}
-		const body = (await response.json()) as unknown;
-		if (!Array.isArray(body)) return null;
-		return body.find(isBlockingCrowdsecDecision) ?? null;
-	} catch (error) {
-		await setBackoff(BACKOFF_MS);
-		logger.warn(
-			"[crowdsec-local] LAPI decision request errored — failing open",
-			{
-				ip,
-				error: error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error),
-			},
-		);
-		return null;
-	} finally {
-		clearTimeout(timer);
-	}
-}
-
-export async function checkCrowdsecLocalBlock(
-	ip: string,
-): Promise<CrowdsecLocalBlockResult> {
-	if (!localEnabled()) return { blocked: false, retryAfterSeconds: 0 };
-	const config = localConfig();
-	if (!config.apiKey) return { blocked: false, retryAfterSeconds: 0 };
-	if (!ip || ip === UNKNOWN_CLIENT_IP) {
-		return { blocked: false, retryAfterSeconds: 0 };
-	}
-
-	if (Date.now() < (await getBackoffUntil())) {
-		return { blocked: false, retryAfterSeconds: 0 };
-	}
-
-	const cached = await readCache(ip);
-	if (cached && cached.until > Date.now()) {
-		return {
-			blocked: cached.blocked,
-			retryAfterSeconds: cached.blocked ? cached.retryAfterSeconds : 0,
-		};
-	}
-
-	const decision = await queryLocalDecision(
-		config.url,
-		config.apiKey,
-		config.timeoutMs,
-		ip,
-	);
-	if (decision) {
-		const retryAfterSeconds = decisionRetrySeconds(decision);
-		await rememberCache(
-			ip,
-			{
-				blocked: true,
-				retryAfterSeconds,
-				until: Date.now() + DECISION_CACHE_TTL_MS,
-			},
-			DECISION_CACHE_TTL_MS,
-		);
-		void bumpCrowdsecStat("blocks");
-		void bumpCrowdsecBreakdownStat("category", "local");
-		logger.info("[crowdsec-local] IP blocked by a local CrowdSec decision", {
-			ip,
-			type: decision.type,
-			retryAfterSeconds,
-		});
-		return { blocked: true, retryAfterSeconds };
-	}
-
-	await rememberCache(
-		ip,
-		{
-			blocked: false,
-			retryAfterSeconds: 0,
-			until: Date.now() + NEGATIVE_CACHE_TTL_MS,
-		},
-		NEGATIVE_CACHE_TTL_MS,
-	);
-	return { blocked: false, retryAfterSeconds: 0 };
-}
-
-export function resetCrowdsecLocalCache(): void {
-	memoryCache.clear();
-	backoffUntil = 0;
-	authBackoffWarned = false;
-}

src/lib/crowdsec-report.test.ts

@@ -1,378 +0,0 @@
-import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
-import type { CrowdsecVerdict } from "./crowdsec-api";
-import {
-	type CrowdsecReportStatus,
-	crowdsecReportEnabled,
-	getLastCrowdsecReport,
-	reportCrowdsecSignal,
-	resetCrowdsecReportCache,
-	verifyCrowdsecReporting,
-} from "./crowdsec-report";
-
-// The signal-push watcher is tested against a deterministic in-memory Redis
-// fake (NX lock + token cache) and a mocked fetch that routes the CAPI paths.
-const state = vi.hoisted(() => ({
-	map: new Map<string, string>(),
-	sendAlert: vi.fn(),
-}));
-
-vi.mock("@/lib/redis", () => ({
-	redis: {
-		get: async (key: string) => state.map.get(key) ?? null,
-		set: async (
-			key: string,
-			value: string,
-			_mode?: string,
-			_seconds?: number,
-			nx?: string,
-		) => {
-			if (nx === "NX" && state.map.has(key)) return null;
-			state.map.set(key, value);
-			return "OK";
-		},
-		del: async (...keys: string[]) => {
-			for (const key of keys) state.map.delete(key);
-			return keys.length;
-		},
-		incr: async (key: string) => {
-			const next = (Number(state.map.get(key)) || 0) + 1;
-			state.map.set(key, String(next));
-			return next;
-		},
-		expire: async () => 1,
-	},
-	__esModule: true,
-}));
-
-vi.mock("@/lib/logger", () => ({
-	logger: {
-		info: vi.fn(),
-		warn: vi.fn(),
-		error: vi.fn(),
-		debug: vi.fn(),
-	},
-}));
-
-vi.mock("@/lib/services/alert", () => ({
-	sendAlert: state.sendAlert,
-	ddosDetected: vi.fn(),
-}));
-
-const tick = () => new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, 20));
-
-const CAPI = "https://capi.example.test/v3";
-const MACHINE = "m".repeat(48);
-const PASSWORD = "Strong!1P@ssw0rdStrong!1P@ssw0rd";
-
-function jsonResponse(body: unknown, status = 200): Response {
-	return new Response(JSON.stringify(body), {
-		status,
-		headers: { "content-type": "application/json" },
-	});
-}
-
-function signalInput(ip = "198.51.100.9") {
-	const verdict: CrowdsecVerdict = {
-		ip,
-		reputation: "malicious",
-		score: 5,
-		aggressiveness: 4,
-		confidence: "0.95",
-		behaviors: ["http:bruteforce", "http:scan"],
-		falsePositive: false,
-		checkedAt: Date.now(),
-	};
-	return {
-		ip,
-		category: "api",
-		ttlSeconds: 86_400,
-		verdict,
-		meta: {
-			source: "crowdsec" as const,
-			category: "api",
-			reputation: verdict.reputation,
-			score: verdict.score,
-			behaviors: verdict.behaviors,
-			ttlSeconds: 86_400,
-			blockedAt: Date.now(),
-		},
-	};
-}
-
-describe("crowdsec-report", () => {
-	let fetchMock: ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>;
-
-	function routeCapi(overrides: Record<string, number> = {}) {
-		const statusFor = (path: string) =>
-			overrides[path] ?? (path === "/signals" ? 200 : 200);
-		fetchMock.mockImplementation((url: string) => {
-			const path = String(url).replace(CAPI, "");
-			const status = statusFor(path);
-			if (status !== 200) {
-				return Promise.resolve(jsonResponse({ message: "boom" }, status));
-			}
-			if (path === "/watchers/login") {
-				return Promise.resolve(
-					jsonResponse({
-						token: "jwt-xyz",
-						expire: new Date(Date.now() + 3_600_000).toISOString(),
-					}),
-				);
-			}
-			return Promise.resolve(jsonResponse({}));
-		});
-	}
-
-	beforeEach(() => {
-		vi.unstubAllGlobals();
-		vi.unstubAllEnvs();
-		state.map.clear();
-		state.sendAlert.mockReset();
-		resetCrowdsecReportCache();
-		fetchMock = vi.fn();
-		vi.stubGlobal("fetch", fetchMock);
-		vi.stubEnv("CROWDSEC_REPORT_ENABLED", "true");
-		vi.stubEnv("CROWDSEC_REPORT_MACHINE_ID", MACHINE);
-		vi.stubEnv("CROWDSEC_REPORT_PASSWORD", PASSWORD);
-		vi.stubEnv("CROWDSEC_CAPI_BASE_URL", CAPI);
-	});
-
-	afterEach(() => {
-		vi.unstubAllGlobals();
-		vi.unstubAllEnvs();
-		state.map.clear();
-		resetCrowdsecReportCache();
-		vi.restoreAllMocks();
-	});
-
-	it("is enabled only when the toggle and credentials are present", async () => {
-		expect(await crowdsecReportEnabled()).toBe(true);
-
-		vi.stubEnv("CROWDSEC_REPORT_ENABLED", "");
-		resetCrowdsecReportCache();
-		expect(await crowdsecReportEnabled()).toBe(false);
-
-		// Machine id supplied but no password: falls back to generating a
-		// stable credential pair persisted in Redis.
