openhands
6cc45d7413
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Second review pass covering security, performance, admin tooling and the public/room flows. All HIGH and MEDIUM findings from the audit are resolved; nothing in this commit changes the visible feature set. Authentication & session security - CSP is now set on the request headers in the proxy, which is what Next.js uses to derive the render nonce, so the nonce is effective. - 2FA: an already-enabled user cannot re-enroll, the setup endpoint is rate-limited per account, and confirmed codes are persisted so the second secret no longer silently never applies. - Password reset revokes the ticket, authTicket and all personal access tokens, and bumps the token version so existing sessions die. The same revocation is now wired into the staff-side password reset. - /reset and /verify return a stable error code instead of raw text; the mail lookups are ordered by id so duplicates cannot vary between runs. - Resending the verification mail gets a per-address cooldown on top of the per-user limit. - Issue API tokens with the narrower radio/ticket ability set instead of "*". Authorization & input handling - Mid-rank staff can no longer keep dynamically granted non-view admin.* permissions: existing grants are revoked by migration and the grant lookup is restricted to "%.view". Rank guards use the dynamic super-admin check. - Alerting a user is permission-checked and audited like the other tools. - Material mutations (giveCredits/giveDuckets/giveDiamonds, the admin user actions route, bulk user actions) are capped and rank-guarded, and bulk ids are bounded. - updateRoom / updateRoomItem write through a field allowlist, and items may only be edited through their own room. - Classnames reaching the filesystem are validated before use so a crafted value cannot escape the asset directories. - The word filter now also covers offline mails, guild forum threads and replies, and user mottos. - Media uploads are validated by magic bytes, /api/media requires the page edit permission, APP_URL must be configured once mail is enabled, and the diagnostics error route checks the fetch site header. Admin tooling - Secret settings render masked and cannot be overwritten with a blank or an arbitrary raw key; radio credentials are new password inputs. - Commandocentrum balance changes are audited. - Admin list pagination reads the caller's per-page instead of the max, and the log exporter caps offset and search length. Performance - Catalog translations are cached per module, with a cheap revision hash; the public online count uses a stale window instead of hammering the DB. - The cache warmup now primes the payload the home route actually reads. - TopHeader batches its queries into one round trip, and LCP avatars load eagerly. - motion/react and sonner are no longer part of the root layout; the nav dropdown and mobile nav panels are lazy client chunks. Anonymous visitors again get the navigation chrome, and public pages get an edge cacheable response. Accessibility - Nested <main> elements in phase pages became <section>; the page entrance and route progress animations are pure CSS that respect reduced motion.
26 lines
1.2 KiB
SQL
26 lines
1.2 KiB
SQL
-- Repair the escalation introduced by 0018's rule 1 ("has admin.dashboard gets
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-- ALL admin.*"). Migrating 0011 grants admin.dashboard to every rank >= 6 so
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-- that the sidebar opens, which meant rank 6 silently acquired
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-- admin.permissions.manage, admin.rcon.execute, admin.settings.edit,
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-- admin.users.edit, admin.users.reset_password, admin.room.delete, ...
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--
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-- Rule 1 is narrowed to `admin.%.view` (read-only, all the sidebar needs) in
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-- both the migration set and the runtime repair action. This migration undoes
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-- the over-grant on databases that already ran 0018: every role below the top
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-- rank keeps dashboard + *.view and loses every other admin.* grant. Ranks
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-- that legitimately hold tools keep them, because rule 3 only targets
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-- rank >= 7 and those roles are not touched here.
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DELETE `amp`
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FROM `acl_model_permissions` `amp`
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JOIN `acl_roles` `ar`
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ON `ar`.`id` = `amp`.`model_id`
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AND `ar`.`model_type` = 'Role'
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AND `amp`.`model_type` = 'Role'
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JOIN `acl_permissions` `ap`
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ON `ap`.`id` = `amp`.`permission_id`
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WHERE `ap`.`slug` LIKE 'admin.%'
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AND `ap`.`slug` NOT LIKE '%.view'
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AND `ar`.`slug` REGEXP '^rank_[0-9]+$'
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AND CAST(SUBSTRING(`ar`.`slug`, 7) AS UNSIGNED) < 7;
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