openhands
6cc45d7413
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Second review pass covering security, performance, admin tooling and the public/room flows. All HIGH and MEDIUM findings from the audit are resolved; nothing in this commit changes the visible feature set. Authentication & session security - CSP is now set on the request headers in the proxy, which is what Next.js uses to derive the render nonce, so the nonce is effective. - 2FA: an already-enabled user cannot re-enroll, the setup endpoint is rate-limited per account, and confirmed codes are persisted so the second secret no longer silently never applies. - Password reset revokes the ticket, authTicket and all personal access tokens, and bumps the token version so existing sessions die. The same revocation is now wired into the staff-side password reset. - /reset and /verify return a stable error code instead of raw text; the mail lookups are ordered by id so duplicates cannot vary between runs. - Resending the verification mail gets a per-address cooldown on top of the per-user limit. - Issue API tokens with the narrower radio/ticket ability set instead of "*". Authorization & input handling - Mid-rank staff can no longer keep dynamically granted non-view admin.* permissions: existing grants are revoked by migration and the grant lookup is restricted to "%.view". Rank guards use the dynamic super-admin check. - Alerting a user is permission-checked and audited like the other tools. - Material mutations (giveCredits/giveDuckets/giveDiamonds, the admin user actions route, bulk user actions) are capped and rank-guarded, and bulk ids are bounded. - updateRoom / updateRoomItem write through a field allowlist, and items may only be edited through their own room. - Classnames reaching the filesystem are validated before use so a crafted value cannot escape the asset directories. - The word filter now also covers offline mails, guild forum threads and replies, and user mottos. - Media uploads are validated by magic bytes, /api/media requires the page edit permission, APP_URL must be configured once mail is enabled, and the diagnostics error route checks the fetch site header. Admin tooling - Secret settings render masked and cannot be overwritten with a blank or an arbitrary raw key; radio credentials are new password inputs. - Commandocentrum balance changes are audited. - Admin list pagination reads the caller's per-page instead of the max, and the log exporter caps offset and search length. Performance - Catalog translations are cached per module, with a cheap revision hash; the public online count uses a stale window instead of hammering the DB. - The cache warmup now primes the payload the home route actually reads. - TopHeader batches its queries into one round trip, and LCP avatars load eagerly. - motion/react and sonner are no longer part of the root layout; the nav dropdown and mobile nav panels are lazy client chunks. Anonymous visitors again get the navigation chrome, and public pages get an edge cacheable response. Accessibility - Nested <main> elements in phase pages became <section>; the page entrance and route progress animations are pure CSS that respect reduced motion.
80 lines
2.7 KiB
TypeScript
80 lines
2.7 KiB
TypeScript
"use server";
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import { mkdir, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
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import path from "node:path";
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import { revalidatePath } from "next/cache";
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import { requirePermission } from "@/lib/admin/guard";
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import { validateSiteImageUpload } from "@/lib/images/site-image-upload";
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import { MEDIA_ROOT, resolveMediaPath } from "@/lib/media-storage";
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import { PERMS } from "@/lib/permissions";
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/**
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* Store an uploaded media file under MEDIA_ROOT.
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*
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* The extension always comes from the *detected* format (magic bytes + a full
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* sharp decode), never from `file.name` or the browser-supplied MIME type:
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* trusting either lets arbitrary bytes land on disk with an attacker-chosen name
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* that the media route would then serve.
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*/
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async function storeUploadedMedia(
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file: File,
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): Promise<{ ok: true; name: string } | { ok: false; error: string }> {
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const validated = await validateSiteImageUpload(file);
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if (!validated.success) return { ok: false, error: validated.error };
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const baseDir = MEDIA_ROOT;
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await mkdir(baseDir, { recursive: true });
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const name = `${Date.now()}-${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 8)}.${validated.extension}`;
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const filePath = resolveMediaPath(name);
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if (!filePath.startsWith(baseDir + path.sep))
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return { ok: false, error: "Invalid path" };
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await writeFile(filePath, validated.bytes);
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return { ok: true, name };
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}
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export async function uploadMedia(
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formData: FormData,
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): Promise<{ ok: boolean; error?: string }> {
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await requirePermission(PERMS.PAGES_EDIT);
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const file = formData.get("file") as File | null;
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if (!file || file.size === 0) return { ok: false, error: "No file provided" };
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const stored = await storeUploadedMedia(file);
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if (!stored.ok) return { ok: false, error: stored.error };
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revalidatePath("/api/media");
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revalidatePath("/admin/media");
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return { ok: true };
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}
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export async function deleteMedia(name: string): Promise<void> {
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await requirePermission(PERMS.PAGES_EDIT);
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const { unlink } = await import("node:fs/promises");
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const baseDir = MEDIA_ROOT;
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// A name that is not a bare file name never reaches the unlink.
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if (name.includes("/") || name.includes("\\") || name.includes("..")) return;
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const filePath = resolveMediaPath(name);
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if (!filePath.startsWith(baseDir + path.sep)) return;
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try {
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await unlink(filePath);
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} catch {
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// File may not exist
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}
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revalidatePath("/api/media");
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revalidatePath("/admin/media");
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}
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export async function uploadMediaAndReturn(
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formData: FormData,
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): Promise<string> {
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await requirePermission(PERMS.PAGES_EDIT);
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const file = formData.get("file") as File | null;
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if (!file || file.size === 0) return "";
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const stored = await storeUploadedMedia(file);
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if (!stored.ok) return "";
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revalidatePath("/api/media");
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revalidatePath("/admin/media");
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return `/api/media/${stored.name}`;
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}
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