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EpicNext-Cms/src/lib/api-auth.ts
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openhands 6cc45d7413
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feat: harden atoms-nexst against review findings (37 items)
Second review pass covering security, performance, admin tooling and the
public/room flows. All HIGH and MEDIUM findings from the audit are resolved;
nothing in this commit changes the visible feature set.

Authentication & session security
- CSP is now set on the request headers in the proxy, which is what Next.js
  uses to derive the render nonce, so the nonce is effective.
- 2FA: an already-enabled user cannot re-enroll, the setup endpoint is
  rate-limited per account, and confirmed codes are persisted so the second
  secret no longer silently never applies.
- Password reset revokes the ticket, authTicket and all personal access
  tokens, and bumps the token version so existing sessions die. The same
  revocation is now wired into the staff-side password reset.
- /reset and /verify return a stable error code instead of raw text; the
  mail lookups are ordered by id so duplicates cannot vary between runs.
- Resending the verification mail gets a per-address cooldown on top of the
  per-user limit.
- Issue API tokens with the narrower radio/ticket ability set instead of "*".

Authorization & input handling
- Mid-rank staff can no longer keep dynamically granted non-view admin.*
  permissions: existing grants are revoked by migration and the grant lookup
  is restricted to "%.view". Rank guards use the dynamic super-admin check.
- Alerting a user is permission-checked and audited like the other tools.
- Material mutations (giveCredits/giveDuckets/giveDiamonds, the admin user
  actions route, bulk user actions) are capped and rank-guarded, and bulk
  ids are bounded.
- updateRoom / updateRoomItem write through a field allowlist, and items
  may only be edited through their own room.
- Classnames reaching the filesystem are validated before use so a crafted
  value cannot escape the asset directories.
- The word filter now also covers offline mails, guild forum threads and
  replies, and user mottos.
- Media uploads are validated by magic bytes, /api/media requires the page
  edit permission, APP_URL must be configured once mail is enabled, and the
  diagnostics error route checks the fetch site header.

Admin tooling
- Secret settings render masked and cannot be overwritten with a blank or
  an arbitrary raw key; radio credentials are new password inputs.
- Commandocentrum balance changes are audited.
- Admin list pagination reads the caller's per-page instead of the max, and
  the log exporter caps offset and search length.

Performance
- Catalog translations are cached per module, with a cheap revision hash;
  the public online count uses a stale window instead of hammering the DB.
- The cache warmup now primes the payload the home route actually reads.
- TopHeader batches its queries into one round trip, and LCP avatars load
  eagerly.
- motion/react and sonner are no longer part of the root layout; the nav
  dropdown and mobile nav panels are lazy client chunks. Anonymous visitors
  again get the navigation chrome, and public pages get an edge cacheable
  response.

Accessibility
- Nested <main> elements in phase pages became <section>; the page entrance
  and route progress animations are pure CSS that respect reduced motion.
2026-10-09 16:19:48 +02:00

112 lines
3.3 KiB
TypeScript

import { createHash, randomBytes } from "node:crypto";
import { and, eq, gt, isNull, or } from "drizzle-orm";
import {
type PersonalTokenAbility,
tokenAllowsAbilities,
} from "@/lib/auth/personal-token-abilities";
import {
personalTokenScope,
USER_TOKENABLE_TYPE,
} from "@/lib/auth/personal-token-scope";
import { databaseUserId } from "@/lib/auth/session-user";
import { db, PersonalAccessTokens } from "@/lib/db";
/**
* Bearer-token auth for the public REST API, backed by personal_access_tokens
* (the Laravel Sanctum table that already exists in the emulator DB). Tokens are
* stored as the sha256 of the plaintext; the client sends the plaintext (or the
* Sanctum "{id}|{plaintext}" form) as `Authorization: Bearer …`.
*/
function hashToken(raw: string): string {
return createHash("sha256").update(raw).digest("hex");
}
/** Resolve an authorized user token; callers without a declared scope require full access. */
export async function bearerUserId(
req: Request,
requiredAbilities: readonly PersonalTokenAbility[] = [],
): Promise<number | null> {
const header = req.headers.get("authorization") ?? "";
const m = header.match(/^Bearer\s+(.+)$/i);
if (!m) return null;
let raw = m[1].trim();
const pipe = raw.indexOf("|");
if (pipe >= 0) raw = raw.slice(pipe + 1); // Sanctum "{id}|{token}"
if (!raw) return null;
try {
const [row] = await db
.select({
id: PersonalAccessTokens.id,
tokenableId: PersonalAccessTokens.tokenableId,
tokenableType: PersonalAccessTokens.tokenableType,
abilities: PersonalAccessTokens.abilities,
})
.from(PersonalAccessTokens)
.where(
and(
eq(PersonalAccessTokens.token, hashToken(raw)),
eq(PersonalAccessTokens.tokenableType, USER_TOKENABLE_TYPE),
or(
isNull(PersonalAccessTokens.expiresAt),
gt(PersonalAccessTokens.expiresAt, new Date()),
),
),
)
.limit(1);
if (
!row ||
row.tokenableType !== USER_TOKENABLE_TYPE ||
!tokenAllowsAbilities(row.abilities, requiredAbilities)
)
return null;
const userId = databaseUserId(row.tokenableId);
if (userId === null) return null;
// Best-effort last-used stamp (don't fail the request if it errors).
void db
.update(PersonalAccessTokens)
.set({ lastUsedAt: new Date() })
.where(eq(PersonalAccessTokens.id, row.id))
.catch(() => {});
return userId;
} catch {
return null;
}
}
/**
* Mint a new token for a user. Returns the plaintext (shown once).
*
* New tokens get the narrow read/write set every client actually needs. The old
* `abilities: ["*"]` meant a leaked token could call *any* endpoint, including
* destructive ones; the wildcard is kept working for reading old rows so
* existing integrations do not break.
*/
const DEFAULT_TOKEN_ABILITIES: PersonalTokenAbility[] = [
"radio:read",
"radio:write",
"tickets:read",
"tickets:write",
];
export async function issueToken(
userId: number,
name = "api",
): Promise<string | null> {
const plaintext = randomBytes(32).toString("hex");
const now = new Date();
try {
await db.insert(PersonalAccessTokens).values({
...personalTokenScope(userId),
name: name.slice(0, 100),
token: hashToken(plaintext),
abilities: JSON.stringify(DEFAULT_TOKEN_ABILITIES),
createdAt: now,
updatedAt: now,
});
return plaintext;
} catch {
return null;
}
}