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Second review pass covering security, performance, admin tooling and the public/room flows. All HIGH and MEDIUM findings from the audit are resolved; nothing in this commit changes the visible feature set. Authentication & session security - CSP is now set on the request headers in the proxy, which is what Next.js uses to derive the render nonce, so the nonce is effective. - 2FA: an already-enabled user cannot re-enroll, the setup endpoint is rate-limited per account, and confirmed codes are persisted so the second secret no longer silently never applies. - Password reset revokes the ticket, authTicket and all personal access tokens, and bumps the token version so existing sessions die. The same revocation is now wired into the staff-side password reset. - /reset and /verify return a stable error code instead of raw text; the mail lookups are ordered by id so duplicates cannot vary between runs. - Resending the verification mail gets a per-address cooldown on top of the per-user limit. - Issue API tokens with the narrower radio/ticket ability set instead of "*". Authorization & input handling - Mid-rank staff can no longer keep dynamically granted non-view admin.* permissions: existing grants are revoked by migration and the grant lookup is restricted to "%.view". Rank guards use the dynamic super-admin check. - Alerting a user is permission-checked and audited like the other tools. - Material mutations (giveCredits/giveDuckets/giveDiamonds, the admin user actions route, bulk user actions) are capped and rank-guarded, and bulk ids are bounded. - updateRoom / updateRoomItem write through a field allowlist, and items may only be edited through their own room. - Classnames reaching the filesystem are validated before use so a crafted value cannot escape the asset directories. - The word filter now also covers offline mails, guild forum threads and replies, and user mottos. - Media uploads are validated by magic bytes, /api/media requires the page edit permission, APP_URL must be configured once mail is enabled, and the diagnostics error route checks the fetch site header. Admin tooling - Secret settings render masked and cannot be overwritten with a blank or an arbitrary raw key; radio credentials are new password inputs. - Commandocentrum balance changes are audited. - Admin list pagination reads the caller's per-page instead of the max, and the log exporter caps offset and search length. Performance - Catalog translations are cached per module, with a cheap revision hash; the public online count uses a stale window instead of hammering the DB. - The cache warmup now primes the payload the home route actually reads. - TopHeader batches its queries into one round trip, and LCP avatars load eagerly. - motion/react and sonner are no longer part of the root layout; the nav dropdown and mobile nav panels are lazy client chunks. Anonymous visitors again get the navigation chrome, and public pages get an edge cacheable response. Accessibility - Nested <main> elements in phase pages became <section>; the page entrance and route progress animations are pure CSS that respect reduced motion.
110 lines
3.9 KiB
TypeScript
110 lines
3.9 KiB
TypeScript
import { NextResponse } from "next/server";
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import { getToken } from "next-auth/jwt";
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import { env } from "@/env";
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import { buildContentSecurityPolicy, createCspNonce } from "@/lib/csp";
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import { ddosReject, enforceDdosRateLimit } from "@/lib/ddos-guard";
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import {
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isCacheableAssetPath,
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isEdgeCacheablePublicPath,
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shouldRedirectAdminRequest,
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} from "@/lib/proxy-access";
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const SECURITY_HEADERS: Record<string, string> = {
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"X-Content-Type-Options": "nosniff",
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"X-Frame-Options": "DENY",
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"X-XSS-Protection": "0",
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"Referrer-Policy": "strict-origin-when-cross-origin",
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"Permissions-Policy": "camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=()",
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"Strict-Transport-Security": "max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains; preload",
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};
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export const proxy = async (req: import("next/server").NextRequest) => {
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const decision = await enforceDdosRateLimit(req);
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if (decision.outcome === "suspect") {
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return ddosReject(403);
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}
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if (decision.outcome === "block") {
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return ddosReject(429, decision.retryAfterSeconds);
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}
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const pathname = req.nextUrl.pathname;
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// Only /admin needs a real session token for the redirect guard; skipping
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// JWT decoding on every other request keeps the proxy cheap under load.
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const adminPath = pathname === "/admin" || pathname.startsWith("/admin/");
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const token = adminPath
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? await getToken({
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req,
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secret: env.AUTH_SECRET,
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secureCookie: true,
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})
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: null;
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if (shouldRedirectAdminRequest(pathname, token)) {
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// Carry the destination along so the sign-in form can send the visitor
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// back to the page they asked for instead of dumping them on /me.
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const login = new URL("/login", req.url);
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login.searchParams.set("from", `${pathname}${req.nextUrl.search}`);
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return NextResponse.redirect(login);
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}
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const nonce = createCspNonce();
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const csp = buildContentSecurityPolicy(nonce);
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const headers = new Headers(req.headers);
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headers.set("x-pathname", pathname);
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headers.set("x-nonce", nonce);
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// Next derives its render nonce from the *request* `content-security-policy`
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// header, not from `x-nonce`, so the policy has to travel on the request as
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// well — otherwise every inline bootstrap/flight script Next emits ships
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// without a nonce and is blocked by the very CSP we are building here.
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headers.set("Content-Security-Policy", csp);
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// A client may supply this legacy derived header; no consumer should trust it.
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headers.delete("x-real-client-ip");
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const response = NextResponse.next({ request: { headers } });
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// HTML is never cached (browser/CDN/edge) so that after a deploy the page
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// always references the current build's chunks. Static assets are
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// content-hashed + immutable and can be cached aggressively; a stale HTML
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// document would reference chunk URLs that no longer exist after a rebuild.
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// Rendered avatars and uploaded media are immutable per key and already
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// carry their own long-lived Cache-Control, so they keep it here.
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if (isCacheableAssetPath(pathname)) {
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// Keep the asset headers as-is.
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} else if (
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isEdgeCacheablePublicPath(pathname) &&
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!req.cookies.get("authjs.session-token") &&
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!req.cookies.get("__Secure-authjs.session-token") &&
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!req.nextUrl.searchParams.has("from")
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) {
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// Anonymous, low-variance public pages get a short shared cache with
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// stale-while-revalidate, so a burst of visitors triggers one render
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// instead of one per visitor. Anything session-dependent still falls
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// through to the private header below.
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response.headers.set(
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"Cache-Control",
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"public, max-age=0, s-maxage=30, stale-while-revalidate=300",
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);
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} else {
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response.headers.set(
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"Cache-Control",
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"private, no-cache, no-store, max-age=0, must-revalidate",
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);
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}
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for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(SECURITY_HEADERS)) {
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response.headers.set(key, value);
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}
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response.headers.set("Content-Security-Policy", csp);
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return response;
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};
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export const config = {
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matcher: [
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"/((?!_next/static|_next/image|assets|favicon.ico|swf|nitro-assets|imaging|images).*)",
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],
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};
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