-		vi.stubEnv("CROWDSEC_REPORT_ENABLED", "true");
-		vi.stubEnv("CROWDSEC_REPORT_PASSWORD", "");
-		resetCrowdsecReportCache();
-		expect(await crowdsecReportEnabled()).toBe(true);
-		const storedMachine = state.map.get("crowdsec:report:machine");
-		expect(storedMachine).toMatch(/^[A-Za-z0-9]{48}$/);
-		expect(state.map.get("crowdsec:report:pass")).toBeTruthy();
-	});
-
-	it("does nothing when the channel is disabled", async () => {
-		vi.stubEnv("CROWDSEC_REPORT_ENABLED", "");
-		resetCrowdsecReportCache();
-
-		await reportCrowdsecSignal(signalInput());
-		expect(fetchMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
-	});
-
-	it("registers once, caches the token and pushes one signal per IP", async () => {
-		routeCapi();
-
-		await reportCrowdsecSignal(signalInput("198.51.100.10"));
-		await reportCrowdsecSignal(signalInput("198.51.100.11"));
-		await reportCrowdsecSignal(signalInput("198.51.100.10"));
-		// Let the fire-and-forget network body land.
-		await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, 20));
-
-		const urls = fetchMock.mock.calls.map((call) => String(call[0]));
-		expect(urls.filter((u) => u.endsWith("/watchers/register"))).toHaveLength(
-			1,
-		);
-		expect(urls.filter((u) => u.endsWith("/watchers/login"))).toHaveLength(1);
-		expect(urls.filter((u) => u.endsWith("/signals"))).toHaveLength(2);
-		// No enrollment requested without an attachment key.
-		expect(urls.some((u) => u.endsWith("/watchers/enroll"))).toBe(false);
-	});
-
-	it("builds a well-formed CrowdSec signal with a ban decision", async () => {
-		routeCapi();
-
-		await reportCrowdsecSignal(signalInput());
-		await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, 20));
-
-		const signalsCall = fetchMock.mock.calls.find((call) =>
-			String(call[0]).endsWith("/signals"),
-		);
-		expect(signalsCall).toBeDefined();
-		if (!signalsCall) throw new Error("expected a /signals call");
-		const init = signalsCall[1] as {
-			body: string;
-			headers: Record<string, string>;
-		};
-		const body = JSON.parse(init.body) as Record<string, unknown>[];
-		expect(body).toHaveLength(1);
-		const signal = body[0] as {
-			machine_id: string;
-			scenario: string;
-			scenario_version: string;
-			source: { scope: string; value: string; ip: string };
-			decisions: {
-				scope: string;
-				type: string;
-				value: string;
-				duration: string;
-			}[];
-			context: { key: string; value: string }[];
-			created_at: string;
-			start_at: string;
-			stop_at: string;
-		};
-		expect(signal.machine_id).toBe(MACHINE);
-		expect(signal.scenario).toBe("community/anti-ddos-block");
-		expect(signal.scenario_version).toBe("1.0.0");
-		expect(signal.source).toEqual({
-			scope: "ip",
-			value: "198.51.100.9",
-			ip: "198.51.100.9",
-		});
-		expect(signal.decisions).toHaveLength(1);
-		expect(signal.decisions[0]).toMatchObject({
-			origin: "crowdsec",
-			scope: "ip",
-			type: "ban",
-			value: "198.51.100.9",
-		});
-		expect(String(signal.decisions[0].duration)).toMatch(/^24h0m0s$/);
-		for (const key of ["created_at", "start_at", "stop_at"] as const) {
-			expect(typeof signal[key]).toBe("string");
-		}
-		expect(
-			signal.context.find((c) => c.key === "crowdsec_reputation")?.value,
-		).toBe("malicious");
-	});
-
-	it("records a healthy last-report state after a successful push", async () => {
-		routeCapi();
-		await reportCrowdsecSignal(signalInput());
-		await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, 20));
-		const last = await getLastCrowdsecReport();
-		expect(last?.ok).toBe(true);
-	});
-
-	it("never throws and logs the failure when the CAPI rejects the signal", async () => {
-		fetchMock.mockImplementation((url: string) => {
-			const path = String(url).replace(CAPI, "");
-			if (path === "/watchers/login") {
-				return Promise.resolve(
-					jsonResponse({
-						token: "jwt-xyz",
-						expire: new Date(Date.now() + 3_600_000).toISOString(),
-					}),
-				);
-			}
-			if (path === "/signals") {
-				return Promise.resolve(jsonResponse({ message: "boom" }, 500));
-			}
-			return Promise.resolve(jsonResponse({}));
-		});
-
-		await expect(reportCrowdsecSignal(signalInput())).resolves.toBeUndefined();
-		await tick();
-		const last: CrowdsecReportStatus | null = await getLastCrowdsecReport();
-		expect(last?.ok).toBe(false);
-		expect(last?.message).toContain("signal push rejected");
-	});
-
-	it("counts a failed push and raises a cooldown-gated ops alert", async () => {
-		fetchMock.mockImplementation((url: string) => {
-			const path = String(url).replace(CAPI, "");
-			if (path === "/watchers/login") {
-				return Promise.resolve(
-					jsonResponse({
-						token: "jwt-xyz",
-						expire: new Date(Date.now() + 3_600_000).toISOString(),
-					}),
-				);
-			}
-			if (path === "/signals") {
-				return Promise.resolve(jsonResponse({ message: "boom" }, 500));
-			}
-			return Promise.resolve(jsonResponse({}));
-		});
-
-		await reportCrowdsecSignal(signalInput("198.51.100.20"));
-		await tick();
-		const today = new Date().toISOString().slice(0, 10);
-		expect(state.map.get(`crowdsec:stat:report_fail:${today}`)).toBe("1");
-		expect(state.sendAlert).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
-		const [input] = state.sendAlert.mock.calls[0];
-		expect(input.type).toBe("ddos");
-		expect(input.severity).toBe("warning");
-		expect(input.context).toMatchObject({ ip: "198.51.100.20" });
-
-		// A second failed push inside the cooldown window stays silent.
