feat(security): drop scanner probes and hostile paths early in proxy

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openhands committed 2026-10-22 22:02:20 +02:00
1 parent a878d831aa
commit fb724a35cc
2 files changed
+29 -6

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@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ import { NextResponse } from "next/server";
import { getToken } from "next-auth/jwt";
import { env } from "@/env";
import { buildContentSecurityPolicy, createCspNonce } from "@/lib/csp";
import { isSuspiciousPath } from "@/lib/ddos";
import { ddosReject, enforceDdosRateLimit } from "@/lib/ddos-guard";
import {
isCacheableAssetPath,
@@ -19,6 +20,13 @@ const SECURITY_HEADERS: Record<string, string> = {
};
export const proxy = async (req: import("next/server").NextRequest) => {
const pathname = req.nextUrl.pathname;
// Drop scanner probes immediately before performing any rate-limit or DB operations.
if (isSuspiciousPath(pathname)) {
return ddosReject(403);
}
// Server actions carry an opaque action id in this header. A malformed or
// trivially short id (e.g. "x" sent by bots) can never resolve to a real
// action; rejecting it here avoids the expensive lookup/render path.
@@ -28,15 +36,10 @@ export const proxy = async (req: import("next/server").NextRequest) => {
}
const decision = await enforceDdosRateLimit(req);
if (decision.outcome === "suspect") {
return ddosReject(403);
}
if (decision.outcome === "block") {
return ddosReject(429, decision.retryAfterSeconds);
}
const pathname = req.nextUrl.pathname;
// Only /admin needs a real session token for the redirect guard; skipping
// JWT decoding on every other request keeps the proxy cheap under load.
const adminPath = pathname === "/admin" || pathname.startsWith("/admin/");