openhands
6cc45d7413
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Second review pass covering security, performance, admin tooling and the public/room flows. All HIGH and MEDIUM findings from the audit are resolved; nothing in this commit changes the visible feature set. Authentication & session security - CSP is now set on the request headers in the proxy, which is what Next.js uses to derive the render nonce, so the nonce is effective. - 2FA: an already-enabled user cannot re-enroll, the setup endpoint is rate-limited per account, and confirmed codes are persisted so the second secret no longer silently never applies. - Password reset revokes the ticket, authTicket and all personal access tokens, and bumps the token version so existing sessions die. The same revocation is now wired into the staff-side password reset. - /reset and /verify return a stable error code instead of raw text; the mail lookups are ordered by id so duplicates cannot vary between runs. - Resending the verification mail gets a per-address cooldown on top of the per-user limit. - Issue API tokens with the narrower radio/ticket ability set instead of "*". Authorization & input handling - Mid-rank staff can no longer keep dynamically granted non-view admin.* permissions: existing grants are revoked by migration and the grant lookup is restricted to "%.view". Rank guards use the dynamic super-admin check. - Alerting a user is permission-checked and audited like the other tools. - Material mutations (giveCredits/giveDuckets/giveDiamonds, the admin user actions route, bulk user actions) are capped and rank-guarded, and bulk ids are bounded. - updateRoom / updateRoomItem write through a field allowlist, and items may only be edited through their own room. - Classnames reaching the filesystem are validated before use so a crafted value cannot escape the asset directories. - The word filter now also covers offline mails, guild forum threads and replies, and user mottos. - Media uploads are validated by magic bytes, /api/media requires the page edit permission, APP_URL must be configured once mail is enabled, and the diagnostics error route checks the fetch site header. Admin tooling - Secret settings render masked and cannot be overwritten with a blank or an arbitrary raw key; radio credentials are new password inputs. - Commandocentrum balance changes are audited. - Admin list pagination reads the caller's per-page instead of the max, and the log exporter caps offset and search length. Performance - Catalog translations are cached per module, with a cheap revision hash; the public online count uses a stale window instead of hammering the DB. - The cache warmup now primes the payload the home route actually reads. - TopHeader batches its queries into one round trip, and LCP avatars load eagerly. - motion/react and sonner are no longer part of the root layout; the nav dropdown and mobile nav panels are lazy client chunks. Anonymous visitors again get the navigation chrome, and public pages get an edge cacheable response. Accessibility - Nested <main> elements in phase pages became <section>; the page entrance and route progress animations are pure CSS that respect reduced motion.
51 lines
1.6 KiB
TypeScript
51 lines
1.6 KiB
TypeScript
import { and, eq, sql } from "drizzle-orm";
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import { invalidateJwtVersionCache } from "@/lib/auth/jwt-version-cache";
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import { personalTokenScope } from "@/lib/auth/personal-token-scope";
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import { db, PersonalAccessTokens, User } from "@/lib/db";
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import { logger } from "@/lib/logger";
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/**
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* Kill every live credential for a user: CMS JWTs (by bumping
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* `website_jwt_version`, which the `jwt` callback re-checks), the game SSO
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* ticket, and the API bearer tokens.
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*
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* Needed by sign-out-everywhere *and* by every password change: without it,
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* resetting a compromised password leaves the attacker's stolen session
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* cookie and API token working until they expire on their own.
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*/
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export async function revokeUserCredentials(userId: number): Promise<void> {
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try {
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await db
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.update(User)
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.set({
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websiteJwtVersion: sql`${User.websiteJwtVersion} + 1`,
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authTicket: "",
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})
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.where(eq(User.id, userId));
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await invalidateJwtVersionCache(userId);
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} catch (err) {
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logger.warn("Failed to revoke CMS session", {
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userId,
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error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : "Unknown",
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});
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}
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// Revoke API bearer tokens (Sanctum / personal_access_tokens).
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try {
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const scope = personalTokenScope(userId);
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await db
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.delete(PersonalAccessTokens)
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.where(
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and(
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eq(PersonalAccessTokens.tokenableId, scope.tokenableId),
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eq(PersonalAccessTokens.tokenableType, scope.tokenableType),
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),
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);
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} catch (err) {
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logger.warn("Failed to revoke personal access tokens", {
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userId,
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error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : "Unknown",
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});
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}
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}
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