-		await reportCrowdsecSignal(signalInput("198.51.100.21"));
-		await tick();
-		expect(state.sendAlert).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
-		expect(state.map.get(`crowdsec:stat:report_fail:${today}`)).toBe("2");
-	});
-
-	it("tallies successful pushes into the daily stats histogram", async () => {
-		routeCapi();
-		await reportCrowdsecSignal(signalInput("198.51.100.30"));
-		await reportCrowdsecSignal(signalInput("198.51.100.31"));
-		await tick();
-		const today = new Date().toISOString().slice(0, 10);
-		expect(state.map.get(`crowdsec:stat:reports:${today}`)).toBe("2");
-		expect(state.sendAlert).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
-	});
-
-	it("raises an info alert the first time the channel heals after failures", async () => {
-		fetchMock.mockImplementation((url: string) => {
-			const path = String(url).replace(CAPI, "");
-			if (path === "/watchers/login") {
-				return Promise.resolve(
-					jsonResponse({
-						token: "jwt-xyz",
-						expire: new Date(Date.now() + 3_600_000).toISOString(),
-					}),
-				);
-			}
-			if (path === "/signals") {
-				return Promise.resolve(jsonResponse({ message: "boom" }, 500));
-			}
-			return Promise.resolve(jsonResponse({}));
-		});
-
-		await reportCrowdsecSignal(signalInput("198.51.100.40"));
-		await tick();
-		expect(state.sendAlert).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
-		expect((await getLastCrowdsecReport())?.ok).toBe(false);
-
-		// Channel heals: the first success after a failure is worth a notice.
-		routeCapi();
-		await reportCrowdsecSignal(signalInput("198.51.100.41"));
-		await tick();
-		const last: CrowdsecReportStatus | null = await getLastCrowdsecReport();
-		expect(last?.ok).toBe(true);
-
-		expect(state.sendAlert).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
-		const alerts = state.sendAlert.mock.calls.map(([input]) => input);
-		expect(alerts[0].severity).toBe("warning");
-		expect(alerts[1].severity).toBe("info");
-		expect(alerts[1].message).toContain("recovered");
-		expect(alerts[1].context).toMatchObject({ ip: "198.51.100.41" });
-	});
-
-	it("verifies the watcher channel end to end", async () => {
-		routeCapi();
-		const status = await verifyCrowdsecReporting();
-		expect(status.ok).toBe(true);
-		expect(String(fetchMock.mock.calls[0][0])).toContain("/watchers/register");
-	});
-
-	it("reports a clear reason when verification is impossible", async () => {
-		vi.stubEnv("CROWDSEC_REPORT_ENABLED", "");
-		resetCrowdsecReportCache();
-		const status = await verifyCrowdsecReporting();
-		expect(status.ok).toBe(false);
-		expect(status.message).toContain("CROWDSEC_REPORT_ENABLED");
-		expect(fetchMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
-	});
-});

src/lib/crowdsec-report.ts

@@ -1,571 +0,0 @@
-import "server-only";
-
-import { createHash, randomBytes } from "node:crypto";
-import { env } from "@/env";
-import { raiseCrowdsecAlert } from "@/lib/crowdsec-alerts";
-import type {
-	CrowdsecBlockMeta,
-	CrowdsecConnectionStatus,
-	CrowdsecVerdict,
-} from "@/lib/crowdsec-api";
-import { bumpCrowdsecStat } from "@/lib/crowdsec-stats";
-import { logger } from "@/lib/logger";
-import { redis } from "@/lib/redis";
-import { UNKNOWN_CLIENT_IP } from "./client-ip";
-
-/**
- * CrowdSec Central API (CAPI) signal push — the "give back" side of the
- * anti-DDoS pipeline.
- *
- * When the gate blocks an IP based on the CTI community reputation, this
- * module reports that detection back to CrowdSec (POST /v3/signals) so the
- * community blocklist also protects every other member. Strictly opt-in
- * (CROWDSEC_REPORT_ENABLED) and always fire-and-forget: a failure here never
- * blocks the hot path, never throws to the caller, and records the last
- * outcome for the admin panel.
- *
- * A plain CTI API key cannot push signals, so we act as a CAPI "watcher":
- *   1. generate/load a stable 48-char alnum machine_id + password pair
- *      (persisted in Redis when not provided via env),
- *   2. register it once (POST /v3/watchers/register),
- *   3. login to obtain a JWT (POST /v3/watchers/login), cached in Redis and
- *      refreshed against its expiry,
- *   4. optional console enrollment via attachment key (POST /v3/watchers/enroll),
- *   5. push the block as a signal (POST /v3/signals), deduped per IP.
- */
-
-const API_TIMEOUT_MS = 10_000;
-const TOKEN_CACHE_KEY = "crowdsec:report:token";
-const MACHINE_KEY = "crowdsec:report:machine";
-const PASSWORD_KEY = "crowdsec:report:pass";
-const REGISTERED_KEY = "crowdsec:report:registered";
-const ENROLLED_KEY = "crowdsec:report:enrolled";
-const LAST_REPORT_KEY = "crowdsec:last-report";
-const REPORT_LOCK_PREFIX = "crowdsec:report:";
-/** An IP is only reported once per window — the block itself already deters. */
-const REPORT_DEDUPE_SECONDS = 6 * 3_600;
-const SCENARIO = "community/anti-ddos-block";
-const SCENARIO_VERSION = "1.0.0";
-
-export class CrowdsecReportError extends Error {}
-
-/** True when the reporting channel is switched on AND usable. */
-export async function crowdsecReportEnabled(): Promise<boolean> {
-	// Production parses CROWDSEC_REPORT_ENABLED to a boolean via zod; tests
-	// (SKIP_ENV_VALIDATION) expose the raw env string, so accept both forms.
-	const flag: unknown = env.CROWDSEC_REPORT_ENABLED;
-	if (flag !== true && flag !== "true" && flag !== "1") return false;
-	return (await loadReportCredentials()) !== null;
-}
-
-function isAlnum48(value: string): boolean {
-	return /^[A-Za-z0-9]{48}$/.test(value);
-}
-
-function generateMachineId(): string {
-	// CAPI schema: exactly 48 characters, [A-Za-z0-9].
-	const alphabet =
-		"ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789";
-	const bytes = randomBytes(48);
-	let id = "";
-	for (let i = 0; i < 48; i += 1) {
-		id += alphabet[bytes[i] % alphabet.length];
-	}
-	return id;
-}
-
-function generatePassword(): string {
-	// Deliberately generous: each class is present so common password-policy
-	// rules on the CAPI side are satisfied.
-	const upper = "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ";
-	const lower = "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz";
-	const digits = "0123456789";
-	const symbols = "!@#$%^&*()-_=+[]{};:,.?";
-	const charset = `${upper}${lower}${digits}${symbols}`;
-	const bytes = randomBytes(32);
-	let password = "";
-	for (let i = 0; i < 8; i += 1) {
-		// Guarantee at least one of each class.
