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EpicNext-Cms/src/proxy.ts
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feat: harden atoms-nexst against review findings (37 items)
Second review pass covering security, performance, admin tooling and the
public/room flows. All HIGH and MEDIUM findings from the audit are resolved;
nothing in this commit changes the visible feature set.

Authentication & session security
- CSP is now set on the request headers in the proxy, which is what Next.js
  uses to derive the render nonce, so the nonce is effective.
- 2FA: an already-enabled user cannot re-enroll, the setup endpoint is
  rate-limited per account, and confirmed codes are persisted so the second
  secret no longer silently never applies.
- Password reset revokes the ticket, authTicket and all personal access
  tokens, and bumps the token version so existing sessions die. The same
  revocation is now wired into the staff-side password reset.
- /reset and /verify return a stable error code instead of raw text; the
  mail lookups are ordered by id so duplicates cannot vary between runs.
- Resending the verification mail gets a per-address cooldown on top of the
  per-user limit.
- Issue API tokens with the narrower radio/ticket ability set instead of "*".

Authorization & input handling
- Mid-rank staff can no longer keep dynamically granted non-view admin.*
  permissions: existing grants are revoked by migration and the grant lookup
  is restricted to "%.view". Rank guards use the dynamic super-admin check.
- Alerting a user is permission-checked and audited like the other tools.
- Material mutations (giveCredits/giveDuckets/giveDiamonds, the admin user
  actions route, bulk user actions) are capped and rank-guarded, and bulk
  ids are bounded.
- updateRoom / updateRoomItem write through a field allowlist, and items
  may only be edited through their own room.
- Classnames reaching the filesystem are validated before use so a crafted
  value cannot escape the asset directories.
- The word filter now also covers offline mails, guild forum threads and
  replies, and user mottos.
- Media uploads are validated by magic bytes, /api/media requires the page
  edit permission, APP_URL must be configured once mail is enabled, and the
  diagnostics error route checks the fetch site header.

Admin tooling
- Secret settings render masked and cannot be overwritten with a blank or
  an arbitrary raw key; radio credentials are new password inputs.
- Commandocentrum balance changes are audited.
- Admin list pagination reads the caller's per-page instead of the max, and
  the log exporter caps offset and search length.

Performance
- Catalog translations are cached per module, with a cheap revision hash;
  the public online count uses a stale window instead of hammering the DB.
- The cache warmup now primes the payload the home route actually reads.
- TopHeader batches its queries into one round trip, and LCP avatars load
  eagerly.
- motion/react and sonner are no longer part of the root layout; the nav
  dropdown and mobile nav panels are lazy client chunks. Anonymous visitors
  again get the navigation chrome, and public pages get an edge cacheable
  response.

Accessibility
- Nested <main> elements in phase pages became <section>; the page entrance
  and route progress animations are pure CSS that respect reduced motion.
2026-10-09 16:19:48 +02:00

110 lines
3.9 KiB
TypeScript

import { NextResponse } from "next/server";
import { getToken } from "next-auth/jwt";
import { env } from "@/env";
import { buildContentSecurityPolicy, createCspNonce } from "@/lib/csp";
import { ddosReject, enforceDdosRateLimit } from "@/lib/ddos-guard";
import {
isCacheableAssetPath,
isEdgeCacheablePublicPath,
shouldRedirectAdminRequest,
} from "@/lib/proxy-access";
const SECURITY_HEADERS: Record<string, string> = {
"X-Content-Type-Options": "nosniff",
"X-Frame-Options": "DENY",
"X-XSS-Protection": "0",
"Referrer-Policy": "strict-origin-when-cross-origin",
"Permissions-Policy": "camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=()",
"Strict-Transport-Security": "max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains; preload",
};
export const proxy = async (req: import("next/server").NextRequest) => {
const decision = await enforceDdosRateLimit(req);
if (decision.outcome === "suspect") {
return ddosReject(403);
}
if (decision.outcome === "block") {
return ddosReject(429, decision.retryAfterSeconds);
}
const pathname = req.nextUrl.pathname;
// Only /admin needs a real session token for the redirect guard; skipping
// JWT decoding on every other request keeps the proxy cheap under load.
const adminPath = pathname === "/admin" || pathname.startsWith("/admin/");
const token = adminPath
? await getToken({
req,
secret: env.AUTH_SECRET,
secureCookie: true,
})
: null;
if (shouldRedirectAdminRequest(pathname, token)) {
// Carry the destination along so the sign-in form can send the visitor
// back to the page they asked for instead of dumping them on /me.
const login = new URL("/login", req.url);
login.searchParams.set("from", `${pathname}${req.nextUrl.search}`);
return NextResponse.redirect(login);
}
const nonce = createCspNonce();
const csp = buildContentSecurityPolicy(nonce);
const headers = new Headers(req.headers);
headers.set("x-pathname", pathname);
headers.set("x-nonce", nonce);
// Next derives its render nonce from the *request* `content-security-policy`
// header, not from `x-nonce`, so the policy has to travel on the request as
// well — otherwise every inline bootstrap/flight script Next emits ships
// without a nonce and is blocked by the very CSP we are building here.
headers.set("Content-Security-Policy", csp);
// A client may supply this legacy derived header; no consumer should trust it.
headers.delete("x-real-client-ip");
const response = NextResponse.next({ request: { headers } });
// HTML is never cached (browser/CDN/edge) so that after a deploy the page
// always references the current build's chunks. Static assets are
// content-hashed + immutable and can be cached aggressively; a stale HTML
// document would reference chunk URLs that no longer exist after a rebuild.
// Rendered avatars and uploaded media are immutable per key and already
// carry their own long-lived Cache-Control, so they keep it here.
if (isCacheableAssetPath(pathname)) {
// Keep the asset headers as-is.
} else if (
isEdgeCacheablePublicPath(pathname) &&
!req.cookies.get("authjs.session-token") &&
!req.cookies.get("__Secure-authjs.session-token") &&
!req.nextUrl.searchParams.has("from")
) {
// Anonymous, low-variance public pages get a short shared cache with
// stale-while-revalidate, so a burst of visitors triggers one render
// instead of one per visitor. Anything session-dependent still falls
// through to the private header below.
response.headers.set(
"Cache-Control",
"public, max-age=0, s-maxage=30, stale-while-revalidate=300",
);
} else {
response.headers.set(
"Cache-Control",
"private, no-cache, no-store, max-age=0, must-revalidate",
);
}
for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(SECURITY_HEADERS)) {
response.headers.set(key, value);
}
response.headers.set("Content-Security-Policy", csp);
return response;
};
export const config = {
matcher: [
"/((?!_next/static|_next/image|assets|favicon.ico|swf|nitro-assets|imaging|images).*)",
],
};