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Second review pass covering security, performance, admin tooling and the public/room flows. All HIGH and MEDIUM findings from the audit are resolved; nothing in this commit changes the visible feature set. Authentication & session security - CSP is now set on the request headers in the proxy, which is what Next.js uses to derive the render nonce, so the nonce is effective. - 2FA: an already-enabled user cannot re-enroll, the setup endpoint is rate-limited per account, and confirmed codes are persisted so the second secret no longer silently never applies. - Password reset revokes the ticket, authTicket and all personal access tokens, and bumps the token version so existing sessions die. The same revocation is now wired into the staff-side password reset. - /reset and /verify return a stable error code instead of raw text; the mail lookups are ordered by id so duplicates cannot vary between runs. - Resending the verification mail gets a per-address cooldown on top of the per-user limit. - Issue API tokens with the narrower radio/ticket ability set instead of "*". Authorization & input handling - Mid-rank staff can no longer keep dynamically granted non-view admin.* permissions: existing grants are revoked by migration and the grant lookup is restricted to "%.view". Rank guards use the dynamic super-admin check. - Alerting a user is permission-checked and audited like the other tools. - Material mutations (giveCredits/giveDuckets/giveDiamonds, the admin user actions route, bulk user actions) are capped and rank-guarded, and bulk ids are bounded. - updateRoom / updateRoomItem write through a field allowlist, and items may only be edited through their own room. - Classnames reaching the filesystem are validated before use so a crafted value cannot escape the asset directories. - The word filter now also covers offline mails, guild forum threads and replies, and user mottos. - Media uploads are validated by magic bytes, /api/media requires the page edit permission, APP_URL must be configured once mail is enabled, and the diagnostics error route checks the fetch site header. Admin tooling - Secret settings render masked and cannot be overwritten with a blank or an arbitrary raw key; radio credentials are new password inputs. - Commandocentrum balance changes are audited. - Admin list pagination reads the caller's per-page instead of the max, and the log exporter caps offset and search length. Performance - Catalog translations are cached per module, with a cheap revision hash; the public online count uses a stale window instead of hammering the DB. - The cache warmup now primes the payload the home route actually reads. - TopHeader batches its queries into one round trip, and LCP avatars load eagerly. - motion/react and sonner are no longer part of the root layout; the nav dropdown and mobile nav panels are lazy client chunks. Anonymous visitors again get the navigation chrome, and public pages get an edge cacheable response. Accessibility - Nested <main> elements in phase pages became <section>; the page entrance and route progress animations are pure CSS that respect reduced motion.
112 lines
3.3 KiB
TypeScript
112 lines
3.3 KiB
TypeScript
import { createHash, randomBytes } from "node:crypto";
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import { and, eq, gt, isNull, or } from "drizzle-orm";
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import {
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type PersonalTokenAbility,
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tokenAllowsAbilities,
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} from "@/lib/auth/personal-token-abilities";
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import {
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personalTokenScope,
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USER_TOKENABLE_TYPE,
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} from "@/lib/auth/personal-token-scope";
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import { databaseUserId } from "@/lib/auth/session-user";
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import { db, PersonalAccessTokens } from "@/lib/db";
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/**
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* Bearer-token auth for the public REST API, backed by personal_access_tokens
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* (the Laravel Sanctum table that already exists in the emulator DB). Tokens are
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* stored as the sha256 of the plaintext; the client sends the plaintext (or the
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* Sanctum "{id}|{plaintext}" form) as `Authorization: Bearer …`.
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*/
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function hashToken(raw: string): string {
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return createHash("sha256").update(raw).digest("hex");
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}
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/** Resolve an authorized user token; callers without a declared scope require full access. */
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export async function bearerUserId(
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req: Request,
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requiredAbilities: readonly PersonalTokenAbility[] = [],
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): Promise<number | null> {
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const header = req.headers.get("authorization") ?? "";
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const m = header.match(/^Bearer\s+(.+)$/i);
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if (!m) return null;
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let raw = m[1].trim();
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const pipe = raw.indexOf("|");
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if (pipe >= 0) raw = raw.slice(pipe + 1); // Sanctum "{id}|{token}"
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if (!raw) return null;
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try {
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const [row] = await db
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.select({
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id: PersonalAccessTokens.id,
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tokenableId: PersonalAccessTokens.tokenableId,
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tokenableType: PersonalAccessTokens.tokenableType,
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abilities: PersonalAccessTokens.abilities,
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})
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.from(PersonalAccessTokens)
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.where(
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and(
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eq(PersonalAccessTokens.token, hashToken(raw)),
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eq(PersonalAccessTokens.tokenableType, USER_TOKENABLE_TYPE),
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or(
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isNull(PersonalAccessTokens.expiresAt),
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gt(PersonalAccessTokens.expiresAt, new Date()),
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),
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),
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)
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.limit(1);
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if (
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!row ||
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row.tokenableType !== USER_TOKENABLE_TYPE ||
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!tokenAllowsAbilities(row.abilities, requiredAbilities)
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)
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return null;
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const userId = databaseUserId(row.tokenableId);
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if (userId === null) return null;
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// Best-effort last-used stamp (don't fail the request if it errors).
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void db
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.update(PersonalAccessTokens)
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.set({ lastUsedAt: new Date() })
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.where(eq(PersonalAccessTokens.id, row.id))
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.catch(() => {});
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return userId;
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} catch {
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return null;
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}
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}
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/**
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* Mint a new token for a user. Returns the plaintext (shown once).
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*
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* New tokens get the narrow read/write set every client actually needs. The old
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* `abilities: ["*"]` meant a leaked token could call *any* endpoint, including
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* destructive ones; the wildcard is kept working for reading old rows so
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* existing integrations do not break.
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*/
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const DEFAULT_TOKEN_ABILITIES: PersonalTokenAbility[] = [
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"radio:read",
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"radio:write",
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"tickets:read",
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"tickets:write",
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];
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export async function issueToken(
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userId: number,
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name = "api",
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): Promise<string | null> {
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const plaintext = randomBytes(32).toString("hex");
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const now = new Date();
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try {
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await db.insert(PersonalAccessTokens).values({
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...personalTokenScope(userId),
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name: name.slice(0, 100),
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token: hashToken(plaintext),
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abilities: JSON.stringify(DEFAULT_TOKEN_ABILITIES),
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createdAt: now,
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updatedAt: now,
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});
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return plaintext;
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} catch {
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return null;
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}
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}
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