-		const pool = [upper, lower, digits, symbols][i % 4];
-		password += pool[bytes[i] % pool.length];
-	}
-	for (let i = 8; i < 32; i += 1) {
-		password += charset[bytes[i] % charset.length];
-	}
-	return password;
-}
-
-interface ReportCredentials {
-	machineId: string;
-	password: string;
-}
-
-let credentialsCache: ReportCredentials | null = null;
-let credentialsMissingRedisWarned = false;
-
-/**
- * Load the configured watcher credentials, or generate a stable pair and
- * persist it in Redis so restarts and other instances reuse the same identity.
- */
-async function loadReportCredentials(): Promise<ReportCredentials | null> {
-	if (credentialsCache) return credentialsCache;
-	const envMachine = env.CROWDSEC_REPORT_MACHINE_ID?.trim();
-	const envPassword = env.CROWDSEC_REPORT_PASSWORD;
-	if (envMachine && envPassword) {
-		credentialsCache = { machineId: envMachine, password: envPassword };
-		return credentialsCache;
-	}
-	if (!redis) {
-		if (!credentialsMissingRedisWarned) {
-			credentialsMissingRedisWarned = true;
-			logger.warn(
-				"[crowdsec-report] Redis is required to persist auto-generated watcher credentials — set CROWDSEC_REPORT_MACHINE_ID and CROWDSEC_REPORT_PASSWORD, or REDIS_URL",
-			);
-		}
-		return null;
-	}
-	try {
-		let machineId: string | null = null;
-		let password: string | null = null;
-		const storedMachine = await redis.get(MACHINE_KEY);
-		const storedPassword = await redis.get(PASSWORD_KEY);
-		if (storedMachine && isAlnum48(storedMachine)) machineId = storedMachine;
-		if (storedPassword) password = storedPassword;
-		if (!machineId) machineId = generateMachineId();
-		if (!password) password = generatePassword();
-		await redis.set(MACHINE_KEY, machineId);
-		await redis.set(PASSWORD_KEY, password);
-		credentialsCache = { machineId, password };
-		return credentialsCache;
-	} catch {
-		return null;
-	}
-}
-
-async function capiRequest(
-	path: string,
-	init: { method?: "POST" | "GET"; token?: string; body?: unknown } = {},
-): Promise<Response> {
-	const controller = new AbortController();
-	const timer = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), API_TIMEOUT_MS);
-	const headers: Record<string, string> = {
-		Accept: "application/json",
-		"Content-Type": "application/json",
-	};
-	if (init.token) headers.Authorization = `Bearer ${init.token}`;
-	try {
-		return await fetch(`${env.CROWDSEC_CAPI_BASE_URL}${path}`, {
-			method: init.method ?? "POST",
-			headers,
-			body: init.body === undefined ? undefined : JSON.stringify(init.body),
-			signal: controller.signal,
-			cache: "no-store",
-		});
-	} finally {
-		clearTimeout(timer);
-	}
-}
-
-async function errorDetail(response: Response): Promise<string> {
-	try {
-		const body = (await response.json()) as { message?: string };
-		return body.message ?? `HTTP ${response.status}`;
-	} catch {
-		return `HTTP ${response.status}`;
-	}
-}
-
-interface CapToken {
-	raw: string;
-	expiresAt: number;
-}
-
-let capToken: CapToken | null = null;
-let tokenPromise: Promise<string> | null = null;
-
-function scenarioHash(): string {
-	return createHash("sha256")
-		.update(`${SCENARIO}:${SCENARIO_VERSION}`)
-		.digest("hex")
-		.slice(0, 16);
-}
-
-async function registerWatcher(
-	machineId: string,
-	password: string,
-): Promise<void> {
-	if (!redis) return;
-	try {
-		const already = await redis.get(REGISTERED_KEY);
-		if (already) return;
-	} catch {
-		// proceed anyway — registering is idempotent-ish (400 = already exists)
-	}
-	const response = await capiRequest("/watchers/register", {
-		body: { machine_id: machineId, password },
-	});
-	if (response.ok || response.status === 400) {
-		try {
-			await redis.set(REGISTERED_KEY, "1", "EX", 30 * 24 * 3_600);
-		} catch {
-			// fine — will just attempt registration again later
-		}
-		return;
-	}
-	throw new CrowdsecReportError(
-		`watcher registration failed (HTTP ${response.status}): ${await errorDetail(response)}`,
-	);
-}
-
-/** Login and cache the JWT; guarded against concurrent logins. */
-async function acquireCapToken(): Promise<string> {
-	if (capToken && capToken.expiresAt > Date.now() + 60_000) {
-		return capToken.raw;
-	}
-	if (tokenPromise) return tokenPromise;
-	const credentials = await loadReportCredentials();
-	if (!credentials) {
-		throw new CrowdsecReportError(
-			"CrowdSec reporting is not configured (no watcher credentials)",
-		);
-	}
-
-	tokenPromise = (async () => {
-		if (capToken && capToken.expiresAt > Date.now() + 60_000) {
-			return capToken.raw;
-		}
-		if (redis) {
-			try {
-				const cached = await redis.get(TOKEN_CACHE_KEY);
-				if (cached) {
-					const parsed = JSON.parse(cached) as CapToken;
-					if (parsed.expiresAt > Date.now() + 60_000) {
-						capToken = parsed;
-						return parsed.raw;
-					}
-				}
-			} catch {
-				// fall through to a fresh login
-			}
-		}
-
-		// First signal push needs the watcher to exist on the CAPI.
-		await registerWatcher(credentials.machineId, credentials.password);
-
-		const response = await capiRequest("/watchers/login", {
-			body: {
-				machine_id: credentials.machineId,
-				password: credentials.password,
-				scenarios: [SCENARIO],
-			},
-		});
-		if (!response.ok) {
-			throw new CrowdsecReportError(
-				`CAPI watcher login failed (HTTP ${response.status}): ${await errorDetail(response)}`,
-			);
-		}
-		const body = (await response.json()) as { token?: string; expire?: string };
-		if (!body.token) {
-			throw new CrowdsecReportError("CAPI watcher login returned no token");
-		}
-		let expiresAt = Date.now() + 3_600_000;
-		const expire = body.expire ? Date.parse(body.expire) : NaN;
-		if (Number.isFinite(expire) && expire > Date.now()) {
-			expiresAt = expire;
-		}
-		const token: CapToken = { raw: body.token, expiresAt };
-		capToken = token;
-		if (redis) {
-			try {
-				await redis.set(TOKEN_CACHE_KEY, JSON.stringify(token), "EX", 3_600);
-			} catch {
-				// in-process view is enough
-			}
-		}
-		return token.raw;
-	})().finally(() => {
-		tokenPromise = null;
-	});
-
-	return tokenPromise;
-}
-
-async function enrollWatcher(token: string): Promise<void> {
-	const attachmentKey = env.CROWDSEC_REPORT_ENROLL_KEY?.trim();
-	if (!attachmentKey) return;
-	if (!redis) return;
-	try {
-		const enrolled = await redis.get(ENROLLED_KEY);
-		if (enrolled) return;
-	} catch {
-		// best effort below
-	}
-	try {
-		const response = await capiRequest("/watchers/enroll", {
-			token,
-			body: { attachment_key: attachmentKey, name: "atomcms-next" },
-		});
-		if (response.ok) {
-			try {
-				await redis.set(ENROLLED_KEY, "1", "EX", 30 * 24 * 3_600);
-			} catch {
-				// best effort
-			}
-		}
-	} catch (error) {
-		// Enrollment only affects Console visibility — not worth failing a push.
-		logger.debug("[crowdsec-report] Console enrollment skipped", {
-			err: error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error),
-		});
-	}
-}
-
-function formatCapiDuration(seconds: number): string {
-	const safe = Math.max(1, Math.floor(seconds));
-	const hours = Math.floor(safe / 3_600);
-	const minutes = Math.floor((safe % 3_600) / 60);
-	const rest = safe % 60;
-	if (hours > 0) return `${hours}h${minutes}m${rest}s`;
-	if (minutes > 0) return `${minutes}m${rest}s`;
-	return `${rest}s`;
-}
-
-async function pushSignal(input: {
-	credentials: ReportCredentials;
-	token: string;
-	ip: string;
-	category: string;
-	ttlSeconds: number;
-	verdict: CrowdsecVerdict;
-	meta: CrowdsecBlockMeta;
-}): Promise<CrowdsecReportStatus> {
-	const now = new Date();
-	try {
-		await enrollWatcher(input.token);
-		const duration = formatCapiDuration(input.ttlSeconds);
-		const response = await capiRequest("/signals", {
-			token: input.token,
-			body: [
-				{
-					machine_id: input.credentials.machineId,
-					message: input.verdict.reputation
-						? "atomcms-next anti-DDoS gate blocked a community-flagged IP"
-						: "atomcms-next anti-DDoS gate blocked a repeat rate-limit offender",
-					scenario: SCENARIO,
-					scenario_version: SCENARIO_VERSION,
-					scenario_hash: scenarioHash(),
-					created_at: now.toISOString(),
-					start_at: now.toISOString(),
-					stop_at: now.toISOString(),
-					source: { scope: "ip", value: input.ip, ip: input.ip },
-					decisions: [
-						{
-							id: 0,
-							origin: "crowdsec",
-							scenario: SCENARIO,
-							scope: "ip",
-							type: "ban",
-							value: input.ip,
-							duration,
-						},
-					],
-					context: [
-						{ key: "crowdsec_category", value: input.category },
-						{
-							key: "crowdsec_reputation",
-							value: input.verdict.reputation ?? "unknown",
-						},
-						{
-							key: "crowdsec_score",
-							value: String(input.verdict.score),
-						},
-						{
-							key: "crowdsec_behaviors",
-							value: input.verdict.behaviors.join(",") || "none",
-						},
-					],
-				},
-			],
-		});
-		if (!response.ok) {
-			throw new CrowdsecReportError(
-				`signal push rejected (HTTP ${response.status}): ${await errorDetail(response)}`,
-			);
-		}
-		// Was the channel down before this? A first success after failures
-		// deserves a recovery notice (separate cooldown key from the failure).
-		const before = await getLastCrowdsecReport();
-		const status: CrowdsecReportStatus = { ok: true, at: Date.now() };
-		await setLastCrowdsecReport(status);
-		void bumpCrowdsecStat("reports");
-		if (before && !before.ok) {
-			void raiseCrowdsecAlert("report-recovered", {
-				type: "ddos",
-				severity: "info",
-				message:
-					"CrowdSec signal push recovered — detections are reaching the community again.",
-				context: { ip: input.ip },
-			});
-		}
-		logger.info("[crowdsec-report] Detection shared with the community", {
-			ip: input.ip,
-			category: input.category,
-			ttlSeconds: input.ttlSeconds,
-			score: input.verdict.score,
-		});
-		return status;
-	} catch (error) {
-		const status: CrowdsecReportStatus = {
-			ok: false,
-			at: Date.now(),
-			message: String(error),
-		};
-		await setLastCrowdsecReport(status);
-		void bumpCrowdsecStat("report_fail");
-		// Ops alert, cooldown-gated: a silently broken channel means the
-		// community never learns about the blocks we keep sharing.
-		void raiseCrowdsecAlert("report", {
-			type: "ddos",
-			severity: "warning",
-			message:
-				"CrowdSec signal push failed — detections are not reaching the community.",
-			context: {
-				ip: input.ip,
-				detail: String(error).slice(0, 300),
-			},
-		});
-		logger.error("[crowdsec-report] Signal push failed", {
-			ip: input.ip,
-			err: error,
-		});
-		return status;
-	}
-}
-
-/**
- * Share a CrowdSec-reputation block back into the community. Safe to call
- * fire-and-forget: does nothing when reporting is off, never throws, and
- * dedupes so the same IP is only reported once per window.
- */
-export async function reportCrowdsecSignal(input: {
-	ip: string;
-	category: string;
-	ttlSeconds: number;
-	verdict: CrowdsecVerdict;
-	meta: CrowdsecBlockMeta;
-}): Promise<void> {
-	const { ip, category, ttlSeconds, verdict, meta } = input;
-	if (!(await crowdsecReportEnabled())) return;
-	if (!ip || ip === UNKNOWN_CLIENT_IP) return;
-	const credentials = await loadReportCredentials();
-	if (!credentials) return;
-
-	try {
-		if (redis) {
-			// Cross-instance dedupe: one report per IP per window.
-			const acquired = await redis.set(
-				`${REPORT_LOCK_PREFIX}${ip}`,
-				"1",
-				"EX",
-				REPORT_DEDUPE_SECONDS,
-				"NX",
-			);
-			if (acquired !== "OK") return;
-		}
-		const token = await acquireCapToken();
-		await pushSignal({
-			credentials,
-			token,
-			ip,
-			category,
-			ttlSeconds,
-			verdict,
-			meta,
-		});
-	} catch (error) {
-		logger.error("[crowdsec-report] Signal push preparation failed", {
-			ip,
-			err: error,
-		});
-	}
-}
-
-export interface CrowdsecReportStatus {
-	ok: boolean;
-	message?: string;
-	at: number;
-}
-
-let lastReportMemory: CrowdsecReportStatus | null = null;
-
-export async function getLastCrowdsecReport(): Promise<CrowdsecReportStatus | null> {
-	if (redis) {
-		try {
-			const raw = await redis.get(LAST_REPORT_KEY);
-			if (raw) return JSON.parse(raw) as CrowdsecReportStatus;
-		} catch {
-			// fall back to the in-process view
-		}
-	}
-	return lastReportMemory;
-}
-
-export async function setLastCrowdsecReport(
-	status: CrowdsecReportStatus,
-): Promise<void> {
-	lastReportMemory = status;
-	if (redis) {
-		try {
-			await redis.set(
-				LAST_REPORT_KEY,
-				JSON.stringify(status),
-				"EX",
-				48 * 3_600,
-			);
-		} catch {
-			// in-process view is enough
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-/** Probe the full register → login path and report the outcome for the admin. */
-export async function verifyCrowdsecReporting(): Promise<CrowdsecConnectionStatus> {
-	if (!env.CROWDSEC_REPORT_ENABLED) {
-		return {
-			ok: false,
-			message: "CROWDSEC_REPORT_ENABLED is not set",
-			at: Date.now(),
-		};
-	}
-	const credentials = await loadReportCredentials();
-	if (!credentials) {
-		return {
-			ok: false,
-			message:
-				"CrowdSec reporting is not configured (set CROWDSEC_REPORT_MACHINE_ID + CROWDSEC_REPORT_PASSWORD, or REDIS_URL)",
-			at: Date.now(),
-		};
-	}
-	try {
-		await acquireCapToken();
-		return {
-			ok: true,
-			message: "CAPI watcher connected — signal push ready",
-			at: Date.now(),
-		};
-	} catch (error) {
-		return {
-			ok: false,
-			message: error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error),
-			at: Date.now(),
-		};
-	}
-}
-
-/** Test hook only. */
-export function resetCrowdsecReportCache(): void {
-	credentialsCache = null;
-	capToken = null;
-	tokenPromise = null;
-	lastReportMemory = null;
-}

src/lib/crowdsec-stats.ts

@@ -1,170 +0,0 @@
-import "server-only";
-
-import { redis } from "@/lib/redis";
-
-// === CrowdSec daily counters ===============================================
-//
-// Small Redis counters so ops can see whether the reputation pipeline is
-// actually doing anything: lookups executed, blocks created, signals pushed,
-// push failures, and per-block breakdowns (request category / CrowdSec
-// reputation) — all bucketed per UTC calendar day
-// (crowdsec:stat:{metric}:{YYYY-MM-DD}). Both the CTI client and the signal
-// pusher feed them; the admin panel renders the last N days. Cheap INCRs on
-// non-hot paths only, so they never tax the request path.
-
-export type CrowdsecStatMetric =
-	| "lookups"
-	| "blocks"
-	| "reports"
-	| "report_fail";
-
-export type CrowdsecBreakdownKind = "category" | "reputation";
-
-const STAT_PREFIX = "crowdsec:stat:";
-const STAT_KEY_TTL_SECONDS = 16 * 24 * 3_600;
-
-function statDate(): string {
-	return new Date().toISOString().slice(0, 10);
-}
-
-function statKey(metric: CrowdsecStatMetric, date: string): string {
-	return `${STAT_PREFIX}${metric}:${date}`;
-}
-
-function breakdownKey(kind: CrowdsecBreakdownKind, date: string): string {
-	return `${STAT_PREFIX}${kind}:${date}`;
-}
-
-/** Count one occurrence of a pipeline event for today. Best effort. */
-export async function bumpCrowdsecStat(
-	metric: CrowdsecStatMetric,
-): Promise<void> {
-	if (!redis) return;
-	const key = statKey(metric, statDate());
-	try {
-		await redis.incr(key);
-		await redis.expire(key, STAT_KEY_TTL_SECONDS);
-	} catch {
-		// tracking is best-effort — a miss only loses a day's histogram
-	}
-}
-
-/**
- * Count one block into today's per-category / per-reputation breakdown. Stored
- * as a JSON object per day and merged by the admin reader; read-modify-write
- * is fine because blocks are rare and the panel is display-only.
- */
-export async function bumpCrowdsecBreakdownStat(
-	kind: CrowdsecBreakdownKind,
-	value: string,
-): Promise<void> {
-	if (!redis) return;
-	const key = breakdownKey(kind, statDate());
-	try {
-		const raw = await redis.get(key);
-		const counts: Record<string, number> = raw
-			? (JSON.parse(raw) as Record<string, number>)
-			: {};
-		const label = String(value).slice(0, 64);
-		counts[label] = (counts[label] ?? 0) + 1;
-		await redis.set(key, JSON.stringify(counts), "EX", STAT_KEY_TTL_SECONDS);
-	} catch {
-		// best effort — a lost breakdown entry only hides a histogram bucket
-	}
-}
-
-export interface CrowdsecDailyStat {
-	/** UTC calendar day (YYYY-MM-DD). */
-	date: string;
-	lookups: number;
-	blocks: number;
-	reports: number;
-	reportFailures: number;
-	/** Blocks per request category (api/pages/auth/global), today-to-date. */
-	categories: Record<string, number>;
-	/** Blocks per CrowdSec reputation (only community-sourced ones). */
-	reputations: Record<string, number>;
-}
-
-function blankRow(date: string): CrowdsecDailyStat {
-	return {
-		date,
-		lookups: 0,
-		blocks: 0,
-		reports: 0,
-		reportFailures: 0,
-		categories: {},
-		reputations: {},
-	};
-}
-
-function toCount(raw: string | null): number {
-	const n = Number(raw ?? 0);
-	return Number.isFinite(n) ? n : 0;
-}
-
-function toMap(raw: string | null): Record<string, number> {
-	if (!raw) return {};
-	try {
-		const parsed = JSON.parse(raw) as unknown;
-		if (parsed && typeof parsed === "object") {
-			return Object.fromEntries(
-				Object.entries(parsed as Record<string, unknown>)
-					.map(([k, v]) => [k, typeof v === "number" ? v : Number(v) || 0])
-					.filter(([, v]) => Number.isFinite(v)),
-			);
-		}
-	} catch {
-		// corrupt counter — treat as empty
-	}
-	return {};
-}
-
-/**
- * Read the per-day counters for the last `days` days (oldest first, ending
- * with today). Every key is fetched in one parallel burst (6 GETs per day),
- * then assembled client-side; never throws.
- */
-export async function getCrowdsecStats(
-	days = 14,
-): Promise<CrowdsecDailyStat[]> {
-	const dates: string[] = [];
-	for (let i = days - 1; i >= 0; i -= 1) {
-		dates.push(
-			new Date(Date.now() - i * 86_400_000).toISOString().slice(0, 10),
-		);
-	}
-	if (!redis) {
-		// No shared store — still return a blank timeline for the UI.
-		return dates.map(blankRow);
-	}
-	const store = redis;
-	return Promise.all(
-		dates.map(async (date) => {
-			const [
-				lookups,
-				blocks,
-				reports,
-				reportFailures,
-				categories,
-				reputations,
-			] = await Promise.all([
-				store.get(statKey("lookups", date)).catch(() => null),
-				store.get(statKey("blocks", date)).catch(() => null),
-				store.get(statKey("reports", date)).catch(() => null),
-				store.get(statKey("report_fail", date)).catch(() => null),
-				store.get(breakdownKey("category", date)).catch(() => null),
-				store.get(breakdownKey("reputation", date)).catch(() => null),
-			]);
-			return {
-				date,
-				lookups: toCount(lookups),
-				blocks: toCount(blocks),
-				reports: toCount(reports),
-				reportFailures: toCount(reportFailures),
-				categories: toMap(categories),
-				reputations: toMap(reputations),
-			};
-		}),
-	);
-}

src/lib/ddos-guard-crowdsec.test.ts

@@ -1,284 +0,0 @@
-import { NextRequest } from "next/server";
-import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
-import { invalidateAntiddosConfig } from "@/lib/antiddos-config";
-import { resetCrowdsecCache } from "@/lib/crowdsec-api";
-import { resetCrowdsecLocalCache } from "@/lib/crowdsec-local";
-import { enforceDdosRateLimit } from "@/lib/ddos-guard";
-
-// The gate's block escalation (and thus the CrowdSec hook) only runs when
-// Redis is reachable, so the integration test drives a small in-memory fake.
-const state = vi.hoisted(() => ({
-	map: new Map<string, string>(),
-	z: new Map<string, Array<[number, string]>>(),
-	sendAlert: vi.fn(),
-}));
-
-vi.mock("@/lib/services/alert", () => ({
-	sendAlert: state.sendAlert,
-	ddosDetected: vi.fn(),
-}));
-
-vi.mock("@/lib/redis", () => ({
-	redis: {
-		get: async (key: string) => state.map.get(key) ?? null,
-		set: async (
-			key: string,
-			value: string,
-			_mode?: string,
-			_seconds?: number,
-			nx?: string,
-		) => {
-			if (nx === "NX" && state.map.has(key)) return null;
-			state.map.set(key, value);
-			return "OK";
-		},
-		del: async (...keys: string[]) => {
-			for (const key of keys) state.map.delete(key);
-			return keys.length;
-		},
-		incr: async (key: string) => {
-			const next = (Number(state.map.get(key)) || 0) + 1;
-			state.map.set(key, String(next));
-			return next;
-		},
-		expire: async () => 1,
-		pexpire: async () => 1,
-		pttl: async () => 60_000,
-		zadd: async (key: string, score: number, member: string) => {
-			const list = state.z.get(key) ?? [];
-			list.push([score, member]);
-			list.sort((a, b) => a[0] - b[0]);
-			state.z.set(key, list);
-			return 1;
-		},
-		zremrangebyscore: async (key: string, min: number, max: number) => {
-			const list = (state.z.get(key) ?? []).filter(
-				([score]) => score < min || score > max,
-			);
-			state.z.set(key, list);
-			return 1;
-		},
-		zcard: async (key: string) => (state.z.get(key) ?? []).length,
-		sadd: async (key: string, member: string) => {
-			const members = new Set(
-				(state.map.get(key) ?? "").split("\u0001").filter(Boolean),
-			);
-			members.add(member);
-			state.map.set(key, [...members].join("\u0001"));
-			return 1;
-		},
-		srem: async (key: string, member: string) => {
-			const members = new Set(
-				(state.map.get(key) ?? "").split("\u0001").filter(Boolean),
-			);
-			const before = members.size;
-			members.delete(member);
-			state.map.set(key, [...members].join("\u0001"));
-			return before - members.size;
-		},
-		smembers: async (key: string) =>
-			(state.map.get(key) ?? "").split("\u0001").filter(Boolean),
-	},
-	__esModule: true,
-}));
-
-function jsonResponse(body: unknown, status = 200): Response {
-	return new Response(JSON.stringify(body), {
-		status,
-		headers: { "content-type": "application/json" },
-	});
-}
-
-function proxiedRequest(ip: string): NextRequest {
-	return new NextRequest("https://hotel.test/api/balance", {
-		headers: { "cf-ray": "abc-AMS", "cf-connecting-ip": ip },
-	});
-}
-
-function directRequest(ip: string): NextRequest {
-	return new NextRequest("https://hotel.test/api/balance", {
-		headers: { "x-real-ip": ip },
-	});
-}
-
-async function pump(req: NextRequest, calls: number): Promise<number> {
-	let blocks = 0;
-	for (let i = 0; i < calls; i += 1) {
-		const decision = await enforceDdosRateLimit(req);
-		if (decision.outcome === "block") blocks += 1;
-	}
-	return blocks;
-}
-
-const apiLimit = "3";
-const maxViolations = "2";
-const crowdsecKey = "test-cs-key";
-
-describe("anti-DDoS automatic CrowdSec blocks", () => {
-	let fetchMock: ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>;
-
-	beforeEach(() => {
-		vi.unstubAllGlobals();
-		vi.unstubAllEnvs();
-		state.map.clear();
-		state.z.clear();
-		state.sendAlert.mockReset();
-		resetCrowdsecCache();
-		resetCrowdsecLocalCache();
-		invalidateAntiddosConfig();
-		fetchMock = vi.fn();
-		vi.stubGlobal("fetch", fetchMock);
-		vi.stubEnv("NODE_ENV", "production");
-		vi.stubEnv("ANTI_DDOS_ENABLED", "true");
-		vi.stubEnv("ANTI_DDOS_API_LIMIT", apiLimit);
-		vi.stubEnv("ANTI_DDOS_MAX_VIOLATIONS", maxViolations);
-		vi.stubEnv("ANTI_DDOS_VIOLATION_WINDOW_SEC", "60");
-		vi.stubEnv("CROWDSEC_API_KEY", crowdsecKey);
-		vi.stubEnv("CLOUDFLARE_API_TOKEN", "");
-		vi.stubEnv("CLOUDFLARE_ZONE_ID", "");
-	});
-
-	afterEach(() => {
-		vi.unstubAllGlobals();
-		vi.unstubAllEnvs();
-		state.map.clear();
-		resetCrowdsecCache();
-		resetCrowdsecLocalCache();
-		invalidateAntiddosConfig();
-	});
-
-	it("blocks a community-flagged offender before the local threshold", async () => {
-		fetchMock.mockResolvedValue(
-			jsonResponse({
-				ip: "198.51.100.71",
-				reputation: "malicious",
-				confidence: "0.9",
-				scores: { overall: { total: 5 } },
-				classifications: { false_positives: [] },
-			}),
-		);
-
-		const ip = "198.51.100.71";
-		// The first three requests pass inside the API bucket; the fourth trips
-		// it, which is where the gate consults CrowdSec (never on the hot path).
-		const firstFour = await pump(proxiedRequest(ip), 4);
-		expect(firstFour).toBe(1);
-		// Let the fire-and-forget lookup + block write settle.
-		await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, 50));
-
-		// The community block is already in the shared gate key after a single
-		// violation — far below the gate's own 2-violation hard-block threshold...
-		expect(state.map.get(`antiddos:block:${ip}`)).toBe("crowdsec");
-
-		// ...so every subsequent request is shed immediately via the block check.
-		const blocks = await pump(proxiedRequest(ip), 4);
-		expect(blocks).toBe(4);
-	});
-
-	it("leaves a community-safe offender to the ordinary gate logic", async () => {
-		fetchMock.mockResolvedValue(
-			jsonResponse({
-				ip: "198.51.100.72",
-				reputation: "safe",
-				scores: { overall: { total: 0 } },
-				classifications: { false_positives: [] },
-			}),
-		);
-
-		const ip = "198.51.100.72";
-		// With a 3-request API limit and 2 allowed violations, exactly the
-		// second repeat request trips the ordinary hard block — value "1",
-		// never "crowdsec".
-		const blocks = await pump(proxiedRequest(ip), 5);
-		expect(blocks).toBe(2);
-		expect(state.map.get(`antiddos:block:${ip}`)).toBe("1");
-	});
-
-	it("never auto-blocks traffic without the API key", async () => {
-		vi.stubEnv("CROWDSEC_API_KEY", "");
-
-		await pump(proxiedRequest("198.51.100.73"), 5);
-		await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, 50));
-
-		expect(fetchMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
-	});
-
-	it("respects the runtime CrowdSec toggle from the config", async () => {
-		vi.stubEnv("CROWDSEC_AUTO_BLOCK_ENABLED", "false");
-		invalidateAntiddosConfig();
-
-		await pump(proxiedRequest("198.51.100.74"), 5);
-		await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, 50));
-
-		expect(fetchMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
-	});
-
-	it("keeps gate decisions unchanged when the CrowdSec API fails", async () => {
-		fetchMock.mockResolvedValue(jsonResponse({ message: "boom" }, 500));
-
-		const ip = "198.51.100.75";
-		const blocks = await pump(proxiedRequest(ip), 5);
-		expect(blocks).toBe(2);
-		expect(state.map.get(`antiddos:block:${ip}`)).toBe("1");
-	});
-
-	it("uses the configured score threshold for ambiguous verdicts", async () => {
-		vi.stubEnv("CROWDSEC_BLOCK_SCORE", "3");
-		invalidateAntiddosConfig();
-		fetchMock.mockResolvedValue(
-			jsonResponse({
-				ip: "198.51.100.76",
-				reputation: "suspicious",
-				scores: { overall: { total: 3 } },
-				classifications: { false_positives: [] },
-			}),
-		);
-
-		const ip = "198.51.100.76";
-		await pump(proxiedRequest(ip), 4);
-		await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, 50));
-
-		expect(state.map.get(`antiddos:block:${ip}`)).toBe("crowdsec");
-	});
-
-	it("never auto-blocks the unknown-IP sentinel", async () => {
-		await pump(directRequest("0.0.0.0"), 1);
-		await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, 50));
-
-		expect(fetchMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
-	});
-
-	it("passes the unknown-IP sentinel through even when a stale block key exists", async () => {
-		state.map.set("antiddos:block:0.0.0.0", "1");
-
-		const decision = await enforceDdosRateLimit(directRequest("0.0.0.0"));
-
-		expect(decision.outcome).toBe("pass");
-		expect(fetchMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
-	});
-
-	it("blocks immediately on a local LAPI ban decision (app-layer bouncer)", async () => {
-		vi.stubEnv("CROWDSEC_LOCAL_ENABLED", "true");
-		vi.stubEnv("CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL", "http://127.0.0.1:18080");
-		vi.stubEnv("CROWDSEC_LAPI_API_KEY", "local-bouncer-key");
-		fetchMock.mockImplementation(async (input) => {
-			if (String(input).startsWith("http://127.0.0.1:18080/")) {
-				return jsonResponse([
-					{
-						origin: "crowdsec",
-						type: "ban",
-						scope: "ip",
-						value: "198.51.100.88",
-						duration: "1h",
-					},
-				]);
-			}
-			return jsonResponse({ message: "unexpected upstream" }, 500);
-		});
-
-		const ip = "198.51.100.88";
-		const blocks = await pump(proxiedRequest(ip), 1);
-		expect(blocks).toBe(1);
-		expect(fetchMock).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
-	});
-});

src/lib/ddos-guard.ts

@@ -7,13 +7,6 @@ import { getAntiddosConfig } from "@/lib/antiddos-config";
 import { resolveClientIp, UNKNOWN_CLIENT_IP } from "@/lib/client-ip";
 import { isCloudflareProxied } from "@/lib/cloudflare";
 import { maybeAutoBlockCloudflare } from "@/lib/cloudflare-api";
-import { maybeAutoBlockCrowdsec } from "@/lib/crowdsec-api";
-import { checkCrowdsecLocalBlock } from "@/lib/crowdsec-local";
-import { reportCrowdsecSignal } from "@/lib/crowdsec-report";
-import {
-	bumpCrowdsecBreakdownStat,
-	bumpCrowdsecStat,
-} from "@/lib/crowdsec-stats";
 import { classifyDdos, isSuspiciousPath } from "@/lib/ddos";
 import { rateLimit } from "@/lib/rate-limit";
 import { redis } from "@/lib/redis";
@@ -91,14 +84,6 @@ export async function enforceDdosRateLimit(
 		}
 	}
 
-	const localBlock = await checkCrowdsecLocalBlock(ip);
-	if (localBlock.blocked) {
-		return {
-			outcome: "block",
-			retryAfterSeconds: Math.max(localBlock.retryAfterSeconds, 1),
-		};
-	}
-
 	const global = await rateLimit(
 		"antiddos:global:all",
 		config.global.limit,
@@ -133,36 +118,6 @@ export async function enforceDdosRateLimit(
 			const ttl = blockTtlForViolations(violations, config.blockTiers);
 			if (violations >= config.maxViolations) {
 				await redis.set(blockKey, "1", "EX", ttl);
-				// Share the block in the daily activity histogram + breakdown.
-				void bumpCrowdsecStat("blocks");
-				void bumpCrowdsecBreakdownStat("category", category);
-				// Opt-in: also push our OWN detection (not just CrowdSec-
-				// reputation blocks) into the community blocklist via the same
-				// CAPI channel. Fire-and-forget; deduped per IP internally.
-				void reportCrowdsecSignal({
-					ip,
-					category,
-					ttlSeconds: ttl,
-					verdict: {
-						ip,
-						reputation: null,
-						score: 0,
-						aggressiveness: 0,
-						confidence: null,
-						behaviors: [`gate:${category}`],
-						falsePositive: false,
-						checkedAt: Date.now(),
-					},
-					meta: {
-						source: "gate",
-						category,
-						reputation: null,
-						score: 0,
-						behaviors: [`gate:${category}`],
-						ttlSeconds: ttl,
-						blockedAt: Date.now(),
-					},
-				});
 				// Mirror the host-level block to the Cloudflare edge (IP Access
 				// Rules) so a repeat offender is shed before it reaches the
 				// origin. Only when this request demonstrably transited
@@ -175,20 +130,6 @@ export async function enforceDdosRateLimit(
 						config.cloudflareAutoBlock && isCloudflareProxied(req.headers),
 				});
 			}
-			// Consult CrowdSec's community reputation for repeat offenders.
-			// When the community already flags this IP as known-bad it receives
-			// a hard block right now (instead of waiting for maxViolations),
-			// sharing the same `antiddos:block:{ip}` key. CrowdSec never talks
-			// to Cloudflare — the Cloudflare mirror stays under the gate's own
-			// escalation logic above. Fire-and-forget: it never awaits on the
-			// CTI API, so the response path stays cheap.
-			void maybeAutoBlockCrowdsec({
-				ip,
-				category,
-				ttlSeconds: config.crowdsecBlockTtlSeconds,
-				scoreThreshold: config.crowdsecBlockScore,
-				enabled: config.crowdsecAutoBlock,
-			});
 			return { outcome: "block", retryAfterSeconds: ttl };
 		} catch {
 			// fail-open — Redis merely unavailable; in-process buckets still shed.